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Abstract 
 Is political fragmentation within the metropolitan area and within central city 
government a cause of central city decline or just the benign evolution of governance? 
Advocates of regional governance consider political fragmentation, the number and types 
of governments in a metropolitan area, a causal factor in decline. However a multiplicity 
of governments offer individual households greater choice and variety, in other words 
fragmentation represents the will of the people. All metropolitan areas are fragmented to 
some degree and whether or not this is harmful to cities and their regions is the empirical 
question considered.  Political explanations on the impact of fragmentation break out into 
two overarching groups. One school of thought argues that regions struggle and 
experience slow growth or decline because the problems of the central city act as an 
anchor pulling the region down, while the other school believes cities struggle due to 
competition from other governments in their metropolitan area for residents and 
economic investment. This dissertation seeks to test the long term effects of political 
fragmentation across metropolitan areas on region-wide segregation, population and own-
source revenue in 100 central cities from 1950 through 2000.  
 Political fragmentation is broken down into horizontal and vertical fragmentation, 
which considers the impact of geographically coterminous governments and 
jurisdictional overlap, and also includes internal fragmentation, which is the division of 
governing authority among elected officials. The results of the analyses show that 
horizontal fragmentation increases segregation across metropolitan areas and reduces the 
city's share of regional population. Both vertical and horizontal fragmentation are shown 
to increase the own-source revenue of central cities, and evidence is presented that shows 
 iv 
internal fragmentation also increases own-source revenue. Essentially city residents pay 
more in taxes living in cities with more elected officials, and are surrounded by higher 
numbers of government and jurisdictional overlap. Fragmentation at the metropolitan 
level is complex but it is clear that high levels can pose problems to both the city and its 
region. The implications of these results are thoughtfully analyzed and recommendations 
are made for future research. 
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Chapter 1 
An Introduction to the Puzzle 
 In 1876 our nation was both on the cusp of the Industrial Era and participating in 
one of most dubious presidential races in our history. St. Louisans, however, were paying 
more attention to issues on the home front. In what can only be described as an ironic 
distortion of our nation’s history, the city described then and now as the gateway to the 
Western territories had slowly begun to turn away from its own western – and other – 
counties. In a colossal failure of imagination later referred to as “The Great Divorce,” St. 
Louis City seceded from the perceived burdens of St. Louis County and established itself 
as a home-rule city. The parting of ways, like many relationships that sour, was fueled by 
differences over money. St. Louis City was more prosperous than the county and outward 
rural growth was a concern to city voters who were weary of diverting tax money for 
roads and the maintenance of other services to their hinterlands (Jones 2000). When city 
voters approved a legal separation they most likely did not foresee the dramatic changes 
that have had a negative and lifetime effect on St. Louis City. For example, by 1950 St. 
Louis County would hold more wealth, population, and would be a competitive force for 
economic development with which St. Louis City would be forced to forever contend. 
The Great Divorce locked up the City’s boundaries, restricting St. Louis’ ability to mold 
the growth of its region meaning today St Louis City is surrounded by a sea of 
governments, making it an iconic picture of political fragmentation. Over time almost 
every aspect of population growth, economic development, and political influence has 
shifted away from St Louis City as the main hub of activity and towards a far-flung 
territory that spans hundreds of miles and is made up of hundreds of governing units.  
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The impact of the Great Divorce was immediate and city planners reacted swiftly 
beginning in 1926 when the first measure was put before city and county voters to reunite 
city and county.  The measure failed then and each subsequent time (four more attempts, 
the last of which was in 1987) voters rejected the initiative.  Reconciliation was not to be. 
These unsuccessful attempts to reduce jurisdictional separation reflect a controversial 
belief that fragmentation, at least between St. Louis City and St. Louis County, is harmful 
to the better interests of both the city and the region. Within the region there is a general 
sense of animosity and mistrust that frames most discourse, covering such diverse topics 
as the uneven burden of caring for the homeless to managing air quality to traffic 
congestion.  
 The story of mistrust between cities and their surrounding regions (and their 
ultimate separation) is a universal one even though the characters in the St. Louis story 
and the ultimate divorce are unique. Over the last sixty years the predominant areas of 
growth in population, land area, development and in the number and types of government 
have been outside the central city. As a result, central cities tend to be plagued by 
depopulation, racial tension, economic disinvestment, concentrated poverty and criminal 
activity. Within each metropolitan region, jurisdictional boundaries can mean the 
difference between an idyllic community and one plagued by blight and concentrated 
poverty.  
When a city suffers population loss, economic disinvestment, rising crime and 
failing schools, the surrounding region is affected in a harmful way. The phrase “as the 
city goes, so goes the region” reflects this mindset (Peirce 1993). Several studies draw 
Introduction 
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connections between the health of the metropolitan region and the condition of the central 
city, but generally focus on how central city conditions impact the greater region.
1
  
So does political fragmentation affect the growth (or decline) of the central city 
and, if so, what is the effect? There is a consensus among urban scholars (Lowi 1979, 
Jacobs 1961) that the fragmentation of governments, at the metropolitan level, is a causal 
factor in the depopulation, racial separation and economic disinvestment that has plagued 
central cities for over fifty years. As metropolitan areas face crises that traverse 
jurisdictional boundaries, political fragmentation is accused of impeding the necessary 
steps to problem solution, such as coalition building and resource pooling. The St. Louis 
case illuminates the tension between city and suburb, which plays out between those who 
view political fragmentation in metropolitan areas as watering down political power so 
thinly that problem solution is ineffective and those who maintain that fragmentation is a 
bastion of democracy.     
 Fragmentation of government is purposefully embedded within the U.S. 
Constitution and Americans have been bequeathed a healthy distrust of centralized 
political power. In the American system of government the crafting, enforcement and 
legality of public law and policy is carried out in different governing bodies across a 
tiered governing structure by hundreds of public servants. Today’s political discourse 
regarding government’s size and scope at the metropolitan level reflects some of the 
constitutional balancing act the Framers so expertly created: strong but not too strong, 
capable of changing but not too quickly or easily swayed, attentive to our citizenry yet 
not unduly influenced by often-fickle public opinion. These are natural tensions between 
state and national government yet they exist within the microcosm of the metropolitan 
Cities Awash in a Sea of Governments 
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area.
2
 The fundamental right to self-government and the relative distrust of concentrated 
political power is played out within all metro areas, which is evident in the pervasiveness 
of political fragmentation seen today.  
There are three key components of political fragmentation in metropolitan areas 
in our current climate, the first being the proliferation of governments across American 
society and geography (Weiher 1991, 4), which in general refers to the expanse of 
general-purpose governments (municipalities), school districts, and single-purpose 
special districts (libraries, water, fire, and the like) across metropolitan areas. The second 
is the layering of governments within a defined geography. Within a region there can be 
municipalities nested within school districts and special districts as well as counties - and 
in some cases regional governments. The third component is the political fragmentation 
within governing entities as evidenced by the number of elected officials which oversee 
the functioning of government. This division of government, in terms of elected officials, 
the layering of governments, and the multiplicity of governments, is at the heart of the 
American ideal that the function of government should be a response to the needs and 
desires of its citizens.  
The decentralization of power within metropolitan areas reflects the principle that 
political power should be distributed closest to the people, traditionally the municipality 
(Hills 2005), which allows citizens to check the powers of their government. Within 
urban areas, there is a quilt-like effect of governments that range in size, function, 
capacity and political importance, but this web-like pattern of governments is not 
necessarily welcomed by all as a triumph of the American system, and political 
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fragmentation has often been criticized as chaotic and inefficient (Benjamin & Nathan 
2001; Orfield 2002; Carruthers 2002).  
Political fragmentation at the metropolitan level can adversely affect the central 
city, a phenomenon coined “suburban exploitation,” which is the idea that residents 
outside of the city limits regularly use the city’s costly and elaborate service system yet 
carry none of the financial burden for maintaining it (Bradford and Oates 1974; Hawley 
1951; Kasarda 1972; Slovak 1985). Suburban residents place "demands" for services 
such as work space, cultural and sporting entertainment, and retail shopping but because 
they live outside the city limits they avoid paying any incurrent costs of building or 
maintaining such services. 
Bradford and Oates (1974) postulate that political fragmentation has allowed, 
especially, upper-income households to create homogenous communities which 
effectively prevent tax redistribution to poorer households and leave the city footing the 
bill to provide services to those both most in need and least able to pay. They examine 
fiscal spending on education by the jurisdictions in three Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (SMSA), in New Jersey: Jersey City, Newark, and Paterson-Clifton-
Passaic, which include five central cities and fifty-three surrounding municipalities and 
conclude that more important than the amount spent per pupil is the governing structures 
within the metropolitan area (1974, 84). While their quantitative analysis only marginally 
supports their “exploitation hypothesis,” Bradford and Oates’ suggestion that a unified 
governing structure (i.e., reduction of fragmentation) will create a more equitable 
redistribution of income rings true with scholars who argue that political fragmentation 
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causes inequalities spanning race and income (see Morgan and Mareschal 1999; Gordon 
2008; or Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2004). 
 Here are two general views of metropolitan political structure and they embody 
the same constitutional tensions over government’s power and size with which the 
Founding Fathers grappled. On the one hand, a plethora of local governments maintain 
decentralization of political power and keep access to government as physically close to 
the people as possible. On the other hand, large region-wide governments can streamline 
the governing process, offer economies of scale for public services, and develop uniform 
policy for collective problems like air pollution and growth. How this tension has played 
out over the past century reveals a hodgepodge solution of cooperation and competition 
among counties; towns; townships; school districts; and regional, general-purpose, 
municipal and single-purpose governments.   
Average citizens remain unaware of the political synergy occurring around them 
when governance is functioning well, at each level: among other things their trash is 
picked up on time, streets are cleaned or plowed if it snows; house fires are responded to 
promptly; schools are well funded; sewers and drainage are maintained; even mosquitoes 
are kept at bay with regular neighborhood sprayings. Let a problem come up, however, 
and an individual’s experience with local government becomes confusing and fraught 
with frustration. What happens when a neighbor refuses to mow her grass and calls to 
local officials go unheeded, the trash service is spotty or an emergency call leads to a 
slow or worse no response? What if attempts at redress or change are both time-
consuming and there is no guarantee of a positive outcome? Eighty percent of the 
population of the United States currently lives in metropolitan areas. The structure of 
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governments and governance within these areas therefore plays an important role in 
determining the quality of life for most of America.  
Fragmentation 
In the broadest sense, political fragmentation is the division of political power. 
Historically, fragmentation was seen as a hallmark of the American Constitution and a 
necessary safeguard against political corruption. To keep political power from coalescing 
around one figure or governing unit, power is split in several dimensions. Government is 
tiered with each level (federal, state, county, municipality) nesting within each other in 
descending areas of geography and jurisdictional control. Political power is also divided 
within each level, and each governing body is run by public officials, most of whom are 
elected.  
This intentionally redundant, nuanced structuring of government, combined with 
its general abundance, makes for a research field that approaches fragmentation in many 
different ways. This is reflected in the literature where the range of studies have focused 
on one type of government (see, for example, Berry’s (2008) or Foster’s (1997) work on 
special districts) to more general approaches that also include financial and population 
components (for example Lewis’s (1996) political fragmentation index). There is no 
universal or consistent approach to measuring and modeling political fragmentation. A 
key component of this work is the careful accounting of fragmentation over time - 
therefore it is of use to discuss, briefly, the three general types that will be modeled in 
this study: horizontal, vertical, and internal political fragmentation.  
Horizontal Fragmentation 
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Metropolitan areas are host to many types of governments and governing 
arrangements including counties, school districts and other special districts, 
municipalities and townships. Perhaps the most common definition of political 
fragmentation is simply the number of local governments within a metropolitan area. 
Horizontal fragmentation captures the multiplicity of governments and generally focuses 
on one type of local government. Common measures of horizontal fragmentation include 
the number of municipalities per capita, the number of local governments per square 
mile, and the percentage of central city population in a region (Hendrick et. Al 2011). 
Metropolitan areas with higher concentrations of municipalities or governments per 
capita are considered more fragmented, whereas areas that have a higher portion of their 
population residing in the central city represent areas that are less fragmented and more 
centralized.  
Within metropolitan areas, higher levels of horizontal fragmentation are believed 
to lead to greater competition between local governments (Tiebout 1956), increase 
pressure on elected officials by local citizens to efficiently provide public services 
(Oakerson and Parks 1989), and diminish the likelihood that governments will collude in 
order to impose higher tax rates. Contrarily horizontal fragmentation is also thought to be 
less efficient and more costly at service delivery because a multiplicity of small 
governments are unable to take advantage of economies of scale (Woods 1961), and 
because there is duplication of services (Foster 1997). Metropolitan areas with higher 
levels of horizontal fragmentation increase the difficulty in coordination between 
governments and the central city. Municipal governments in particular feel pressure to 
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protect their political turf and the interests of their population base. There tends to be 
animosity, therefore, as each municipality views all others as competitors. 
Vertical Fragmentation 
Vertical fragmentation is defined by Boyne (1992) and Hendrick, Jimenez, and 
Lal (2011) as a number of overlapping governments. Governing units such as counties, 
municipalities, and special districts do not always fit neatly within the boundary lines of 
larger geographies and the number of jurisdictions that overlap or intersect create vertical 
fragmentation. Within the metropolitan area vertical fragmentation is perhaps most 
evident in special districts. Berry's (2009) work on special districts demonstrates that 
vertically fragmented metropolitan areas have more complex revenue structures. This is 
because the layering of local governments creates a common fiscal pool that each 
government must draw from to meet its own expenditures. As the number of 
governments that are drawing from the common fiscal pool increase, the overall tax 
burden for residents also increases.   
Vertical fragmentation can be measured by the ratio of special purpose 
governments to general purpose governments or by the percentage of special purpose 
governments of total local governments. Higher levels of vertical fragmentation are 
associated with higher government expenditures, particularly in metropolitan areas with 
more special districts (Hendrick et al 2011). The effect of vertical fragmentation on 
central cities can affect their ability to compete for residents because suburban areas, 
where there are more services provided by special districts, can be perceived as more 
attractive. The effects of vertical fragmentation may be experienced by cities in their 
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ability to draw from the common fiscal pool to provide quality services to their residents 
as well. 
Internal Fragmentation 
Each governing unit is overseen by a governing body and, with some exceptions, 
these are publically elected officials. The division of political power within a jurisdiction 
among elected officials is internal political fragmentation. Each publically elected 
government official represents a finite amount of political power and influence over 
government operations. Nelson and Foster (2000) point out that cities with higher 
numbers of elected officials represent governments that are more responsive to public 
needs, whereas cities with few elected officials are subject to higher scrutiny and 
accountability. Cities with greater numbers of elected officials usually represent larger 
government structure, which to the typical resident can be a turn off because of the 
complexity. Internal fragmentation within the central city is measured by the number of 
elected officials per capita and higher concentrations of such will have a negative effect. 
Cities may lose residents to suburban communities which tend to have fewer elected 
officials because they appear to be a simpler beast to wrangle.  
Internal fragmentation may also have an adverse effect in that cities have a harder 
time responding quickly and nimbly to policy problems when compared to other 
municipalities with different governing structures. Looking at the number of government 
employees per capita is another measure of internal fragmentation that can indicate the 
relative size of city government. A city-manager style government may have an easier 
time navigating policy problems than mayor-council simply because there are fewer 
elected officials involved in the decision-making process. 
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The horizontal, vertical, and internal fragmentation of government within 
metropolitan areas reflects the principle that political power should not only be 
fragmented but distributed closest to the people, traditionally at the municipal level (Hills 
2005). The movement of people across the United States from an agrarian society to a 
nation of cities over the last sixty years has been noteworthy with most households now 
rooted in suburban communities outside city limits. As the population has changed so too 
have the number government bodies that serve them. As the government arrangements in 
metropolitan areas have increased in complexity, the usefulness of decentralized political 
power because of political fragmentation has come under increased scrutiny. An excess 
of local governments maintain decentralization of political power and access to 
government physically close to the people. On the contrary, large, region-wide 
governments can streamline the governing process, offer economies of scale for public 
services, and develop uniform policy for collective issues like air pollution and managed 
growth.  
This pattern is illustrated well in the St. Louis case. Consider the hierarchy of 
government and number of elected officials that serve the typical resident of the city. St. 
Louis is governed by the elected, city-wide offices of mayor, comptroller, and the 
president of the board of aldermen; there is also district representation through the 
twenty-eight member Board of Aldermen. The Great Divorce made the city its own 
county and so voters elect city-wide the offices of circuit attorney, circuit clerk, collector 
of revenue, license collector, recorder of deeds, sheriff, city treasurer and public 
administrator. The city has one school district, which is overseen by a superintendent 
along with a school board.
3
 The city provides water, fire and ambulance services, but 
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until 2012 the state of Missouri controlled the police force, a holdover from the Civil 
War. Each public official has a distinct slice of political power and authority. The citizens 
of St. Louis have had little to fear from the threat of large scale political corruption but 
the system is prone to a feudal mentality where turf battles and status can prevent true 
policy innovation from occurring. The complex governing arrangement within the city is 
matched by a complex and vibrant array of fragmentation across the metropolitan area.  
Within the St. Louis region there is a patchwork-like pattern of governments that 
range in size, function, capacity, and political importance. Figure 1.1 illustrates the steady 
growth of governments across the St Louis metropolitan region from 1950 to 2000. As of 
the 2002 Census of Government, surrounding the city and comprising the greater St. 
Louis region are 16 counties, 286 municipalities, 144 school districts, and 423 special 
districts, each with a finite geography and realm of political power. The feudal protection 
of political turf and power within the city makes cooperation and collaboration with 
governments within the region incredibly complex if not downright discouraging. What 
remains unclear is whether the City of St. Louis would fare any better if there were fewer 
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Figure 1.1: Number of Governments in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area, 1950 – 
2000. This figure shows the growth of governments across the St. Louis metropolitan 
area. Noteworthy is the explosion of special district governments and the consistent 
uptick in the number of municipalities. With the exception of school districts, which 
experienced some consolidation during the time period, the number of governments has 
grown steadily. Source: U.S. Census of Governments. 
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Fragmentation and Central City Decline 
 Many of the underlying problems facing urban areas such as housing, 
transportation, pollution, education and access to open spaces were determined to be due 
to political as well as fiscal fragmentation as determined by the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relationship (1976). Dreier, Mollenopf, and Swanstrom (2004) as 
well as Morgan and Mareschal (1999) describe the metropolitan maze of governments as 
a key determinant of economic and racial isolation within metropolitan areas. However, 
there is a contingent of urban scholars and political economists who view political 
fragmentation within metropolitan areas, what the ACIR term an “urban jungle” (ACIR 
1976, 145) as a reflection of the fundamental right to self-govern and for individuals to 
work out problems themselves (McGinnis 1999, 3; Jones 2000).  Resistance to regional 
governance is fierce in most metropolitan areas and city leaders, academics, and policy 
makers have turned their attention to building stronger regional governance rather than 
regional government. Within metropolitan areas there are great disparities in the quality 
of public services ranging from police to education, and if these differences are driven by 
political boundaries (Weiher 1991) then fragmentation warrants further investigation. 
Despite much scholarship, the relationship between urban decline over the past century 
and political fragmentation remains unclear. Tension between metropolitan government 
structure and urban decline leads us to the question of what role, if any, political 
fragmentation plays in the varying outcomes of central cities.   
The Research Question 
Conceptually, fragmentation represents a continuum of political power.  At one 
end there is no fragmentation of political power; all decision-making is done by one 
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central authority and at the other end, political power is highly decentralized within and 
across several levels of government. Americans have a fundamental distrust of 
concentrated power and value the separation of political power, which is why 
fragmentation occurs horizontally, vertically, and internally. Does the existence of 
fragmentation within levels of government as well as across governments contribute to 
the decline of a metropolitan area’s central city? An assumption of the research question 
is that fragmentation is a causal factor of decline. Decentralization of political power at 
the metropolitan level may or may not have a direct impact on the decline of central cities 
over the last sixty years, but I believe that higher levels of political fragmentation within 
a central city and across a metropolitan area will lead to greater central city decline over 
time. 
Consider the individual – household, corporation, small business - facing the 
decision of where to locate within a metropolitan area. The degree of political 
fragmentation within the central city plays a role in that decision-making process, albeit a 
subtle one. Central cities, particularly older ones, can have complex governing 
arrangements compared with their surrounding municipalities, which may offer a more 
streamlined system of government. A city, where power is separated between several 
elected officials and administrative offices, presents a potentially confusing and 
intimidating bureaucratic maze, whereas a suburban government overseen by one 
governing body or even no formal governing arrangement, in the case of unincorporated 
areas, can make the locating process more clear cut. The attractiveness of the central city 
to one suburb over another can also be driven by the number and type of places.  
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For example, a metropolitan area such as Portland, Oregon offers a limited 
number of jurisdictional choices; only 58 municipalities in 2000 which compared to a 
metropolitan area like St. Louis, home to 287 municipalities, (the third highest behind 
Chicago and New York) offers an overabundance of choice. All other factors being 
equal, the City of Portland may have retained more residents over time because the 
choices available to residents seeking a higher quality living arrangement are limited. The 
abundance of choices available to St. Louisans may only increase the likelihood that 
some place other than the central city will appear more attractive.  
Hirschman’s theory concerning responses to decline is useful for understanding 
the relationship of a central city to its surrounding metropolitan region. Hirschman argues 
that when a consumer good deteriorates in quality, those consumers who value quality 
over cost will purchase a higher quality product even if it is more expensive (1970, 49). 
However, when choice is limited or a higher quality option is unavailable, consumers will 
voice their dissatisfaction in order to try to prevent deterioration (Hirschman 1970, 53). 
At one time the central city was the only option for individuals seeking employment, 
culture, entertainment, and political influence. Social mobility, particularly to a higher 
economic class, was possible principally within the city limits. Residents had few options 
to maintain the same quality of life living outside of the city, and thus problems that 
threatened their quality of life were confronted using voice. With advances in 
transportation coupled with availability of land, a high quality life outside of the city was 
made possible. Not surprisingly, when faced with quality options, those who desire to 
leave the city choose to exit. The growth of municipalities around central cities presents a 
milieu where quality conscious residents (consumers) are presented with a variety of 
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options. Hence the growth or decline of a central city is affected by the number and 
perceived quality of the governing arrangements surrounding it.  
The choice to exit (or never to enter) the central city in preference for suburban 
living is determined by many factors and metropolitan fragmentation or the complexity of 
governing arrangements within the central city represent only one schema. There is fine 
scholarship which suggest the choice of living arrangements is hardly an all things equal 
situation but race (Cutler, Glaeser & Vigdor 1999), education (Bischoff 2008), and 
employment opportunity (Wilson 1996) play significant roles. Historic policies at the 
federal level such as urban renewal and offering mortgages in suburban areas that are 
cheaper and more attractive than within central cities, combined with practices like 
redlining and blockbusting, have made residential choice uneven across racial and 
economic groups (Jackson 1985).  The loss of manufacturing jobs within cities has also 
played a significant role in undermining fiscal health and population stability. Whether or 
not cities fare worse in urban areas that are more fragmented than others is an explanation 
of decline that can only benefit from continued research. 
Political fragmentation occurs both at all levels of government as well as within 
each individual level and this makes measurement of the concept somewhat unwieldy. 
Because it is so pervasive, it is important to understand the effect fragmentation plays in 
relationship to the central city within its particular region. Of the many measures of 
political fragmentation, Hendrick, Jimenez, and Lal (2011) identify twenty specific ones 
in the literature and unsurprisingly researchers have had varying levels of success 
determining fragmentation’s effects. Understanding the nuanced and complex 
relationship of cities and their suburbs will hopefully lead to better policy and greater 
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appreciation of how seemingly independent decisions in the suburbs can affect the central 
city. As metropolitan areas face crises that traverse jurisdictional boundaries, and 
political fragmentation is accused of impeding upon the necessary steps to problem 
solution such as coalition building and resource pooling. These tensions are particularly 
pronounced when they occur between the central city and its suburbs. Historical tensions 
unfurl between those who view political fragmentation in metropolitan areas as watering 
down political power so thinly that problem solving is ineffective, and those who 
maintain that fragmentation is a stronghold of democracy and individual choice.    
Theoretical Foundations of Metropolitan Government and Governance Structure 
Scholarly work on the structure of metropolitan political structure has evolved 
over time from a focus on the optimal governing arrangement to optimal arrangements of 
governance. The call for institutional reform of governing structure in metropolitan areas 
from many governing bodies into one regional government for each metropolitan area 
was dominant during the Progressive Movement. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren’s 1961 
article was provocative in its argument that governments within a metropolitan area could 
compete like markets and allocate public goods and services through combinations of 
provision and production. As empirical evidence accumulated showing that individuals as 
well as institutions collaborate in order to provide and produce services, studies of the 
metropolitan area have shifted toward issues of governance. While the impact of 
metropolitan fragmentation on the central city may seem somewhat dated given the 
current discussions on governance, a better understanding of how metropolitan areas 
relate to their central cities is critical to the current success of metropolitan areas to 
collectively solve problems, despite diversity of communities and governments.    
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Institutional Reform 
  Institutional reform was the dominant paradigm during the Progressive Era 
(1890-1920s), the urban renewal programs in the 1950s, and through the Model Cities 
program, which ended in the mid-1970s. Political scientists and public administrators 
facing rapid change in government demands and the decentralization of cities’ population 
across an expanding metropolitan area concluded that government works best when its 
services are delivered with greatest efficiency and minimized fiscal separations between 
areas of need and areas of resources. Institutional reformers viewed city machines as 
corrupt institutions that had to be squashed and replaced with a governing structure that 
was more businesslike, efficient, and responsible (Frug 1999, 52). Reformers view 
political fragmentation as something that diminishes efficiency and equity for several 
reasons. They assume that individual jurisdictions will not view themselves as 
interdependent economic, social and political entities in a regional sense and thus forsake 
the well-being of the region in pursuit of their own interests.  
The reform school is grounded in the classic theory of collective action. This 
traditional view assumes that individual, rational actors will proceed in their own self-
interest and not in a way to benefit the group without coercive authority to enforce the 
rules (Olson 1965). The multiplicity of governments within a metropolitan area is seen as 
harmful because each community, made up of individuals seeking their own self-interest, 
demand their local government to act for their benefit even if those actions harm the 
region as a whole. Proponents of institutional reform view metropolitan governing 
arrangements in terms of how institutions ought to be in order to achieve the twin goals 
of efficiency and equity. As the number of suburban municipalities increases and 
Cities Awash in a Sea of Governments 
20  Chapter 1  
competition for wealthy residents intensifies, communities become self-centered and 
exclude individuals, housing developments and businesses that are perceived as harmful. 
As part of his study of city incorporation in the Los Angeles area, Miller (1981, 173) 
describes how municipal boundaries were used to stratify groups by income and race. 
Similar observations are made by Ladd and Yinger’s (1989) study of fiscal health in 
central cities between 1972 and 1982. Gordon (2008) and Gamm (1999) describe how 
exclusionary practices, such as redlining and discounted mortgages were used to entice 
middle-class whites out of city limits and prevent impoverished minorities from exiting. 
Downs (1999) succinctly describes how federal policies offered cities a token gesture of 
aid while at the same time encouraging households and firms to move into suburban 
communities (466). 
Forty years after Woods’ (1961) study of the New York metropolitan area, in 
which he argues that fragmentation prevents individual jurisdictions from achieving 
efficiency through economies of scale in service provision, Benjamin and Nathan’s 
(2001) study demonstrates that services continue to be duplicated or overlap within a 
jurisdiction. Both studies recommend that fewer governments would facilitate greater 
efficiency and equality in the New York metropolitan area. Lyons and Lowery (1989) 
argue that political fragmentation leads to higher information and transaction costs for 
citizens creating participation barriers, spurring voter apathy and inflating budgets and 
expenditures. Political fragmentation is also seen as something that exacerbates 
inequality through institutional structures that mismatch tax resources and service needs 
and thwart redistribution in order to achieve economic, social, and political equality 
(Orfield 2002); thus there is need for a regional government that would enforce the 
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production and provision of public goods to achieve equity and efficiency for all 
residents within a metropolitan area.  
Public Choice 
The remedy to problems outlined in the traditional theory of collective action was 
that public goods had to be left in political hands (Hardin 1968, Olson 1965). This 
remedy was challenged by scholars who believed the empirical evidence was weak and 
institutions were not the only mechanism by which to solve social dilemmas. The 
emergence of a behavioral approach to collective action theory was driven by political 
scientists and economists whose application of market principles formed the school of 
public choice. This school argues that a competitive market environment could be 
simulated by municipalities competing for residents, thus creating a market rationale for 
the production of public goods. Tiebout’s (1956) watershed article “A Pure Theory of 
Local Expenditures” pioneered the idea that public goods could have a market if a 
metropolitan area has sufficient levels of fragmentation. If residents had enough choices 
they could seek out their preferred ratio of taxes to services when deciding where to live 
and “vote with their feet.” Public choice theory focuses on the individual motivations for 
living in one community over another. The theory assumes that individuals have known 
preferences and, if given enough choice, could match their tax and service ratio to their 
ideal community. Public choice theory approaches political fragmentation as something 
useful to the health and vitality of the metropolitan area.  
Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren’s article “The Organization of Government in 
Metropolitan Areas,” published in 1961, pushed back against calls for reform by arguing 
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that the various governing arrangements within metropolitan areas can function like a 
market and deliver services efficiently. Public choice theory forms a foundation for future 
work to build empirical research to further push back against calls for metropolitan 
reform.  
Metropolitan 
In the face of the theoretical claims made by proponents of public choice, 
reformers still argued that the continued proliferation of political fragmentation was only 
exacerbating the differences in the efficiency and equity of services across metropolitan 
areas. The metropolitan school of thought encompasses the assumptions of institutional 
reformers by recommending the dissolution of all fragmented entities into one 
metropolitan government for each metropolitan area. Orfield’s 2002 work, American 
Metropolitics outlines a sweeping number of benefits that would be incurred by the 
metropolitan region if adopting a unified system of government. These benefits range 
from cohesive land use planning and a diminished mismatch of affordable housing 
between cities, older suburbs and wealthier, newer communities, to improving transit and 
solving population retention problems facing at-risk suburbs (Orfield 2002, 162-167). 
 Illustrative of the potential in unified government is Baltimore County, 
Maryland. Maryland counties are quite resilient and there are no municipalities in this 
county. Each county government takes in revenue and provides services for much of its 
metropolitan area. Vicino’s (2008) study of suburban decline in Baltimore County 
illustrates the redistributive ability that a large, centralized government can have in 
moving dollars from one area of wealth to areas of need. Rather than the norm, however, 
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Maryland counties are the exception for the characteristic powers of county governments. 
Calls for metropolitan government are not only driven by a theoretical view that 
individuals will act in their own self-interest to the detriment of the group, but also are 
driven by a belief that if political power is spread too thinly across governing units, the 
overall governing system can become out of balance. Even the efforts by citizens to 
check and correct the system are ineffectual, thus a restructuring of governing 
arrangements is the best solution.  
Institutional reform and metropolitan theory focus upon the humanitarian and 
political ills that have plagued metropolitan areas for a century. Their central remedy to 
the inefficiencies and inequality within the metropolitan area is the creation of regional 
government, which voters in most locations have consistently rejected. Despite reformers' 
continued efforts to change the public discourse in their favor, political reality favors a 
fragmented governing structure. The frustration that reformers feel towards the current 
governing arrangements in the metropolitan area resonates with many practitioners and 
claims that fragmentation is an underlying source of social and economic disparity 
between cities and their surrounding communities. However, the lack of momentum to 
create regional governments has become motivation to study the governance in 
metropolitan regions (Hall 2009).  
 Polycentricity 
Developed by the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana 
University, the concept of polycentricity emerges in response to calls to reform 
fragmented metropolitan political structures into one “Gargantua” (Wood 1958) 
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government. Polycentricity is defined as the idea that within a metropolitan area the 
political system would have many centers of decision making that are independent of 
each other (Ostrom 1999). In essence, polycentricity argues individuals can and do 
collaborate to solve problems. Polycentricity theory adds to public choice theory with 
assumptions that in urban areas, service production and function vary substantially; there 
is a preference for homogenous neighborhood, and competition among service producers 
will encourage innovation, production and delivery (Ostrom 1999). The Ostroms’ 15-year 
study of police performance in metropolitan areas across the country found that smaller 
police departments provide services with better quality and satisfaction (according to 
residents) than their larger counterparts (Ostrom and Whitaker 1999). Oakerson’s (1999) 
analysis of local public economies argues that through combinations of service 
production and contracting for service provision, communities are able to function with 
efficiency, equity and be highly fragmented. Polycentricity theory looks out over the 
politically fragmented landscape and does not see a crazy-quilt but a complex 
development of competition and collaboration, operating in a cohesive and stable pattern.  
In regard to urban decline, particularly of central cities, public choice and 
polycentricity theorists believe in multi-level governance and view the argument that 
suburbs (i.e. fragmentation) take away population and revenue as overstated. Hawkins 
and Ihrke’s (1999) review of the suburban-exploitation literature conclude that suburbs 
may not hurt cities and in some cases cities benefit from their suburbs. Their analysis 
suggests that economic and technological changes are to blame for central-city decline, 
not political fragmentation. If citizens are unhappy with their government, the impetus for 
change rests not only upon attentiveness of public officials, but on the determination of 
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the community, neighborhood and individual to demand change. Fragmentation, 
according to public choice theory, is not an impediment to citizens acting as a check on 
their governments but rather as a stronghold of the democratic process.  
Regionalism 
 The case for regional cooperation and governance is the raison d’etre for the 
regionalism school, a derivative of institutional reform. Instead of focusing the 
dissolution of all fragmentation into one metropolitan government for each metro area, 
the focus of regionalism is on how communities build cooperative agreements and 
collaborate to solve social dilemmas or, more simply put, issues of governance rather 
than government. Regionalists still view political fragmentation as a mechanism for 
social disparity but believe that metropolitan governance, with its focus on civil society, 
can effectively foster healthy levels of participation, manage public goods, and keep 
public officials accountable (Oakerson 2004).  
Theoretical Crossroads. While the reform, metropolitan, and regionalism schools 
of thought hold unified government as an ideal, reformers have not been blind to political 
realities. Advocates for inter-governmental cooperation not only between suburban 
municipalities but between the central city and its surrounding municipalities argue that 
collaboration through informal and formal agreements is currently the best way to combat 
problems of a regional scale. Collaborative efforts between governments still have to 
overcome political fragmentation as getting public officials across a metropolitan area to 
agree, even on an informal policy arrangement, is difficult.  
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Public choice and institutional reform set the foundations for two distinct theories 
of political fragmentation’s effect on central city decline; however, the empirical 
evidence indicates that something is still missing from what is known about these 
interactions. Studies in the polycentricity school of thought have accumulating evidence 
that small scale service provision performs with efficiency to the satisfaction of their 
consumers, and promotes local control of government. In other words, political 
fragmentation is not harmful but reflects the will of the people. This seems to fly in the 
face of evidence amassed by reformers and advocates of regional governance who have 
painstakingly detailed that economic and racial disparities appear to escalate with the rise 
of political fragmentation. In other words, political fragmentation appears to lead to 
systematic inequalities.  
The Puzzle 
     From these differing views emerges the following question: Has political 
fragmentation within the metropolitan area and within central city government been a 
cause of central city decline or just the benign evolution of governance? The literature 
clearly identifies two points of view concerning whether or not fragmentation is a public 
good or public evil but the tensions remain unresolved. The argument that political 
fragmentation is harmful to the central city stems from a theoretical view of the 
individual as rational, seeking to get the most out of a living arrangement for the least 
amount of cost. When individuals behave in this way, the governing arrangements within 
the city put it at a disadvantage compared with its surrounding communities.   
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Causal Mechanism. The Tiebout hypothesis, which states that given enough 
choices individuals will sort themselves out by tax-service ratio into their ideal 
communities, is the basis for the assumption that individuals have a known preference for 
where they live. Based upon the work of Tiebout and others, I assume that individuals 
will attempt to maximize their utility in a relatively rational manner, seeking to improve 
their self-interest, loosely defined as getting the most out of their living arrangement for 
the least amount of cost. When deciding where to live, these individuals will search to 
find optimal living arrangements. Theoretically, individuals (both households and firms) 
could move ad infinitum until their preferences were met. Naturally, the empirical 
evidence demonstrates that most individuals are not constantly on the move, seeking out 
their ideal living arrangement, but are operating under certain constraints. For instance, 
poverty or community attachment may hinder the ability to move. There are numerous 
factors that affect where and how often individuals change residences ranging from 
proximity to work, cost of moving and selling a home, as well as family needs.  
A plausible motivation to move or to remain in a community for some is 
proximity to public transportation. Whether because of financial savings or 
environmental conscience, the desire to be close to public transportation may hinder a 
household moving even if there is a desire to move out of the community. The decision-
making process of choosing a community involves prioritizing, taking stock of the 
benefits as well as the costs, and making the best choice in the face of constraints. I 
assume that individuals still seek to behave rationally and have an internally known 
optimal living arrangement that motivates a desire to move, but that there are several 
factors that inhibit, encourage or prevent their capacity to move. As clearly laid out by 
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institutional reformers, institutions play a key role in an individual’s choice and ability to 
move. 
The ability of an individual to exercise choice is affected by not just a desire to 
move, but is either encouraged or discouraged by the number and perceived quality of 
communities. In an effort to attract and retain residents, communities will compete with 
each other and distinguish themselves by altering their service-tax ratio. Whether an 
individual is able to start house shopping is encouraged or discouraged by the 
institutional rules in place. Under certain conditions, communities can act with 
exclusivity to keep undesirable residents out and attract those they deem more desirable. 
These institutional rules have historically been a cause of the concentration of poverty 
within central cities. For example, federal housing and interstate highway policies as 
described by Jackson (1985) and others, encouraged suburban growth and did almost 
nothing to help cities retain or attract desirable residents.  
Political fragmentation manifests itself in two ways, across a metropolitan area 
and by higher levels of fragmentation within central city government. Higher levels of 
fragmentation across a metropolitan area increase the number and perceived quality of 
choices to individuals. The more communities with which a city has to compete for 
residents (thus higher levels of political fragmentation) can lead to greater decline in the 
central city. Fragmentation within central city government in terms of public officials, 
bureaucratic departments, and segmentation of fiscal and political power hamstring the 
ability of a city to act nimbly when competing with surrounding communities for 
residents.  
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Political power within city government is generally divided between a mayor and 
council as well as other elected officials. Cities may also have a city manager as well as a 
mayor. Whether by resistance to reforms or political history, city government can vary in 
strength, resources, and ability to institute change. Rich’s (1996) seminal work regarding 
African-American mayors and city schools demonstrates the difficulty a mayor can have 
effecting change within its own school district. Elected school boards were cautious and 
mistrustful of calls for reform emanating from the mayor’s office and the perception of 
city schools as “failing” further weakens the city’s ability to compete for residents. 
Portz’s (1990) work on the politics of plant closings discusses how city officials can 
struggle to respond with meaningful public policy to either prevent or circumvent a plant 
closing. When it comes to decision-making, particularly crafting public policy that is 
timely, cities can be at a disadvantage simply because of the number of decision-makers 
who must agree for a policy to move forward (Pressman and Wildavsky 1979). The 
number of elected officials within city government can be a hindrance because each 
official will not only guard his political and financial resources but can be slow moving 
in response to competition for households or firms. Thus the fragmentation within a 
central city can be a real disadvantage when competing with suburban communities for 
households and firms.   
The general hypothesis among advocates of metropolitan reform is that 
metropolitan areas with more fragmentation will have more decline than metro areas with 
less fragmentation. Much of the scholarship written in support of the “fragmentation 
causes urban decline” hypothesis relies upon descriptive statistics and case study 
analysis. The literature is rife with subjective examples of cities wrecked by fragmented 
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government. Jackson’s acclaimed work Crabgrass Frontier is representative of the rich 
anecdotal evidence used to explain the devastation fragmentation can have on central 
cities. The vicious cycle between fragmentation and urban decline is described by 
Jackson: “The same broad patterns of downtown decline, inner-city deterioration, and 
exurban development so evident in Saint Louis are actually typical of the large 
population centers of the United States” (1985, 218).  
However, while every metropolitan area in the United States is fragmented, not 
every metro area has experienced the same levels of urban decline. The New York 
metropolitan area is highly fragmented, as detailed in Robert Woods’ work 1400 
Governments (1961) and yet the city’s economy, infrastructure, and population have 
endured, despite Woods’ own recommendation for broad, sweeping reforms of the 
government structure (Wood 1958). According to the Nathan and Adams Index
4
, New 
York is characterized as prosperous and its central city is growing, even as its 
metropolitan area expands. Though its population dropped between 1970 and 1990, it 
experienced population gains, primarily through immigration, in the following decades 
giving the city a positive net change over the past thirty years (Savitch and Kantor 2002, 
12).  The city is not without its problems. There is still poverty, housing projects, and 
New York City experienced its own share of white flight, particularly after the black out 
and subsequent looting in 1975. The economy of the city has not always been vibrant – 
the city has been on the brink of bankruptcy several times. But despite the growth of the 
metropolitan area over the last fifty years, the city thrives. 
Detroit is considered by many measures to be relatively low on the fragmentation 
scale but the decline of the city has continued unabated since the 1950s. For example, 
Introduction 
 Wiedlocher  31  
Orfield’s fragmentation index gives Detroit a score of 3.3, which is quite low, but even 
though Detroit has less fragmentation than New York, it has experienced far greater 
decline (2002, 134). Looking at the Nathan and Adam’s Index over the same time span as 
New York, Detroit is considered distressed, its central city in decline, and has had a net 
change in population of -36% between 1970 and 2000 (Savitch and Kantor 2002, 12). 
Much of Detroit’s decline stems from the changes in the American auto industry (Glaeser 
2011). As its markets have changed, moving business out of Detroit, indeed even out of 
the country, Detroit has been unable to fill the industrial vacancy. The city itself has 
grown to be majority minority, while the surrounding areas remain white enclaves. 
Despite or perhaps because of political fragmentation a city like New York has continued 
to grow and prosper whereas Detroit has been unable to stem the waves of decline 
emanating from its central city. 
Herein lies the puzzle: Does the pluralistic ideal of decentralized government 
actually cause more harm than good to the central city? New York and Detroit represent 
somewhat extreme cases of fragmentation but their contrary conditions draw out the 
tension in the debate. If political fragmentation is harmful to central cities it should help 
Detroit and hurt New York but the effect of fragmentation on these cities is not clear. 
Over the last century, all metropolitan areas have experienced changes in political 
fragmentation; some of them have experienced severe levels of central city decline as 
well. Whether varying levels of political fragmentation have a causal impact on central 
city decline has not been firmly established and needs to be carefully, systematically 
measured and tested over time.  
Implications 
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The problems facing cities and metropolitan areas are varied and complex ranging 
from local issues like government employee pensions and health services, to regional 
issues such as traffic congestion and air quality, and even national and international 
issues like competition for trade hubs and economic development. The belief that fewer 
governments will make solving these problems easier has become conventional wisdom. 
Even in St. Louis, there is renewed dialogue concerning rejoining the city to St. Louis 
County and while many tout advantages like economies of scale and the leveraging of 
resources, it is still murky as to whether or not changing the governing structure will 
make solving any of these problems easier. While not all academics and policy-makers 
are persuaded that consolidated government like what exists in Louisville, Kentucky or 
Indianapolis, Indiana is the ideal governing arrangement, regional consolidation and 
cooperation keep cropping up as problem solutions. 
This study will contribute to the long debate over the role of metropolitan political 
structure by teasing out some of the complexities of how political fragmentation across 
metropolitan areas and within cities has affected the health and vitality of cities over 
time. There are several political and policy related implications of this analysis. If 
political fragmentation has an adverse effect on cities, it implies that building cooperative 
agreements as well as formal partnerships for the managing of resources, outward 
growth, and transportation are not exercises in futility but can help culture a metropolitan 
perspective, rather than an "us" versus "them" mentality between urban municipalities 
and their central city. Tracking the condition of central cities in relation to their growing 
metropolitan areas over sixty years and modeling that data with panel study regressions 
represents new analysis of political fragmentation and central city decline. 
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A Road Map for the Analysis 
The central hypothesis is to test the impact of political fragmentation on central 
city decline between the years 1950 – 2000, for 100 central cities. I predict that 
metropolitan areas and cities with higher degrees of political fragmentation will have 
central cities with greater levels of decline. The 100 largest cities in 1950 make up the 
sample for this study. Using primarily U.S. Decennial Census data and U.S. Census of 
Government data measures of population, education, race, income, employment, poverty, 
fiscal health as well as several measures of political fragmentation have been compiled 
for each city and their metropolitan area. A list of the 100 cities included along with their 
rank and population in 1950 is displayed in Table 1.1. The data is used to construct three 
time series cross-sectional models of central city decline. Three components of decline 
are chosen, population loss, racial segregation, and declining fiscal health, to model 
decline. While many measures of political fragmentation were considered, ultimately 
nine distinct measures are included to capture the conceptual components of horizontal, 
vertical, and internal fragmentation. The results of these time series cross-section 
analyses are discussed in chapter four.  
Chapter Two is a discussion of several causes of central city decline, such as 
technological advances, decline of manufacturing, racial bias, and federal government 
policies and considers how political fragmentation helps explain city outcomes. Chapter 
Three carefully examines the two overarching schools of thought about political 
fragmentation and government structure; small is beautiful and large is lovely. In 
addition, chapter three further draws the theoretical connection between political 
fragmentation and central city decline. Chapter Four includes an explanation of the 
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measures used, data anomalies, and pertinent summary statistics. Finally, Chapter Five 
presents and summarizes the findings from four panel study cross-section analyses and 
offers suggestions for future research.  
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Table 1.1: The 100 Largest Cities in 1950 by Population. Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
City, State Rank Population  
 
City, State Rank Population  
New York, NY 1 7,891,957  Memphis, TN 26 396,000 
Chicago, IL 2 3,620,962  Oakland, CA 27 384,575 
Philadelphia, PA 
3 2,071,605 
 Columbus, OH 
28 375,901 
Los Angeles, CA 
4 1,970,358 
 Portland, OR 
29 373,628 
Detroit, MI 5 1,849,568  Louisville, KY 30 369,129 
Baltimore, MD 
6 949,708 




 Rochester, NY 
32 332,488 
St. Louis, MO 8 856,796  Atlanta, GA 33 331,314 
Washington, DC 
9 802,178 

















 Fort Worth, TX 
38 278,778 
Houston, TX 14 596,163  Akron, OH 39 274,605 
Buffalo, NY 
15 580,132 
 Omaha, NE 
40 251,117 
New Orleans, LA 
16 570,445 
 Long Beach, CA 
41 250,767 
Minneapolis, MN 17 521,718  Miami, FL 42 249,476 
Cincinnati, OH 
18 503,998 




 Dayton, OH 
44 243,872 
Kansas City, MO 20 456,622  Providence, RI 43 248,674 
Newark, NJ 
21 438,776 
 Dayton, OH 
44 243,872 
Dallas, TX 22 434,462  Oklahoma City, OK 45 243,504 
Indianapolis, IN 
23 427,173 




 Syracuse, NY 
47 220,583 
San Antonio, TX 
25 408,442 
 Norfolk, VA 
48 213,513 
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Table 1.1 Continued 
Jacksonville, FL 49 204,517  Mobile, AL 77 129,009 
Worcester, MA 50 203,486  Evansville, IN 78 128,636 
Tulsa, OK 51 182,740  Trenton, NJ 79 128,009 
Salt Lake City, 
UT 
52 182,121 
 Shreveport, LA 
80 127,206 
Des Moines, IA 53 177,965  Baton Rouge, LA 81 125,629 




 Knoxville, TN 
83 124,769 




 Camden, NJ 
85 124,555 
Wichita, KS 58 168,279  Cambridge, MA 86 120,740 
New Haven, CT 59 164,443  Savannah, GA 87 119,638 
Flint, MI 60 163,143  Canton, OH 88 116,912 
Springfield, MA 61 162,399  South Bend, IN 89 115,911 
Spokane, WA 62 161,721  Berkeley, CA 90 113,805 
Bridgeport, CT 63 158,709  Elizabeth, NJ 91 112,817 
Yonkers, NY 64 152,798  Fall River, MA 92 111,963 
Tacoma, WA 65 143,673  Peoria, IL 93 111,856 
Paterson, NJ 66 139,336  Wilmington, DE 94 110,356 
Sacramento, CA 67 137,572  Reading, PA 95 109,320 
Albany, NY 68 134,995  New Bedford, MA 96 109,189 
Charlotte, NC 69 134,042  Corpus Christi, TX 97 108,287 
Gary, IN 70 133,911  Phoenix, AZ 98 106,818 
Fort Wayne, IN 71 133,607  Allentown, PA 99 106,756 






Erie, PA 74 130,803     
El Paso, TX 75 130,485     
Kansas City, KS 76 129,553     
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Summary 
Political fragmentation is at the root of why central cities can no longer be treated 
as isolated, but must be considered as part of a larger urban area. Thus, it is important to 
increase our understanding of fragmentation and its effect on urban decline, racial 
isolation, political efficacy, and civic participation. Danielson and Lewis (1996) state this 
eloquently, “The point is neither that central cities are unimportant or unworthy of serious 
study. It is only that cities are not enough to understand urban politics, and that city 
politics cannot be understood without encompassing the rest of the spreading 
metropolis.” This dissertation aims to add to the discipline by studying fragmentation at 
the metropolitan level for the hundred largest central cities in 1950 and following them 
through time, to explain the relationship between fragmentation and central city decline.  
Fragmentation has the potential to be a powerful mechanism to better understand 
the political context in which most of America lives. Though some scholars and public 
officials would like to see metropolitan governance reformed and the degree of 
fragmentation diminished, the federalist value of keeping power separated across units of 
government and the important role elections play in keeping government in check will 
more than likely maintain a polycentric system. A study that models the complex nature 
of fragmentation in metro areas will shed some light on this puzzle of fragmentation and 
urban decline. Understanding the historical relationship between central cities and their 
surrounding communities helps policymakers and academics build healthier metropolitan 
areas. Pollution, energy efficiency, workforce displacement, education quality, these are 
all problems facing metro areas that grow ever serious, and a greater understanding of 
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Notes: Chapter One
                                                          
1
 For example see Savitch et al. 1993, whose work finds evidence that the prosperity of 
the central city contributes significantly to the prosperity of their surrounding suburbs. 
Also Dreier et al. 2004, demonstrate how the problems of decay, crime and poverty are 
creeping over central city boundaries and into first ring suburban communities. 
2
 Federalism typically refers to constitutionally shared powers between two relatively 
coequal levels of government. Because local governments are creatures of the state, the 
idea of dual sovereignty does not apply, federalism is an idea with many meanings and in 
this case the use of federalism refers not to the hierarchical nature of governance but the 
multiplicity of governance. A more accurate term might be intergovernmental relations.  
 
3 The current governance of the public school district is even more complex. In March 
2007, after multiple evaluations gave the school district provisional accreditation, the 
state transferred governing authority from the school board to an appointed board. The 
school board still exists but with limited powers, which it shares with the appointed 
board.  
4
The Nathan and Adams Index is a composite of six equally weighted factors, 
unemployment, dependency, education, income level, crowded housing, and poverty. The 
values are a comparison of central city conditions to their surrounding suburbs within the 
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Chapter 2 
America's Great Cities 
“A suburb is ultimately an instrument by which the periphery can exploit the center … a 
suburb is a parasite whose residents can enjoy the benefits of scale and specialization 
without sharing in all the attendant costs.”  
- Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism 
 
U.S. cities represent a complete spectrum of urban experience; in the Northeast 
cities such as New York are densely populated with metropolitan areas bleeding into 
others like Hartford, Philadelphia and Newark. Others like Phoenix and Houston have 
smaller cores of population density and have miles of low density bedroom communities. 
Some cities sprang up out of pioneer trading and shipping posts; others, because of 
proximity to natural resources or location along westward expansion routes. They have 
all served as home to those who beat the drums of progress. The manufacturers who 
turned raw elements into goods, inventors, entrepreneurs, researchers, the arts, 
entertainment, engineering, architecture, and science, as well as the great schools of 
education and medicine, have mostly called cities home. While cities have served as the 
meeting ground for countless creations that have advanced America down the road of 
progress, they have also had their share of great troubles from natural disaster, financial 
strain, riot, gang violence, poverty and pollution. Explaining why some cities have grown 
and thrived over time while others have diminished is a puzzle scholars have spent much 
effort piecing together. Part of what makes cities so complex is the fact that they are all 
nested within larger metropolitan areas and understanding the causes for success or 
decline in any particular city should include its position within its region, for the two are 
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linked by economy, the movement of its citizens, and by its common problems and 
triumphs.  
According to the U.S. Census’s classification of urban places, the United States is 
considered an urban nation and in many regards this classification is an apt description. 
As of the 2000 Census nearly 80%
1
 of Americans no longer live on farms and in rural 
communities but in a kind of urban-rural hybrid, part traditional city and part rural oasis 
(the suburbs). Alongside the growth of urban areas as population centers has been the 
growth of governing structures to provide services and political representation. The 
growth of suburban areas has had dramatic and in some cases devastating impacts on the 
American city, however this growth pattern has not been universally bad for cities. 
Suburban life has also become an iconic image of the American Dream and has made 
possible home ownership, mobility and access to urban amenities possible for millions 
(Glaeser 2011). Southern and Western cities have experienced tremendous outward 
growth in their metropolitan areas spurred by population growth and economic 
development and typically have fewer municipal governments. Some of America’s most 
vibrant cities, New York, Los Angeles and Chicago, exist in incredibly fragmented 
metropolitan areas. As outlined in Chapter 1 the governing arrangements within a 
metropolitan area may have a causal role in explaining why some cities thrive and others 
decline.  While cities across the country have had their share of difficulties, the question 
endures: How much of their continued struggle, resilience, or success can be explained 
by the amount of political fragmentation surrounding them?  
Theories examining the impact of racial bias, federal urban policy, technological 
innovation, and the decline of the manufacturing industry within the central city have 
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attempted to explain why cities have experienced population loss, fiscal strain, enduring 
segregation, struggling schools, and criminal activity (Dreier, Mollenkopf & Swanstrom 
2004, Judd & Swanstrom 2006, Rich 1996). However these explanations are not entirely 
adequate for explaining the vast differences in outcomes cities have experienced. Having 
a racially biased urban housing policy was harmful to city residents but the implication 
here is that cities that thrived did not suffer the same ill effects. No urban scholar would 
argue that cities like New York, Chicago or Los Angeles are vibrant because they were 
not negatively impacted by racial bias or loss of manufacturing jobs. There is need for 
other explanations that might explain the differences in city outcomes. If not all cities 
exposed to negatives like white flight, declining housing stock and economic 
disinvestment experienced persistent decline, it implies that there must be other 
explanations.    
The urban politics literature clearly identifies symptoms of decline. Fitting them 
within the larger theory of urban politics and policy, however, and grappling with why 
cities decline can be both a nuanced and complex undertaking as there remains an 
element of mystery in our understanding of cities. This becomes apparent simply by 
examining the causal mechanisms of urban theories. Many of the symptoms for decline 
could just as easily be the causes of decline. The ease with which one could switch the 
equations’ sides enables a self-reinforcing cycle that has become the established view 
regarding cities. Conventional wisdom explaining the causes for city decline are many 
but vary along some common themes: Schools are terrible in cities; interstate highways 
devastated neighborhoods and were black removal; cities are dirtier and more polluted 
than suburbs; cities are dangerous – you’re more likely to be victim of crime in the city; 
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traffic in cities is awful, there is nowhere to park and it takes an eternity to get anywhere. 
Although a few of these ad hoc conclusions are rooted in scholarly research, many are 
perpetuated by common misconceptions. Despite struggles, there is still much greatness 
in U.S. cities. For example, many of the highest ranking high schools in the U.S. News 
annual report are routinely located in cities; some of the best research hospitals in the 
world call American cities their home; and violent crime rates are actually falling in cities 
across the board, according to FBI data.
2
  It is not always clear what the key factors are 
which separate a city's perceived success from others thought to be in decline. Also 
uncertain is the role that metropolitan growth over time, particularly that outside of the 
core city, has upon the health of the region and the central city. One plausible explanation 
to explain the differences in city outcomes and the effects of regional growth is political 
fragmentation. 
Political fragmentation, or the number and types of governments at play in a 
metro area, create a powerful and complex context in which governance, public policy, 
housing and economics must go about their work. A common banner to place problems 
such as pollution, traffic congestion, racial isolation and concentrated poverty is under the 
notion that too many governments in a region make it near impossible to govern as a 
region. The argument that suburban communities have a parasitic effect on cities (Lowi 
1979) is just one of many explanations for the decline in central cities over the last 60 
years.  
This idea is illustrated nicely in work like the Peirce Reports. These 
commissioned studies, first published in newspapers beginning in 1987, were charged to 
identify the most salient problems facing the city and its region in six cities (Phoenix, 
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Arizona; Seattle, Washington; Baltimore, Maryland; Owensboro, Kentucky; Dallas, 
Texas; and St. Paul, Minnesota). The Peirce Reports have three common themes, poor 
cities and their affluent suburbs (the socioeconomic gulf), sprawl, and a lack of coherent 
governance (Peirce, Johnson and Hall 1993). Political fragmentation is charged with 
enabling the outward migration of residents, increasingly converting green space into 
residential and business space (29) and allowing the wealthy and affluent to create safe 
havens for their wealth by excluding poorer households, through zoning codes and 
ordinances (27). Fragmentation of government also creates an environment where 
problems that cross jurisdictions are incredibly difficult to solve (Peirce, Johnson and 
Hall 1993, 32). Government officials are alternatively cast as "too many cooks in the 
kitchen" or view other governments as "us versus them." The detriments of political 
fragmentation hit core cities particularly hard because they are left to care for those who 
cannot afford to leave, or for those who have historically been excluded from suburban 
life. This means that core cities are disadvantaged when competing with suburbs for 
economic growth.  
Though political fragmentation has been charged as harmful, the verdict is still 
decidedly undecided. This is, in some sense, a problem of causality and perhaps over 
identification; there are many plausible explanations why some cities have suffered (or 
not) over the last sixty years. The negative consequence of factors such as the exodus of 
white households out of the city into suburban enclaves, the decline and relocation of 
manufacturing in the US, the effects of interstate highways and federal urban programs 
all tend to correlate with political fragmentation. This is makes is difficult to distinguish 
if differences in city outcomes is a direct effect of political fragmentation or other factors. 
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While exposure to each of these factors has impacted cities in different ways, particularly 
in terms of regional location, cities were all affected by things like highway construction 
and federal housing policy, yet some have had markedly different outcomes.  
A hallmark of the American political system is fragmentation of governing 
authority across governing bodies, and all cities in the US exist within politically 
fragmented metro areas. Though the amount of fragmentation varies, the principle goal of 
this research is to examine the popular notions of why cities thrive or decline in the 
presence of fragmentation and to see how they measure up alongside theories of political 
fragmentation’s effect. In other words does a city like New York grow and thrive because 
political fragmentation allows increasing levels of economic interconnectivity and access 
to urban amenities to rich and poor alike, or does it thrive in spite of vast degrees of 
fragmentation? A summary of the usual suspects for city decline will be examined and 
then political fragmentation will be presented as an alternative explanation for the 
variation seen in city outcomes.  
Death and Life of Cities 
One of the most striking character changes experienced by urban America is the 
continued and ongoing population migration toward the edges of metropolitan areas over 
time. It is not simply that cities lose citizens in their center that is devastating; it is the 
specific nature of that loss that has been so damaging. The desire to move away from the 
noise, pollution and crowding in cities (yet remain able to avail oneself on its benefits) 
stretches all the way back to the earliest cities (Bruegmann 2005). The ability to escape 
the pathologies of the central city was limited to those wealthy enough to afford the 
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commute. It was not until the middle of the 20
th
 century that affordable automobiles and 
housing made it possible for the middle class to choose to exit en masse.  
Up until relatively recent life in suburbia was also limited primarily to Caucasians 
(Kruse 2005; Sugrue 2005; Jackson 1985). Through public policy and practice white 
families were encouraged to exit the city; this move to suburban governments was not 
random nor was it uniformly distributed across households. While the choice to move is 
made by individuals, the enticements to do so are a matter of policy and politics. The 
explanations for the growth of metropolitan America and the decline of core cities 
include white flight, federal urban policy, manufacturing industry decline, highway 
development and financial hardship. These components make up a cadre of some of the 
most influential reasons for sprawl and city struggles. 
White Flight. On the surface, America in the late 1940s appears to have been a 
fantastic place to live. We were experiencing a post-World War II economic boom, Harry 
Truman was president, we emerged victorious not only in a just and moral war but were 
key players on the international stage, and we were experiencing an expansion of the 
middle class. Our manufacturing industry continued to thrive as it shifted from a war 
industry to the production goods and products. The mood in the country was jubilant. 
Cities were bustling as all manner of people flooded to them looking for new jobs, 
careers, lives, starts, and fresh adventures. 
A deeper exploration, however, reveals the strains of such rapid growth. The 
Great Migration of African-Americans during the 1940s and 50s from Southern states to 
the industrial cities in the north to pursue opportunities for employment in the 
manufacturing industry grew urban populations dramatically both during and after World 
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War II. Additionally, immigrants the world over came to the States for the chance at a 
better life, which often hinged upon employment in manufacturing in a city center. This 
influx of people, coupled with our returning servicemen from overseas, soon led to a 
housing shortage in cities. During the war years, new construction and renovation had 
ground to a halt and afterward could not keep pace with the demand. The use of frame 
style home construction combined with federally-backed home mortgages kept the 
housing crisis focused on construction of new homes and creation of communities at the 
periphery of the city (Jackson 1985).  
Access to these new homes and the mortgages to afford them were not available 
to all, however. The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) and later the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) adopted the same hierarchical lending structure that had 
been used by realtors and lenders in urban areas nationwide. Cities had long been 
segregated and realtors used a color-coding system to impose a racially centered housing 
policy. The term “redlining” refers to the practice of drawing a perimeter around certain 
sections of the city where it was unacceptable to buy and sell homes to what was thought 
of as “less desirable” clients. Racial and ethnic segregation was supported and maintained 
in cities by the housing industry (Gordon 2008; Judd & Swanstrom 2006; Sugrue 2005).  
The rise of suburban communities expanded this racial and ethnic segregation by 
replacing the realtor's redlining tactics with jurisdictional boundaries. For example a 
white household interested in a new suburban home could qualify for a 30-year, FHA-
backed loan with as little as 10 percent down. Thus, whites were encouraged to pack up 
the equity in their homes and move outside the city limits. It was also common practice to 
use restrictive covenants, refuse loan services, or offer prohibitively strict mortgage terms 
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to potential minority homeowners in order to prevent integration in the suburbs. From the 
creation of the earliest suburban municipalities through the early 1970s there emerged 
entire communities that were entirely homogenous in terms of race, ethnicity and income 
and an alarming number of these remain intact today. African-Americans, Hispanics and 
Asians were excluded from participating in federal housing programs until the passage of 
the Fair Housing Act in 1968. 
The exodus of white households from Atlanta from the 1950s through the 1970s 
is described in Kevin Kruse’s seminal work, White Flight (2005). While unique in many 
aspects, Atlanta's story exemplifies several important practices within cities that further 
encouraged white households into suburbia. As white households departed, over-crowded 
African-American sections of cities began taking up residence outside the infamous 
redline. Kruse demonstrates how the practice of "blockbusting", a highly effective tactic 
used in neighborhoods that were in the process of integrating, was employed. Realtors 
would approach white homeowners on a block-by-block basis and encourage them to 
sell, telling them that their block, street, or neighborhood was "going black" and when 
that happened they would be victims to falling housing values, rising criminal activity, 
vulnerable to the spread of disease, and that their beloved public spaces, parks and 
schools would be "infiltrated." Using these unscrupulous scare tactics, the realtors would 
capitalize on one or two black households as the starting point for entire streets emptying 
out.  
The practices of redlining, blockbusting, and restrictive covenants facilitated the 
beginning of what is known as geographically driven racial sorting (Gordon 2008), where 
minorities were left with aged housing stock (FHA loans for home renovations were 
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practically non-existent) while white families enjoyed their choice of new communities 
with varying levels of services and taxes. The FHA-eligible loans had several 
requirements which had the effect of focusing home loan services outside the city, such 
as requirements for lot size, width, distance from other buildings and the street (Jackson 
1985). By the time overtly racist policies like restrictive covenants and redlining finally 
became illegal with the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, followed by the 
Community Reinvestment Act in 1977, suburban communities had perfected the use of 
zoning codes based on household income to maintain their much-cherished homogeneity. 
While it may be unlawful to discriminate by race or ethnicity, there is nothing unlawful 
about keeping minimum standards for lot size, house size or distance from the street; in 
effect setting a minimum standard using income in lieu of race as the metric for future 
residents.  
For decades the core city held a concentration of our country's poorest and 
minorities. During the 1970s the movement to suburban communities was opened to 
minorities and poorer households as further outward migration to newer communities on 
the metropolitan fringe left older suburbs available. Suburban America may have begun 
as an escape for wealthy and upwardly mobile but represents diversity in wealth, race and 
housing quality. Problems such as drug violence and failing schools, which have been 
traditionally been associated with the inner-city are now suburban problems as well 
(Dreier, Mollenkopf & Swanstrom 2004; Orfield 1998). White flight offers a compelling 
explanation for central city decline by arguing that it was the loss of a particular 
population class and race that devastated cities. The implication is that cities that thrive 
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must not have experienced white flight, or at least not to the degree which Rust Belt cities 
did.  
The exodus from central cities like Detroit, Michigan and Atlanta, Georgia does 
not represent anomalies but reflect a shared experience across all American cities. The 
growth of suburban America was pioneered by wealthy and upwardly mobile white 
households and this process began long before the federal government started securing 
mortgages or the advent of frame style housing (Glaeser 2011; Jackson 1985; Sugrue 
2005). White flight as an explanation by itself is unable to explain why cities like San 
Francisco, California and Detroit, Michigan have found themselves in remarkably 
different places in terms of urban growth, economic development and racial diversity, 
despite experiencing exodus to communities outside the city limits. Certainly white flight 
has had negative consequences for many cities but it has not necessarily a death-knell. To 
understand why a city like San Francisco which is considered by many as a desirable 
destination to work, vacation and live, can be so different from Detroit - a bankrupt city, 
where whole sections of the city are now turning back to prairie and could become urban 
farmland
3
- other explanations need to be considered, such as the role of the Federal 
government.      
Federal Urban Policy. During the administration of John F. Kennedy and 
culminating with President Johnson's Great Society, the federal government turned the 
full weight of its good intention and policy toward the problems of the city. The 1960s 
saw the rhetoric of an urban crisis shift from a local issue to being wrapped up as part of 
a larger national dialogue on cities. The Civil Rights Act (1964) and Brown v Board of 
Education (1954) made enormous legal inroads toward changing social and political 
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inequities in cities. President Johnson’s Great Society programs were crafted to further 
help impoverished residents and city neighborhoods and seemed to hold great potential 
and yet in the end failed to live up to expectations (Moynihan, 1969). In 1965 Congress 
enacted just over 80 programs to address everything from education, health and economic 
development to workforce training in cities, raising the amount of federal 
intergovernmental transfers to state and local governments to $41.7 billion by 1973 
(Peterson 1981, 86). While each of these programs originated at the federal level, they 
were administrated and implemented by state and local governments.  
Frieden and Sagalyn (1994) write that federally funded urban renewal was an 
extremely useful program for cities in that it provided "a way to assemble and clear land 
in and around downtown, to use land for what they wanted, and to do it almost all at the 
federal expense"(..). The focus of business and civic leaders on demolition and 
construction led to decades of social unrest and tension. The abuses of urban renewal 
were manifold, coined by scholars like Lowi (1979) as “black removal” and in cities like 
Detroit, New Haven, and Newark it created views of deep distrust of government and 
tensions which sparked riots (Frieden & Sagalyn, 1994). Altshuler and Luberoff point out 
that, “central city leaders experienced a growing sense of desperation. In order to head off 
the spiral of decline, they came to believe, nothing short of radical surgery would do to 
clear away slums, to assemble and write down the large cost of development sites, to 
build expressways from the suburbs and regional airports into downtown, and more 
generally to retrofit obsolete elements of the urban fabric for the dominant technologies 
and corporate space demands of the second half of the twentieth century” (2003, 14). 
Urban renewal programs successfully enabled cities to cheaply double down their efforts 
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to stabilize downtown business districts but this was often at the expense of residential 
neighborhoods.  
In the face of mounting dissatisfaction with urban renewal programs, President 
Nixon transferred control of urban federal grants from Washington D.C. to the states and 
cities and then merged urban renewal programs into a single funding source now known 
as community development block grants (CDBG) (Frieden & Sagalyn, 1994). Cities 
could no longer depend upon federal dollars to demolish or construct new buildings, but 
would have to compete with other cities, done by a formula originally more beneficial to 
newer cities, for a share of each year’s community development grant. The fallout from 
federally funded Urban Renewal program meant that cities had to pursue different 
avenues in order to keep economic life flowing into central business districts, the hope 
being that a revitalized downtown will lead to revitalization throughout the city.  
Frieden and Sagalyn (1994) have studied some of the efforts city governments' 
have made toward modern-day urban renewal. Most have continued to focus on central 
business districts and the struggle to bring dollars into a city with significantly less 
federal aid. Before the suburban boom in the early 1950s, US cities were the primary 
market for goods and services. It did not take long, though, for suburban areas to start 
competing with cities to be a new home for some of its business life. Businesses that 
specialized in providing goods and services to the typical household followed the middle-
class to the suburbs. Even in the 1950s, city officials felt the trend of business decline and 
wrung their hands over tax revenue losses. City leaders and businesses keenly observed 
the economic successes of suburban malls since the opening of Northgate Mall in Seattle, 
Washington. One tactic used in the 1980s and 90s that has helped many a city's 
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downtown area bring business back has, ironically, been modeling the suburban shopping 
mall, although not in suburban fashion. Seattle, Boston, Pasadena (even St Louis) all 
have attempted to bring entice business back to downtown through the mall concept. 
Urban malls such as Paseo Colorado in Pasadena, California are successful because they 
interweave residential living and amenities with retail.
4
  
Urban renewal was winding down by 1970, and many cities had used the 
programs to build conference centers and stadiums that successfully drew suburbanites to 
downtown, and many suburban Americans worked in the city. Federal urban policies 
were designed to help cities combat their social and economic woes, yet unfortunately 
they have led to frustration and left many jaded, displaced and, if able, opting for 
suburban communities. After the game was over, the conference had ended or the 
workday was done, downtowns remained troubled ghosts of what they once were. 
Federally-sponsored programs have changed cities irrevocably and city officials as well 
as the business community are still dealing with the after-effects. However the impact of 
these programs and the structures built (and demolished) with federal dollars did not 
wound all cities universally. Maintaining stadiums, conference centers and vibrant 
downtowns allows cities to capitalize on being at the center of the marketplace of ideas 
and an entertainment destination. Attracting people the world over to start a business, a 
restaurant or to play a concert are good things for a city and as Glaeser (2011) points out, 
a city’s success is wrapped up in its ability to be an attractive economic and social hub. 
Many cities have been able to increase their attractiveness by leveraging urban renewal 
programs to shape their look and appeal in ways that would have been out of reach 
without federal help.      
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Highways. Since the 1930s, an interstate highway system had been on the wish 
list of automakers, trucking and freight unions, that lobbied Congress and policy makers 
to craft legislation. It was under President Eisenhower that a highways act (where the 
federal government footed most of the bill), finally had enough political traction to 
become law. The Interstate Highway Act of 1956 and has had a profound and lasting 
effect on how we Americans think about transportation. Cities from New York to Los 
Angeles embraced the super highways, believing that they would be able to right many 
urban wrongs, from blight to economic decline. Agricultural areas saw highways as a 
streamlined, efficient way to bring goods to bigger markets faster, and further away. 
Making good use of urban renewal programs, American cities sought out highways as a 
means to promote their growth. The expansion of suburbia, too, has been aided by federal 
transportation policy that is almost uniformly in favor of automobiles. Highway 
construction represented ways to remake the urban landscape and connect cities.  
Interstates made living outside the city possible, and practically convenient 
precisely because they connected suburban communities with central cities. Arguably the 
phenomena of a sprawling suburban landscape surrounding central cities would not have 
happened on the same scale without interstates. Not only did freeways provide the 
physical connections between cities and suburbs, they were instrumental in the attempts 
of cities to clear out their slums and other so-called blighted neighborhoods and to 
rejuvenate the central business districts. What city residents and public officials found, 
however, was that the cost of placing an interstate through a city was not the magic bullet 
solution they had hoped for after all but at times even compounded the same old 
problems. In high-density urban areas freeways often cut through neighborhoods causing 
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sections to become physically isolated, which caused decay and only encouraged those 
residents to move. 
State and local transportation departments were responsible for implementation of 
the Highway Act. They were also accountable for the location of and allocations for the 
freeways. Transportation departments adhered to cultures that value efficiency and 
scientific principles as the best means to serve the public and were resistant to change 
highway plans based on political influence or neighborhood pleas. As a result, much to 
his or her chagrin, the typical local government official had very little to do with where 
actual routes would be located. What was important to the national and state highway 
departments was alleviating traffic congestion in urban areas by providing the most direct 
and timely routes, often to the detriment of community preservation and rational land 
development (Fainstein et al 1986).   
For many New England or Midwestern cities struggling against the changing tide 
that was carrying their populations and businesses out to the suburbs, an efficient network 
of highways implemented at the national level and largely on the federal dime had 
seemed as if it would be a win/win for everybody. Many of these officials believed 
interstate highways would boost the city’s economies and entice their citizens to remain, 
at least for shopping and entertainment. However, one of the well-documented effects of 
highway development is how it spurred on suburbanization (Fainstein et al 1986, 14; 
Jackson, 1985). Competition among cities for business and capital investments as well as 
government funding for projects and improvements has always been fierce (Logan & 
Molotch, 52) and the need to incorporate an interstate highway within the city meant that 
rarely were cities leaders able to approach highway construction with thoughtful, 
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articulated plans. A significant exception to this was New York City planner Robert 
Moses, who seemed to have no shortage of grand plans for interweaving federally-funded 
highways throughout the entire New York region (Caro 1975). Moses' plans were not 
benign, he was a master of using highways as a means for removing poor minority 
residential neighborhoods away from downtown and their residents ultimately into 
segregated public housing. A number of city leaders emulated his schemes or hired him 
as a consultant. Through at least the 1970s, top government officials and members of the 
business community viewed interstate projects as necessary for the future of their cities 
and an economic godsend.  
Public officials felt a real sense of urgency when it came to highway 
development. Similar to the pressure to have multiple railroad lines going through a city, 
if an urban area failed to connect with a major highway, officials knew the effect would 
be crippling. They foresaw that highways were necessary to keep businesses located in 
the city. The interstate system was a key component in shaping the economic 
connectivity between states and regions, as well providing ease for people to travel great 
distances (Dunn 1998). Transportation policy at both the national and state levels came to 
be dominated by road construction and the auto industry at the expense of all other modes 
of transportation. In Detroit and other cities public transportation fell into serious 
disrepair or else was nearly choked out of existence. Scholars such as Jackson (1985) and 
Judd et al. (1998) have linked highway development to increases in urban sprawl and 
cultural separatism. Highways disproportionately favored white households who desired 
to take advantage of home ownership opportunities made possible by federal housing 
policy in the suburbs. Minorities who remained in central cities were left with a severely 
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underdeveloped public transit system as transit funding dwindled or were bought and shut 
down by private organizations who would benefit from auto industry expansion  (Bullard 
2004).  
  Teaford (1990, 1993) has examined how cities such as Pittsburgh and Baltimore 
have struggled to cope with declining economic vitality and a changing population post-
WWII. Interstates in particular have acted as double-edged swords because though people 
were attracted downtown for jobs, entertainment or cultural events, highways have also 
facilitated movement out to the suburbs, which helps explain cities' struggles with urban 
highway development.  
Cities clamored for express highways to be built within their borders, hopeful it 
would stimulate and grow their market economy. They were unable to manage the 
negative effects highways had on neighborhood redevelopment. For many cities, 
expressway projects only served to demolish minority neighborhoods, herding those 
displaced into other marginalized neighborhoods, thereby causing stress on social 
services and unrest (Squires, 191). Interstate highways have had some severe effects on 
cities, but they have made commuting in and out of the city convenient. Highways alone 
did not create suburban sprawl and cannot bear the entire burden for population loss of 
urban cores. Breugmann (2005) argues that suburbanization would have occurred 
whether interstate highways had been built or not because there was a strong desire by 
many to move to communities outside the city limits. While there are differences in the 
degree highways impacted a city, the location of highways within cities and historic 
differences between cities, all major US cities are on interstate routes and highways 
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represent an unchanging, universal factor – thus they cannot entirely explain the 
differences in growth or decline that cities have experienced.     
Manufacturing. Beyond population loss, cities also faced the loss of commercial 
activity, most especially in production. In the Fordist Era manufacturing industry has 
traditionally been a source of reliable, entry-level work that paid relatively well and did 
not require a college degree. During the 1940s through the 1970s thousands of African-
Americans were migrating to cities, dealing with the not-so-easy task of finding decent 
housing for their family and adjusting to life in a new place. Over the same time period, 
America's industrial economy was being transformed into one based almost solely on 
service. Technological innovations in transportation and communication enabled many 
industries to relocate outside the urban core and even in other countries where regulation 
and oversight were less strenuous and where trade unions were weak (Sugrue 2005). The 
global marketplace also impacted US manufacturing such as the steel industry, which 
was devastated when international steel production became competitive in price and 
quality. 
John Portz’s work The Politics of Plant Closings considers the various responses 
a city or community takes when faced with a plant closing. Portz (1990) shows how 
developing relationships with key industry leaders and being quick to form alliances in 
order to amass resources on behalf of a threatened industry had a decisive impact on 
whether a plant ultimately closed. However, policy makers are constrained by the tools, 
bargaining chips, goals, and rules that play into whether a plant will close or remain open. 
While no public official wants business to leave the local economy, there are times when 
there is little that can be done to affect the decision to close a plant down. This is 
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particularly evident in older Northern and Midwestern cities where suburban 
municipalities or Sunbelt communities were able to welcome manufactures into their 
communities by offering tax incentives. Businesses also found the South and Sunbelt's 
lack of organized labor and unions attractive. The movement of manufacturing to the Sun 
Belt has been a boon to Southern and Western cities which have grown and prospered 
dramatically over the last sixty years (Savitch & Kantor 2002). 
The movement of the auto industry’s manufacturing plants from Detroit to 
suburban and Sunbelt regions are illustrative of devastating loss and the inability of city 
leaders to prevent it. Sugrue describes how the loss of jobs in the automotive industry had 
a ripple effect as smaller industries that supported auto manufacturing either went out of 
business or moved closer to newer plants, this in turn hurt retail business, bars and 
restaurants (2005, 149). The response of Detroit city officials to loss of jobs and high 
rates of unemployment was to focus attention on building massive structures that were 
largely unneeded and did not provide enough jobs to outweigh the costs of neighborhood 
destruction and  revenue loss through tax breaks (Glaeser 2011, 62-62). Central cities, 
particularly Rust Belt cities, are not the manufacturing centers they were in the 19
th
 
Century. As manufacturing jobs disappeared, city officials have been left overseeing 
abandoned factories, vacant warehouses and populations ill-equipped to work in a service 
and technology driven economy.  
While industrial decline in the US was concentrated in the Rust Belt, some cities 
were able to successfully reinvent themselves. Cities such as Detroit, Pittsburgh, New 
York and Boston were manufacturing giants but do not all share the same fate. New York 
suffered severely from the loss of the garment industry but flourished with the growth of 
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its financial services sector. Glaeser (2011, 42) makes the point that while politics and 
political mismanagement are a common feature of Rust Belt cities, the critical mistake 
was focusing on the built environment rather than promoting commerce, building a 
skilled workforce and fostering entrepreneurial innovation. The decline of the 
manufacturing industry was harmful to cities but it did not necessarily put cities on a 
permanent path to ruin.  
Fragmentation and the City 
The impact of white flight, federal urban policy, highways and the decline of 
manufacturing in the central city are some of the traditional reasons for why some cities 
in America have suffered. However these explanations do not fully explain the variation 
in outcomes that has occurred over the last 60 years. White flight, urban renewal 
programs, highway construction and blue-collar job loss occurred almost universally 
across cities and yet not all cities have found themselves in continued decline. In other 
words, cities that have grown and thrived do so not because they never experienced white 
flight or do not have highways but in spite of them. What then could explain the 
differences between cities in decline and cities that grow? I submit that the varying levels 
of political fragmentation that exist in metropolitan areas play just such a role.  
An additional explanation for why some regions end up in more disastrous 
predicaments than others is that higher levels of fragmentation lead to uneven tax levels, 
and social disparities (Berry 2009). Political fragmentation has been linked to racial 
segregation in school districts and across municipalities. Additionally, fragmentation 
creates more stakeholders, which can bog down responses to problems across the entire 
region (Leach 1976, 156). In spite of much study across a number of decades which has 
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been devoted to sorting out these claims, large gaps in our understanding of political 
fragmentation remain. The largest of these and the primary focus of my study is based on 
an examination of how political fragmentation compares with other explanations of 
decline. 
The impact of fragmentation on the condition of the central city is an area in need 
of continued study but it is a sensitive topic precisely because the choice of where to live 
is a cornerstone of the American Dream. If the decline of central cities is due, even in 
part, to political fragmentation, it calls into question the idea that we are free and 
independent to choose where to live. As the number of governments grow and 
metropolitan areas expand outward, the enticements to exit the central city may become 
all the more attractive. Chapter 3 will discuss the role that political fragmentation has 
played in city outcomes and demonstrate that cities can at times be at a disadvantage in 
competing with their suburbs where housing is both cheaper and larger, schools are 
newer and the governing structures young and pliable. 
Summary 
White flight, federal urban policy, highways and the decline of the manufacturing 
industry in Rustbelt cities each offer explanations for urban decline in America. However 
they are not able to fully explain the differences between whether a city ultimately 
remains in decline or a state of slow growth or even becomes a fast growth city. It is 
possible that political fragmentation can explain the disparity. Regions with less 
fragmentation may have denser cities and an easier time crafting solutions for 
metropolitan wide problems, whereas urban areas with higher levels of fragmentation 
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may succumb to a competitive and defensive view of political neighbors and be resistant 
to collective action.   
How interconnected are the governing bodies that exist around the central cities to 
the condition of the central city? Does a region suffer because its central city can only 
grasp at solutions to its problems, or because there is a failure to see the struggles of the 
city as having anything to do with the behavior of governing bodies within the region? 
There are no quick and easy answers to these questions but building a better 
understanding of how cities decline in relation to their region. Chapter 3 will fill in the 
gap left from urban political theories will address this with an in-depth consideration of 
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Notes: Chapter 2 
                                                          
1 Growth in Urban Population Outpaces Rest of Nation, Census Bureau Reports. Census 
Newsroom update Monday, March 26, 2012. CB12-50.  
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html 
2
 In the top 25 high schools as ranked by U.S. News and World report in 2012, 10 are 
located in the central city. U.S. News and World Report rankings for research hospitals in 
2012 for specialties such as cancer, diabetes, and cardiology are all located within central 
cities. The FBI's Crime in the United States report for 2012 showed that violent crime 
rates have been falling for the last ten years. 
3




 Pasadena, California is a classic suburb and on the surface may not appear to fit within 
the same list with cities like Seattle and Boston. The example of Paseo is included 
because as the metropolitan area of Los Angeles has expanded, suburban Pasadena 
became more urbanized and experienced problems that were typically associated with a 
central city, particularly disinvestment in its central business district. Its mixed use mall 
is touted as a success story for reinvestment and development. 
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Chapter 3 
Cities Awash in a Sea of Governments 
"A Region is an area safely larger than the last one whose problems we found no 
solution." 
-Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities 
A common caricature of the suburbs is that they are uniform in their upper-class 
values, populated by those who are wealthy or upwardly mobile and politically 
Republican. Suburban communities have also been credited for causing the central city to 
carry an unfair share of the expenditures to support public welfare, pollution control, 
museums, highway and street maintenance, as well as public safety and crime fighting 
(Rehfuss 1977). Rehfuss is swift to point out that these attributes do not apply to all 
suburbs but are at times formed and perpetuated from cherry-picked examples. Still 
decades after his writing, works like Bishop's The Great Sort ascribe much the same 
characteristics to the suburban way of life.
1
 As discussed in Chapter 2, there are many 
reasons why cities have experienced dramatically different outcomes over the last century 
such as the out migration of manufacturing, technological innovation, neighborhood 
destabilization, crime, blight, and failing schools. Alone, none of these factors can 
adequately explain the sometimes vast differences in outcomes that exist between cities. 
Political fragmentation may be the missing link in these explanations, indeed the 
persistence of the "suburbs are exploitive and harmful to core cities" hypothesis is due in 
part to the continued linking of governing structure to uneven paths of renewal and 
decline that continue to play out in U.S. cities.   
The idea that metropolitan growth outside of the central city and political 
fragmentation can have a negative impact on the city is not path breaking. Indeed it is a 
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common complaint in the literature stretching back to 1926 Supreme Court affirmation of 
Euclidean zoning in Euclid v. Ambler which essentially allowed suburbs to exclude 
undesirable residents (Wolf 2008) to reports by the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations of the economic and social disparities between central city 
and suburb (ACIR 1965). Though warnings of the dangers in unbridled political 
fragmentation have been sounded for decades, the empirical evidence that fragmentation 
actually causes harm to central cities is still developing. All metropolitan areas in the 
U.S. are politically fragmented to varying degrees but does the amount of fragmentation 
play a role in the growth, economic vitality, or diversity of a central city? In light of that 
question, this chapter will consider empirical evidence that has accumulated over the last 
half century to ascertain what is understood about the effects of fragmentation on central 
cities.   
Fragmentation is pervasive in metropolitan areas and because of this scholars 
have developed many ways of defining and quantifying the concept. What is most 
commonly meant by the term political fragmentation, at least in the local government 
context, is the division of some geographic space into units of government, commonly 
municipalities. But fragmentation also occurs in the hierarchy of government as 
municipalities are nested within special districts, counties, states, and ultimately the 
federal government. In addition to the layering and multiplicity of governments, I add in 
this study a third arena of fragmentation for consideration, and that is the division of 
political power within a level of government among elected official,s referred to as 
internal fragmentation. Taken together, these three components of fragmentation 
comprise a more comprehensive and nuanced definition of political fragmentation which 
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sets this study apart. Each of these components has its own body of scholarship focused 
on understanding the impact fragmentation has on a range of topics from political 
participation and land use, to service delivery and taxation. It is common for studies to 
examine only one level of fragmentation at a time, but this singular view obscures 
complexities in fragmentation's effects that emerge when each component is represented. 
While Chapter 1 included a discussion of metropolitan organization and political 
fragmentation, this chapter drills down deeper into the discussion of how political 
fragmentation shapes city outcomes and how this may impact the greater metropolitan 
area.     
Horizontal Fragmentation 
The multiplicity of governing units within a metropolitan area is horizontal 
fragmentation. Perhaps the most common conceptualization of political fragmentation is 
simply the number of governments in any given geography. Within a metropolitan area, 
the number of municipalities or special districts would be a general indication of how 
much fragmentation exists within the region. Horizontal fragmentation occurs wherever 
there are coterminous governing units of the same type within the metro area, such as 
local municipal governments. Fragmentation at this level varies in cities and metro areas 
both across geographic space and through time.  In general urban areas in the Northeast 
and Midwest have more horizontal fragmentation than regions in the South and West. 
Horizontal fragmentation has leveled off in terms of the number of new municipal 
governments. However, growth is steady in special districts which continue to be created 
in metropolitan areas. There has also been a downward trend in school district growth, 
primarily because of consolidation during the late 1930s through 1980. Although 
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consolidation has been concentrated in rural districts it was driven at the state level by a 
bureaucratic push for professionalism and centralization of district control (Strang 1987). 
While horizontal fragmentation generally is the proliferation of non-overlapping 
governing units in a metro area, the bulk of the scholarly research focuses on the 
municipal level. 
There is a deep well of scholarly work on horizontal fragmentation showing its 
impact on everything from governance, to the movement of jobs and population from the 
central city to the urban fringe. High concentrations of governments in a metro area have 
been linked to racial isolation and separation, growth of the metro area at the fringe, and 
economic disparity between the core city and suburban municipalities. A review of these 
findings and how they impact city outcomes is useful to establish what the expected 
effects of horizontal fragmentation will be for the analysis.  
The literature on urban and metropolitan politics broadly classifies metro areas 
into central cities and suburbs. This city-suburb dichotomy has produced two 
perspectives about the effectiveness of local governments in using their legal powers and 
the ability of local officials to control the affairs of their own jurisdiction. The disparities 
that developed between cities and their suburbs during the 1950s and 1960s were 
systematic and observed in urban areas across the country leading to the suburban 
exploitation hypothesis. The work of Kasarda and others, who examined the city-suburb 
dynamic, developed the suburban exploitation hypothesis as a framework to explain the 
economic stratification occurring between city and suburb. In essence the exploitation 
hypothesis claimed that suburban residents take advantage of central cities by demanding 
services and facilities, but avoid the attendant costs by living beyond the city's 
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jurisdiction (Kasarda 1972). Later work by Slovak shows the fading of suburban 
demands for services such as streets and recreational facilities but a growing demand for 
protective services (1985). This led Slovak to conclude that exploitation of cities still 
occurs, just in a more focused way (185). The exploitation hypothesis has faded, pushed 
back by scholarly reviews such as Hawkins and Ihrke (1999) who argue that it is now 
suburbs that instead of taking from cities, are providing income through taxes and fees, 
employment, retail revenues  and then provide parks, retail, jobs and other recreation to 
city residents.  
In some aspects Hawkins and Ihrke’s criticism is valid, Kasarda's work looked at 
metropolitan areas during the 1950s and 1960s before cities had adopted measures to 
limit suburban "free-riders" such as fee-for-service, earnings taxes, and special 
metropolitan taxing districts. However the argument that central cities and suburban 
governments are on unequal footing remains relevant in terms of autonomy over land use 
policies and as a question of whether fragmentation facilitates racial and economic 
sorting, consumption of green space and unplanned growth.  
A common view of fragmentation is that it encourages growth at the fringe by 
turning green space into residential neighborhoods, office parks and retail space. The 
movement of people and firms is in the same direction, towards the periphery. However 
the empirical link between sprawl and fragmentation is not conclusive. Razin and 
Rosentraub's (2000) study of U.S. and Canadian cities finds a weak correlation between 
sprawl and fragmentation. They also note that having a region with less fragmentation 
does not equate to compact development or high population density. However 
Carruther’s (2003) research at the county level found a significant relationship between 
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fragmentation and urban sprawl. He found that municipal and special district 
fragmentation, infrastructure investments and white flight all have significant impacts on 
growth in unincorporated areas on urban fringes (475). These studies demonstrate that 
sprawl is not solely a factor of growing horizontal fragmentation but a result of variations 
in the powers and restrictions on land use.   There is evidence that development on the 
edges of metropolitan areas is driven not only by population growth, but by localized 
zoning laws that direct and manipulate development to the benefit of housing prices 
(Poindexter 2005). The desire to control land use, exclude undesirable businesses and 
low-income housing are also key factors in metropolitan political reorganization 
according to Hogen-Esch (2001) and Purcell's (2001) studies on secession attempts in 
Los Angeles' San Fernando Valley. The conditions necessary to promote competition 
between governing units and to use limited governing authority to be attractive to 
upwardly mobile households seems to be magnified in urban areas with higher horizontal 
fragmentation. 
In that same vein, a centralized metropolitan area would be characterized by less 
income sorting and competition between communities. Portland, Oregon is notable for its 
mechanism put in place to control sprawl, reduce the zero-sum nature of competition 
between the city and its suburbs, and to keep low-income housing decentralized by 
requiring multi-family, affordable housing throughout the region (Aoki 2005). The city of 
Portland has certainly benefited from being within a centralized region but the conditions 
are somewhat unique to Portland. Metro areas have not eagerly sought to model the 
governing arrangements of Portland, but this is partly due to the role of state law and the 
way it defines and limits the choices available to communities within a metropolitan area. 
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Peterson (1981) makes a compelling argument that cities are limited by state laws 
in the choices they make. Jurisdictions must compete with other governments within the 
region and because cities are limited, this compels them to narrow down to a singular 
focus on economic development. Redistributive policies that would directly benefit 
neighborhood residents are relatively ineffectual or pushed to the backburner. City 
officials must focus on bringing in private investments, at times to the neglect of local 
residents, who are then more likely to move outside the central city to places where they 
perceive their needs will be better met. Limited political autonomy and fierce competition 
then become the causal mechanism to explain city outcomes. In regions where there are 
more municipal governments surrounding the central city, the more magnified the focus 
will be on economic development and perceptions of competition. 
While Peterson's work emphasizes the limited scope of local autonomy, 
Danielson's work focuses on what cities do with the autonomy they possess. He argues 
that municipal governments utilize their power to protect boundary lines, set lot sizes, 
establish building codes and housing densities, in order to ensure that residents meet a 
minimum economic threshold. This allows local governments to keep a high value 
property tax base and a low tax rate (Danielson 1976). Danielson's concern is not what 
central cities are unable to do with their local authority but the ability of suburban 
governments to effectively exclude certain groups of people - though history shows cities 
are not naive of exclusionary powers. When suburban communities systematically 
exclude apartment buildings and other multifamily housing and demand that new 
residences and lots be a certain size, they restrict the types of households that are able to 
move into the community. Central cities end up with disproportionally higher levels of 
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homeless, mentally ill, low-income, and elderly populations (Parks 1997).  By this 
reasoning, cities surrounded by more municipal governments should find themselves 
shouldering a disproportionate burden of poorer residents.  
Horizontal fragmentation is also a source of blame when it comes to racial 
separation and isolation across geography. Part of this is historic in nature because early 
federal housing policy routinely favored white households over minorities and 
encouraged whites to move outside the city limits. Municipalities also commonly adopted 
laws and policies that made it illegal to sell, lease, or rent property to racial minorities. 
While racially motivated restrictive covenants have been illegal for decades, their ghosts 
linger on in urban housing patterns. Jonas (1998) shows that the desegregation of the 
Columbus Ohio School District not only encouraged white flight, but housing developers 
successfully exploited the fragmented metro area to promote continual residential 
development.  
There is scholarly evidence to suggest that higher levels of horizontal 
fragmentation in the metropolitan area have led to greater concentrations of minority 
groups in the central city (and then in first-ring suburbs) and less integration in 
municipalities, within municipalities and across the region (Massey and Denton 1988, 
Massey and Hajnal 1995). Logan (2001), Massey and Denton (1993) and Farley (2008) 
clearly show that not only are communities and neighborhoods still highly segregated but 
white exposure to other races, in particular African-Americans, is limited. Segregation 
and isolation of races appears to be more pronounced in larger metropolitan areas 
(Glaeser and Vigdor 2001). This pattern of segregation extends beyond the neighborhood 
or municipality. Bischoff’s (2008) investigation of segregation across political units 
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shows that increasing the number of school districts in a region increases the levels of 
racial segregation. Despite the relative decline of research on the suburban exploitation 
hypothesis, the factors of that framework still studied point to evidence that political 
fragmentation, specifically horizontal fragmentation remain important for understanding 
the racial composition of metropolitan areas.  
Segregation and poverty have not respected the central city-suburban bright line 
and have not remained confined to city ghettos and slums. Municipal decline and poverty 
have found their way into suburban neighborhoods in metropolitan areas across the 
country. Suburban municipalities, particularly traditional working-class communities, 
have witnessed an influx of poorer residents, economic disinvestment, struggling schools, 
and rising crime. Barron and Frug (2005), Dreir (2004), Orfield (2002), and Vicino 
(2008) are among those who demonstrate that local autonomy over land use, tax levels 
and education policy are often not enough to leverage the fiscal capacity necessary to 
combat decline. The problems of central cities are now common complaints in inner-ring 
working-class suburbs. The decline of suburban communities has brought to light an 
interesting pattern in local autonomy over land use. It would seem that the tools available 
for local government to shape what happens within their boundaries appear more 
powerful when cultivating residents of higher incomes but when faced with the demands 
that accompany poorer households and a need for more redistributive policies, the tools 
seem inadequate.  
The amount of fragmentation in a metro area is a further complexity of local 
autonomy. Vicino’s study of Baltimore is illustrative. The typical pattern goes something 
like this: High levels of fragmentation allow newly developing fringe areas to exclude 
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lower income households through zoning codes; older suburban communities lose 
residents to the newer neighborhoods and are replaced by poorer households who require 
a higher level of public services. Metro areas with higher fragmentation would be 
expected to have more extreme levels of income sorting, demonstrating the pattern 
described above. In the Baltimore case struggling suburban communities exist in very 
low levels of fragmentation. Outside of the City of Baltimore, Baltimore County has no 
other municipal governments and so presents an opportunity to test the assumption that 
where there is centralized local autonomy to pool resources and redirect funds, there will 
be less blight and poverty. Vicino finds that despite a consolidated political structure and 
concentrated redevelopment efforts Baltimore County lacked the regional tools and 
funding from state and federal government needed to adequately stop and reverse decline 
(2008). Our understanding of how horizontal fragmentation shapes suburban and central 
city outcomes is still not entirely clear and this is due to the complex nature of 
metropolitan fragmentation in America. The actions of other governments certainly 
impacts central cities, but the way that vertical and internal fragmentation exert 
themselves on the city are different.    
Summary. The scholarly evidence suggests several conclusions about the impact of 
horizontal fragmentation. Metropolitan areas with higher numbers of municipal 
governments surrounding central cities have greater degrees of racial sorting leading to 
higher levels of segregation and racial isolation. Increases in municipal growth increase 
the likelihood that there will be pockets of isolated poverty and wealth not just in the 
central city but in the suburbs as well. Municipal growth is also linked to greater 
development of green space and growth of the metropolitan area at the fringe. Horizontal 
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fragmentation may also negatively impact the population density of the central city as 
residents have more options beyond the city limits. Cities surrounded by greater numbers 
of municipalities may view the surrounding communities as competition for resources 
and revenues and thus are more likely to tax wages on those who work or reside within 
the city.  
Hypotheses. The literature on horizontal fragmentation leads to the following hypotheses 
to be examined in this study. Differing levels of horizontal fragmentation will have a 
negative impact on central city population change. As the proportion of governments, 
particularly school districts and municipalities, increase in a metropolitan area the 
population in the central city is expected to decrease. Horizontal fragmentation is also 
expected to have a significant relationship with segregation across the metropolitan area 
(measured by racial dissimilarity and isolation). As the proportion of municipal 
governments and school districts increase in a metropolitan area, the levels of 
dissimilarity and isolation are also expected to increase. In other words, more government 
will indicate higher levels of overall segregation.   
.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Vertical Fragmentation 
Political fragmentation is not only the proliferation of governing units of the same 
type across the metropolitan area, but also occurs whenever governing bodies overlap 
each other. In the United States, governments exist in a top-down hierarchy; federal, 
state, county, and municipality where each level has constitutional authority over a 
smaller unit. Within a metropolitan area however, governments exist in an additional type 
of vertical fragmentation called jurisdictional overlap. Governing units do not always fit 
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neatly within the boundary lines of larger geographies and so vertical fragmentation is 
created whenever jurisdictions intersect each other (Berry 2009, Park 1997, Wagner and 
Weber 1975). For instance, a resident of the city of St. Louis, Missouri pays taxes to 10 
different taxing authorities. Some of these taxing authorities, like the public schools and 
city operations only collect revenue from city residents but others, such as the sewer 
district and the zoo and museum district, collect taxes from city residents as well as non-
city (i.e. suburban) residents. Typically with metro areas, governing units that overlap 
other governments do not exercise authority in a hierarchical sense but only over a 
specific area of service provision. The focus in this study is where vertical fragmentation 
occurs at the metropolitan level, which is mainly in special districts. Following the work 
of Berry (2009) vertical fragmentation will be defined as the territorial overlapping of 
special districts within metropolitan areas. Governments such as counties and 
municipalities rarely have boundaries that overlap, however school districts, sanitation 
districts, parks, and even libraries can pile on, one on top of another.  
Scholarly evidence on vertical fragmentation show that it creates financial 
disparities between the central city and the rest of a metro area (Sacks 1968), increases 
the redundancy in service provision (Parks and Oakerson 1993) and has a harmful effect 
on the economic growth and incomes of a region (Nelson and Foster 1999). There has 
been a rise in the number of studies on regional governance. The discussion of the effects 
of vertical fragmentation includes both the differences in cities with decentralized and 
centralized regional government as well as instances where there is no formal regional 
government structure but networks of governance. 
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Vertical fragmentation creates an environment ripe for competition not only 
between governments with similar powers but also between governing units of different 
powers. Park (1997) interprets this intergovernmental competition as something innate to 
our federal system: The constitutions, statutes and rules of states encourage counties, 
central cities and suburbs to compete with each other in order to prevent political 
monopoly and preserve jurisdictional autonomy (730). This is demonstrated by Miller's 
(1981) finding that local governments desire to maintain prominence and power and will 
do so by increasing their service responsibilities. Local governments are attuned to their 
position within the metropolitan area, particularly the policy activities of the central city, 
and will adjust their expenditures in order to compete for development or cooperate on 
public safety policies (Park 1997, 743). 
Jurisdictions may engage in competition on the horizontal level but with vertical 
fragmentation, where governments overlap, there is also a pull towards monopolistic 
behavior (Wagner and Weber 1975). Governments balance a combination of profit 
maximization and output maximization and so when the population is small, less than 
150,000 according to research by Wagner and Weber, governments will focus on cost-
reduction. Beyond that population size they switch and focus more on controlling supply 
(1975, 679). Fragmentation is also accused of causing inefficiencies in service delivery, 
as well as driving up the cost of providing those services. This cost can be seen overtly 
through higher taxes or covertly through special districts that take in tax revenue, but it is 
sometimes hard to distinguish for the typical citizen (Berry 2009). But when inter-
municipal cooperation occurs, it can promote efficiency, equity and voice (Warner and 
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Hefetz 2002). Dowding and Mergoupis (2003) also find that fragmented governing 
systems do not increase efficiency either at the jurisdiction or at the metropolitan level. 
Beyond effects on governing behavior, vertical fragmentation has some distinct 
impacts on political participation. In fragmented metropolitan areas citizens are not better 
informed about their local government's service-tax package; they are not more likely to 
participate in local affairs; nor are they more satisfied with their local services when 
compared to residents of a consolidated, regional government (Lyons and Lowery 1989). 
Kelleher and Lowery note that fragmented governing arrangements in metro areas do not 
promote turnout until it reaches a theoretical point where there are so many governments 
it resembles a competitive market scenario. However when a metro area moved to 
consolidated government political participation by voting was predicted to be higher 
(2004). The level of political participation is also an important factor when it comes to 
understanding the role of special district governments. 
Special districts vary widely in size from subdivision-size to large enough to 
overlap other governing boundaries. Special districts are designed to provide a single 
service such as education, airports, highways, water, or mass transit. These governing 
units may collect a tax or issue fees for service in order to operate and over the last sixty 
years they have grown more than any other type of government. The distribution of 
special districts varies across metropolitan areas, something which Foster (1996) 
attributes to the legal environment in states. She finds that metropolitan areas with greater 
concentration of special districts exist in states  where the ground rules for creating 
governments that oversee service delivery are more permissible (306). The growth of 
special districts can be attributed to a pattern of officials utilizing lenient state laws to 
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simply create a new, single-purpose governing unit and avoid putting a tax increase 
before voters. Though residents are unable to avoid paying for the new service, they 
typically accept a special district as legitimate. The works of Berry (2009), Foster (1997) 
and Hendrick, Jimenez and Lal (2011) clearly show that vertical fragmentation actually 
increases total government spending. In other words, it is more expensive to live in metro 
areas that have higher levels of vertical fragmentation.   
Single-service governments are criticized for not carrying the same expectations 
of transparency and accountability that are ascribed to elected offices at the county or 
municipal level. The role of special districts on metropolitan governance and city service 
provision is a particular concern in this regard because even in cases where officials are 
elected there is still a risk that they will become captured by special interests. Special 
interest capture takes place because political participation is significantly lower for 
single-function elections versus general-purpose elections; they typically do not occur at 
the same time as other elections. Berry (2009, 65-67) discusses how the lower turnout can 
mean that the voters who do participate are not representative of the general public but of 
those select few who have a vested stake in the actions of the single-purpose government. 
The end result is that single-purpose governments tend to increase the cost of service 
provision as elected officials align policy closer to the desires of those who voted for 
them (Berry 2009).    
The number of special districts, and the level of overlapping governments can 
also create an environment where public policies are ineffective and private developers 
can take advantage of fragmentation. Jonas’ (1998) study of Franklin County and its 
central city Columbus, Ohio underscores this phenomenon. A busing program 
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implemented in the early 1980s to bring racial balance to the Columbus School District 
instigated a wave of white flight into other areas of Franklin County not included in the 
Columbus district. This was further exasperated by housing developers who utilized the 
vertical fragmentation – school districts, municipalities, county and state governments – 
to expand water and sewer services in order to build more housing outside of the 
Columbus School District. Developers also worked to keep school district and municipal 
boundary lines intact to keep the Columbus School District from incorporating new 
territory. Ultimately this maintained conditions for further white flight out of city schools 
(Jonas 1998, 335). The experience of Columbus is unique but it emphasizes a byproduct 
of vertical fragmentation: Where there is perceived demand economic development will 
work governing structures to their advantage in order to meet supply.      
Central cities tend to have less vertical fragmentation because they produce many 
services in house. Suburban governments have higher levels because many governments 
produce the same package of services (Parks and Oakerson 1993). Sacks (1967) found 
that fiscal disparities – the gap between needs and resources – are higher in central cities 
than in suburban areas. This is driven by differences in expenditures. Cities were found to 
have lower resources and higher tax rates, and to focus less spending on education but 
more on non-education services compared to their surrounding region (Sacks 1967, 249). 
If a multiplicity of governments encourages sorting and drives disparities in income 
between the central city and its suburbs then it makes sense that cities would have to 
increase spending on other areas such as safety and health. In contrast, suburban 
governments are free to spend more on education services because there is less demand 
for safety and health services. 
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There is also evidence that vertical fragmentation impacts the central city’s 
economic growth. As political fragmentation in a metropolitan area grows, economic 
growth and population growth increase as individuals and households have greater choice 
of where to reside. Stansel (2004) finds that the number of municipalities and the number 
of counties per 100,000 residents have a positive effect on economic growth as measured 
by population growth and per capita income.  His analysis lends support to the idea the 
fragmentation is not harmful to cities but economic growth is actually encouraged in 
areas with more government.  
The work of those like Rusk (1993) and Peirce (1993) suggest that in states where 
the laws of incorporation are more lenient central cities are doing better because they 
have been able to grow and expand their territory and population through annexation. 
Houston is an iconic example of this. The city was given a significant amount of 
autonomy from the state government to determine what areas were annexed into the city. 
No other major city has successfully adopted ten annexations between 1978 and 1996.  
Houston demonstrates that expanding territory is an effective way to capture population 
and revenues. Cities that exist in states where incorporation laws are harder are less likely 
to have successfully expanded their borders. This is because vertical fragmentation 
allows the higher level government to set the rules that influence a lower level of 
government. Rusk's elasticity hypothesis has been criticized though because his models 
fail to control for region and most states that have easier incorporation laws are located in 
the South and West, whereas the tougher incorporation states are primarily in the North 
East and Midwest. As Houston incorporated more and more territory, suburban areas felt 
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threatened enough that the state of Texas changed its laws to limit the geographic growth 
of the central city.  
Summary. Vertical fragmentation occurs when governing units territorially overlap one 
another. Within the metropolitan area, vertical fragmentation exists  as governments are 
piled on in a top down fashion, counties, special districts, municipalities and towns. 
While municipalities do not overlap, special districts do overlap each other as well as 
other governments. The work of Berry (2009) shows that jurisdictional overlap leads to 
higher tax rates among governments that share a common tax pool. This is primarily 
because individual jurisdictions will cater to special-interest constituencies while the 
costs are covered by the entire tax base. Vertical fragmentation also impacts what areas 
governments focus spending. In central cities more resources are allocated to safety and 
health compared to suburban municipalities. School districts represent a type of vertical 
fragmentation that may increase levels of segregation within a metro area as residents 
sort by race and wealth along school district boundaries. While horizontal fragmentation 
focused on the proliferation of governments across space and vertical fragmentation 
occurs when special districts overlap other jurisdictions, internal fragmentation involves 
the fragmentation of political power within the central city. 
Hypotheses. Vertical fragmentation is expected to have a positive relationship with own-
source revenue. As the levels of jurisdictional overlap increase across the metropolitan 
area, the level of tax burden borne by city residents will also increase. 
Internal Fragmentation 
A common charge laid against political fragmentation is that too much of it 
prevents crafting solutions to the problems that are notorious for crossing jurisdictions 
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(pollution, traffic congestion, water runoff) because there are too many decision-makers 
at the table. As central cities compete with their surrounding suburbs for residential and 
economic investment, they may find their own government structure presents another 
obstacle, particularly in regards to the number of elected officials. Internal fragmentation 
refers to this division of political power within a governing unit. Public officials are 
asked to balance the need to cooperate with officials from competing municipalities to 
craft regional policies and the need to focus on the constituents within their own 
jurisdiction. I posit that central cities where there is greater division of government 
among elected officials will have a harder time forming cooperative agreements and 
formal arrangements with other governing units across their region.   
 City planners and mayors may focus on economic investment, downtown 
redevelopment and working with other elected officials within the region, but for locally 
elected officials such as council members or aldermen elected from districts, the primary 
focus is on the neighborhood and its constituents. This inevitably can lead to conflict 
when making budgets, voting on tax policy, or education issues, because the various 
stake-holders have differing goals. Suburban cities often have newer, more streamlined 
government and so may have less internal politicking or at least an easier time moving 
legislation forward. Kantor's (2002) appraisal of New York City post 9/11 views the 
politically fragmented landscape of the city as a detriment to the city's recovery. Part of 
the problem is budgetary, but the key impediment is the governing structure and gridlock 
on key issues (budget, education, and finance) between the city council and mayor 
(Kantor 2002, 122). Cities with more elected officials represent a conundrum of too many 
cooks in the kitchen and the policies that emerge from their efforts may be too bland to 
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be effective. Taken together, elected official such as those on a school board, city council 
or board of aldermen may find that issues affecting their constituent base and protecting 
their political turf are more pressing and act as self-seeking profit maximizers. 
The levels of internal fragmentation may also affect the maneuverability of the 
city because each official acts as a gatekeeper for projects and developments within his or 
her jurisdiction. Public officials may find that issues affecting their constituent base 
demand their attention more than issues pertinent to constituents outside of their voting 
district or even their city. There is a tendency to have a singular focus on matters that 
impact ‘the folks back home’ and to leave issues that impact the greater good to the 
mayor and planning commissions. Zhang's (2011) study of how political representation 
affects preservation and economic development efforts within Chicago demonstrates this 
phenomenon. When development was supported by local aldermen the process for 
preservation initiatives moved forward, but when aldermen were not on board, such as 
when development cut through ward boundaries, the initiative went nowhere (Zhang 
2011, 535). Efforts by community-based organizations for development or preservation 
may reasonably be easier in cities that are less internally fragmented simply because there 
are fewer actors with agenda setting or veto power. 
The work of Feiock (2004, 2010) clearly lays out some of the hurdles facing 
elected officials when it comes to regional collaboration. Feiock's depiction of elected 
officials as risk averse, considering decisions in the short-term, able to veto policy by 
withholding information or consent, and resistant to giving up authority represent 
substantial barriers to solving regional problems (2010). Inter-government agreements are 
potentially more difficult to craft in urban areas where the number of elected officials 
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who are necessary to share information and take political risk are higher relative to 
others. However, Feiock consistently argues that collaboration is not only possible in 
light of these obstacles, but occurs in cases where there is sufficient incentives. When 
cooperating with other local governments for federal grants, officials will use collective 
action to work together (2004). This willingness of public officials to work together is 
present in Lindstrom's study of the Chicago area mayor's caucus. The Mayor's Caucus 
was formed to bring together mayors from across the Chicago region to collaborate on 
mutual concerns. Lindstrom details the group's struggle to restructure and refinance the 
public transportation systems into one, centralized system and he demonstrates how 
politically difficult it is to enact a policy that an elected official  perceives to be harmful 
to his community (2010).  The difficulty is not necessarily assuaged even when the policy 
would clearly benefit the greater good of the region.  
Rubin's (1992) case study analysis of budget reform in central cities finds a trend 
between adopting reform and a reformed governing style. This fits within the internal 
fragmentation framework that stipulates that the division of political power among 
elected officials impacts the city's ability and willingness to deal with problems. Cities 
that have adopted fewer progressive reforms are hallmarked by the persistent presence of 
patronage, politics playing an important part in policy-making, and less accountability 
and transparency in administration processes and documentation. Less reformed cities are 
slower to adopt budget reforms, to innovate, and to alter control of department operations 
(Rubin 1992). Central cities who have a more reformed style of government, such as city-
manager, typically have more at-large elected officials than less reformed cities which 
could reduce turf protection and encourage regional cooperation.  
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There is also some literature on the impact politically fragmented systems have on 
levels of corruption. Wilson (1966) makes a strong case that at least at the state level, the 
fragmented American system creates an environment that allows individuals to use 
political means for their own benefit. This is due in part to less visibility of public 
officials - particularly in special purpose districts. Meier and Holbrook (1992) argue that 
corruption has historical and cultural roots in urban America because of political 
machines and a culture among politicians that valued favors, loyalty and personal gain 
over efficiency. The work of Litt (1963) finds a link between cynical views about 
government and political participation. Individuals are less likely to participate if they 
feel that elected officials are corrupt and Litt found that this effect varied by location. His 
comparison of Boston, suburban Boston, and communities in Oregon show that 
proximity to a central city is associated with increased political cynicism towards local 
politics and politicians (Litt 1963, 318). Density of elected officials is not only an issue 
for central cities but for the greater urban area as well. 
 While internal fragmentation is primarily a central city phenomenon, 
theoretically elected officials could impact political participation and growth in suburban 
areas as well. The conventional wisdom about elected officials in suburban governments 
is that since these governments tend to be smaller in comparison to the central city and 
typically represent more reformed government, they are more likely to have residents 
who know who their elected officials are and be more in-tune with local issues. However, 
Lyons and Lowery (1989) find that citizens in internally fragmented metropolitan areas 
do not feel a closer connection to their elected officials, at least when compared to 
residents of consolidated government. Nelson and Foster (1999) actually find that the 
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density of elected officials at the special-district level has a negative effect on per capita 
income growth. This implies that greater concentrations of elected officials cost more to 
sustain than in areas with fewer elected positions.  
Summary. A common approach to cure a metro area of the ills of too much political 
fragmentation is to consolidate government and reduce the number of elected officials. 
However resistance to regional government and governance does not only come from 
individual voters who do not want to see their municipality absorbed into a larger form of 
government, but also from elected officials who risk political impotence and do not want 
to lose their jobs and livelihood. The concentration of elected officials may have a 
negative impact on central cities as they compete with their surrounding governments for 
residents and resources because elected officials may resist new developments or 
participation in collective action if they perceive such things as being harmful to their re-
election. Higher numbers of elected officials are also associated with higher residential 
political cynicism. The density of elected officials in older central cities may be resistant 
to political reforms, less likely to adopt budget reforms, slower to innovate and alter 
control of department operations. Ultimately high levels of internal fragmentation may be 
harmful for cities because they are unable to craft solutions to region-wide problems and 
substantial policy innovation may be watered down or take decades to become politically 
palatable to elected leaders. 
 Hypotheses. Internal fragmentation is expected to have an overall negative effect on city 
outcomes. Increases in the number of elected officials will likely increase the tax burden 
and increase levels of segregation. 
Summary 
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  The continued growth of metropolitan areas, while meeting consumers’ demands, 
comes at a cost. Each individual unit of government tends to be inward looking and does 
not consider its actions and policies within the broader context of the metro area. There 
tends to be not just competition between city and suburb but each municipality competes 
with all those surrounding it for residents, businesses, and revenues. This lends itself to a 
kind of hostile fiefdom mentality. While competition among municipalities is lauded for 
promoting practices that ideally would be efficient and cost effective, in reality it 
produces an environment where city officials are able to exercise restrictive zoning to 
keep out multi-family housing and less desirable businesses. Because residents are loathe 
to raise their own taxes, it is commonplace for service provision to be controlled by 
special district governments. Special districts are more likely to be run by officials 
beholden to special interests, which means there is less accountability and transparency.  
When it comes to the central city, the impact of political fragmentation across the 
metropolitan area is often overlooked. This is an area rich in potential research that can 
be a great benefit to regions as a whole. Many studies consider only the dynamics 
occurring within the suburbs or only within the central city but I argue that understanding 
the relationship of cities within their regions is critically important. Regions, at least by 
Census Bureau definitions, exist as functional wholes or in some cases dysfunctional 
units, and by not studying cities and suburbs in context to each other means that 
phenomena occurring at a system level will be systematically missed. Pivotal to the study 
of the functionality of a metropolitan area is an understanding of the context of 
jurisdictional development within the region. The crafting of research studies, policy 
recommendations and public initiatives that address issues of crime, education, political 
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participation, public health disparities and poverty will be strengthened by also 
considering the political explanation of the living and economic conditions within the 
region. Political fragmentation potentially plays a causal role in this political and policy 
explanation.  
Chapter 4 defines and explains the role of horizontal, vertical and internal 
political fragmentation on central city outcomes. The focus of the chapter is findings 
which help to understand the outcomes associated with varying levels of political 
fragmentation, particularly how it affects disparities in publicly provided services, tax 
burden and racial segregation. Chapter 5 describes the way in which the types of 
fragmentation are operationalized and measured. Utilizing data from the 100 largest cities 
in 1950 and their metropolitan areas, measures for fragmentation and city outcome are 
discussed. 
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Notes: Chapter 3
                                                          
1
 Bishop’s “Big Sort” hypothesis has come under scrutiny since its debut in 2008. 
Abrams and Fiorina (2012) find very weak evidence that geographic political sorting 
drive Americans into culturally homogenous communities. They agree that sorting occurs 
in the U.S. but contend that political party association and polarization are unrelated. 
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Chapter 4 
Measuring Political Fragmentation and Central City Outcomes 
In every metropolitan area in the U.S. there exists political fragmentation of three 
types, horizontal, vertical and internal. The prevalence of fragmentation at each level 
varies by region and through time. The question considered here is whether the changes 
over time and the different amounts of fragmentation impact central city outcomes? 
Political fragmentation has been accused of aiding urban decline (Lowi 1979; Dreier, 
Mollenkopf & Swanstrom 2004) both of the central city (Teaford 1979) and the suburbs, 
(Orfield 2002; Peterson 1985), costs residents more as governing arrangements become 
more complex (Berry 2009), and increasing racial isolation and disparity (Gordon 2008; 
Kasarda 1985; Wilson 1985) as the population sorts along racial and economic lines. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that cities like St. Louis, Missouri and Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania struggle more than cities such as Phoenix, Arizona and Houston, Texas 
because they have more political fragmentation ceteris paribus. This chapter describes 
the levels of fragmentation as well as city outcomes for growth and decline for a sample 
of cities between 1950 and 2000.  
 The empirical claim that I test in this study is that political fragmentation at any 
level (horizontal, vertical or internal) affects a central city’s political economy, 
population or racial disparity. My sample is the 100 largest cities in 1950 by population. 
The following sections describe the measures used for horizontal, vertical and internal 
fragmentation and the measures used to assess how well or poorly a city is faring. These 
measures are then quantitatively modeled using panel-study time series to investigate 
how cities are impacted by political fragmentation at each level, through time.  While the 
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time period of 1950 to 2000 does not represent the beginning and end of urban decline or 
boom, it was chosen for two reasons. During this time period Rustbelt cities acutely felt 
the decline of the manufacturing industry, the large in-migration of minority populations, 
and the out-migration of whites to suburban neighborhoods. Southern and Western cities 
and their metropolitan areas experienced population booms, with the steady growth of 
industries built on high-tech, service, and administration. The second reason this time 
period is chosen was for the general consistency of U.S. Census record keeping; 1950 
was the first year the U.S. Census recognized metropolitan areas in a standard way, 
which is a key component of this analysis. Examining fragmentation over time is critical 
because the effects are not always immediate and may be missed using cross-sectional 
data. This study utilizes a panel-study regression analysis which allows for the effects of 
political fragmentation to be seen though time.  
100 Cities and Their Metro Areas 
The primary sources of data for this study are taken from the U.S. Census City 
and County Data books. Measures of population, race, income, education, employment, 
age, and poverty were collected for each of the 100 cities and their metropolitan area at 
each census year between 1950 and 2000. The 100 largest cities by population in 1950 
were chosen to populate the sample for this study. While there is some arbitrariness to the 
number of cities, overall they represent a wide assortment of population, size, geography, 
degree of fragmentation and outcome. The selection of cities and the time period also 
have the advantage of hindsight. It is already known that some cities on this list will 
diminish in size and stature, but other cities will grow and expand and this variability in 
outcome enables an analysis of how much fragmentation matters in these outcomes. The 
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distribution of the cities across the continental U.S. is shown in Figure 4.1. There is a 
clustering of cities in the Northeast and Midwest, which is expected as 1950 is still at the 
beginning of the great shifts of population and economic development to the South and 
West. This sample of cities is also notable for cities that are absent such as San Jose, 
California which grew significantly over the five decades. Cities such as Peoria, Illinois, 
which was one of the 100 largest cities in 1950 but declined in population and size over 
time, do not make the list of the 100 largest cities today. There could be meaningful 
trends and findings that will go overlooked in this study by the exclusion of some cities. 
However, for the purposes of answering the research question - what is the impact of 
political fragmentation on central cities - having a variety of cities that have declined and 
grown over the time period is the crucial component.  
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Figure 4.1: Map of the 100 Biggest Cities by Population in 1950. Population was 
clustered in the Northeast, Midwest and South in 1950. The shifts of economic 
development and population to the West were still in its beginning.This is evident by the 
notable absence of cities like San Jose, California which grew significantly over the next 
five decades. 
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The cities represent over 20% of the total U.S. residential population in 1950 and 
18% in 2000. When the populations of each core city’s metro areas are included, it 
represents 47% in 1950 and 61% of the residential population in 2000. Table 4.1 show a 
breakdown of the population change and rank, the number of local governments and the 
city’s proportion of the metro area population as of 2000 for the top 10 cities in 1950. 
What this table conveys is a glimpse of the degree of change these cities have 
experienced. New York City maintained its number 1 ranking over the time period 
whereas St. Louis slipped from number 8 to 49
th
. Looking at the rank of the top ten cities 
in 1950 along with the total number governments (counties, municipalities, townships, 
school districts, and other special districts) and comparing to their rank and number of 
governments in 2000 hints at the complex relationship fragmentation has on central 
cities. Cities surrounded by higher numbers of governments are among the highest and 
lowest ranked cities by population. 
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 Table 4.2: Top 10 Cities in 1950 Compared with 2000 and the Total Number of 
Governments in each Metropolitan Area. Looking at the rank of the top ten cities in 
1950 along with the total number governments (counties, municipalities, townships, 
school districts, and other special districts) and comparing to their rank and number of 
governments in 2000 hints at the complex relationship fragmentation has on central 
cities. Cities surrounded by higher numbers of governments are among the highest and 
lowest ranked cities by population. Source: U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Census of 
Government.  


















1 New York City 7,608,070 1,760 1 2,225 37.8 
2 Chicago City 9,157,540 1,553 3 1,851 31.6 
3 Philadelphia City 6,188,463 1,133 5 950 24.5 
4 Los Angeles City 16,373,645 481 2 713 22.6 
5 Detroit City 5,456,428 394 10 529 17.4 
6 Baltimore City 7,608,070* 23 17* 262* 8.6* 
7 Cleveland City 2,945,831 227 33 463 16.2 
8 St. Louis City 2,603,607 690 49 979 13.4 
9 Washington DC 7,608,070 141 21 262 8.6 
10 Boston City 5,819,100 289 20 952 10.1 
*In 1990 the U.S. Census placed Baltimore and Washington D.C. within the same 
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While the cities remain constant through time, the metropolitan areas may change every 
census year. The U.S. Census has developed several definitions of a metropolitan area 
over the decades. In 1950 when the concept of a metropolitan area was first used by the 
Census, a region was defined by the Office of Management and Budget as the immediate 
counties surrounding a city where economic and market activity reached a minimum 
threshold. Each decade, as suburban communities grew outward definitions of 
metropolitan areas were expanded. By the 2000 Census the classifications for what 
constituted a metropolitan area had evolved to include more nuanced classifications 
ranging from the primary metropolitan statistical area, which just contained the urban 
core, to the larger consolidated metropolitan statistical areas, which include outlying and 
even rural counties.  
For this study I chose to use the OMB’s most geographically expansive definition 
of metropolitan areas for each census year. Starting with the standard metropolitan area 
definitions in 1950, I expanded the metro area each census year according to the broadest 
classification used by the Census. This means that over the course of time some central 
cities have had their metropolitan area swallowed by other regions as they grew. Cities 
like Dallas and Fort Worth quickly had a combined metropolitan area but others are more 
dramatic, such as the inclusion of Baltimore in Washington D.C.'s metro area in 1990. 
The purpose of using this broad definition, rather than maintaining the boundaries 
established in 1950 was to keep the growth of an area in line with the Census’ own 
measures. This was critical for my counts and measures of political fragmentation. In 
order to accurately count the numbers, types, and levels of fragmentation at play in a 
region it was necessary to account for expanding metro areas. To establish a count of 
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local governments the U.S. Census of Government reports were used to tally up the 
number of county, municipal, school district, and special district governments in the 
metropolitan areas over the time span of the study.
1
 The count of governments was taken 
from the Census of Government in 1952, 1962, 1982, 1992 and 2002. Information for 
total area of a metro area is from the Census and represents the most geographically 
expansive definition of the metropolitan statistical area as defined by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB). The Census Bureau utilizes several population data, 
economic activity and commuting patterns to determine if a county is a part of an urban 
area.  
In 1950 when metropolitan areas were first defined by the OMB they comprised 
the county containing the principal city and a few surrounding counties but as population 
and economic activity have continued to grow at the periphery, the definition of a 
metropolitan area has become more expansive. At the 2000 Census a metropolitan area 
was made up of the largest city of at least 10,000 people or more, termed the principal 
city, and the surrounding urbanized counties made up of 50,000 people or more, plus 
outlying counties that have a high degree of economic and social integration.
2
 
Commuting patterns are used to determine the degree of economic and social integration. 
The Census created differing levels of metropolitan area to show the primary 
metropolitan area as well as secondary and outlying areas. The Bureau has also given 
special designation to the towns and cities in New England. For the purposes of this 
research, I selected the most geographically expansive Census definition of the 
metropolitan area associated with each of the 100 cities in my sample. Often this 
designation was the consolidated or combined statistical area and as a metropolitan area 
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expanded over time, several of the cities became part of larger, faster growing 
metropolitan areas nearby. For the 100 cities included in this study, there are 84 unique 
metropolitan areas associated with them in 1950.  By the 2000 Census only 55 
metropolitan areas are associated with the 100 cities due to their metro area definition 
expanding or being consolidated into surrounding urbanized areas.  
 There are also regional differences between cities and their metro areas in term of 
the geography they cover and their population density. Figure 4.2a shows the average 
area in square miles for central cities along with the average population density broken 
out by region.
3
While the Northeast has retained the highest population densities within its 
cities, the levels have been declining over the time period. Western cities are a notable 
exception – in this case the average population density began to rise in 1980 and by 2000 
is close to its 1950 level. Cities in the South and West have been able to significantly 
expand their territories on average when compared to the Midwest, which saw just 
moderate growth and the Northeastern cities which have experienced almost no growth in 
area. A similar pattern plays out at the metropolitan level. Metro areas in the Midwest, 
Northeast and South have declining population densities and expanding geographies, 
while the West is growing both in territory and density. 
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Figure 4.2a: Average Population Density and Area in Square Miles of Central Cities 
by region, 1950-2000. Across most regions the population pattern is similar, the solid 
line for population density has declined meaning fewer people per square mile in cities. 
However the geographic growth in square miles differs by region. In the Northeast the 
size of cities has remained almost unchanged while the South has seen a large growth of 
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Figure 4.2b: Average Population Density and Area in Square Miles of Metropolitan 
Areas by region, 1950-2000. Like the cities they surround, metropolitan areas have seen 
a decline in population density. The growth of the metro areas has been steady but it is 
important to note that the size of metro areas is dramatically larger than cities. This 
makes the average growth of western metro areas the more dramatic, going from an 
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 Regional differences in cities and metro areas serve as a common mechanism for 
comparing cities to each other. Southern cities have a common culture, climate and 
political development and this is distinct from the Midwest, Western and Northeastern 
cities. The same can be said for each region and examining fragmentation and city 
outcomes within these distinctions help to reveal patterns that would be missed if the 
study only took a national level perspective. Regional differences have also served as a 
key explanation for why certain cities have fared better over time. For example the work 
of Rusk (1995) discusses the importance of region. Typical of this narrative is that 
Northern and Midwestern cities have struggled because they have higher levels of 
fragmentation compared to their counterparts in the West and South (Rusk 1995). 
Regional breakouts of the fragmentation measures as well as the central city outcome 
measures will help illuminate whether similar patterns emerge in this data.   
Political Fragmentation 
The overall pattern of government growth in metropolitan areas has been positive. 
While in the 1970s the average number of governments in a metro area declined due to 
school district consolidation and the leveling off of municipal growth, since then there 
has been a steady increase. Figure 4.3 shows two plots, the average number of 
governments in the metropolitan areas associated with the cities included in the study and 
a break out of government by type over time. County and municipal inclusion in 
metropolitan areas has been small, if not stagnant when compared to changes in school 
districts and special districts. After a period of school district consolidation during the 
1970s, the addition of school districts in metropolitan areas has leveled off. The bulk of 
new government growth in recent decades is driven by special districts. The average 
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number of governments reflects this larger pattern, a steady rise in the number of 
governments, followed by a decline during the 1970s and then the uptick begins again.  
Figure 4.3: Mean number of governing units in Metropolitan Areas, 1950-2000. The 
average number of governments in a metropolitan area rose sharply through 1970 and 
then declined, primarily due to school district consolidation and the leveling off of 
municipal government creation. The continued rise in governments is driven by the 
growth of special districts. Source: US Census of Government. 
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Total Fragmentation. As a general concept fragmentation is governing units in 
geographic space and this can be measured simply as the total number of governments in 
a region. A simple count of governments, while informative, only scratches the surface of 
fragmentation’s prevalence in metropolitan areas. The literature on political 
fragmentation represents a kind of taster’s choice of definitions and measurement 
calculations and not surprisingly the variation in measurement has yielded disparities in 
findings. In a recent Urban Affairs Review article, Hendrick, Jimenez, and Lal (2011) 
identify twenty unique measurements of fragmentation. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
levels of fragmentation across a metropolitan area's geography represents the division of 
political power with governments that are territorially exclusive (horizontal 
fragmentation), governments that overlap jurisdictions (vertical fragmentation) and also 
internal division of power among elected officials. This complexity of governing 
arrangements is what contributes to the variety of measures. For this study eight measures 
of political fragmentation are utilized for their conceptual relevancy to horizontal, vertical 
and internal fragmentation and are further discussed along with descriptions of each 
measurement and summary statistics. Table 4.2 gives the definition of each fragmentation 
measure and what level of fragmentation it conceptualizes. 
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Table 4.2: Measures of Political Fragmentation by Type in Metropolitan Areas and 
Central Cities. 




1 Total number of local governments per capita (10,000) within the 
metropolitan area (political fragmentation) 
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Total number of local governments per square mile within the 





Ratio of municipal governments per capita (10,000)  
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The first two measures of fragmentation considered represent traditional or 
common variables in the literature. Spatial fragmentation and political fragmentation 
represent the counts of governments per square mile and per capita. I define spatial 
fragmentation as the number of local governments per square mile which include 
counties, municipalities, townships, schools and other special districts within each 
metropolitan area. Metro areas with greater density of governments, or more 
governments per square mile, are considered more fragmented.  
Political fragmentation is measured as the total number of governments for every 
10,000 individuals. While spatial fragmentation gives a sense of the geographic density 
of governments, political fragmentation is a general picture of the density of governments 
to population. Political fragmentation gives a bird's eye view of how prolific governing 
units are in any metro area, but does not convey much about the variation and type of 
governing arrangements within a metro area. Figure 4.4 shows the average political and 
spatial fragmentation over the time period. Both political and spatial fragmentation 
experienced a sharp drop between 1950 and 1960 and then in the case of political, began 
growing. Mean levels of spatial fragmentation continued to decline but begin rising 
steadily in 1980. Though the levels of spatial and political fragmentation never reach 
their averages in 1950 again, their rates of growth suggest that the typical metropolitan 
area is gradually growing in its density of government. 
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Figure 4.4: Average Political Fragmentation (number of governments per 10,000) 
and Spatial Fragmentation (number of governments per square mile) in 
Metropolitan Areas, 1950-2000. Both political and spatial fragmentation experienced a 
sharp drop between 1950 and 1960 and then in the case of political, began growing. 
Mean levels of spatial fragmentation continued to decline but starting rising steadily in 
1980. Though the levels of spatial and political fragmentation never reach their averages 
in 1950 again, their rates of growth suggest that the typical metropolitan area is gradually 
growing in its density of government. Source: US Census of Government 
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The patterns of spatial and political fragmentation are more nuanced when 
considered by region. Figure 4.5 shows a breakdown of these measures for the Midwest, 
Northeast, South and Western metro areas. Here it is evident that the concentration of 
governments is quite different by region, averages of political and spatial fragmentation 
reflect a similar pattern as shown in Figure 4.4 sharp declines in the 1950s and then, with 
the exception of Western metros, an increase through 2000. Western metropolitan areas 
continued to experience declining political fragmentation whereas Midwest and Southern 
cities saw notable increases in average levels. This indicates that while Western urban 
areas maintain low concentrations of government, other areas have actually experienced 
increases in the number of governing units per capita and square mile. These general 
measures offer a succinct picture showing that for the typical metropolitan area there was 
a decline in governments in the early decades and this reflects shifts in population and 
land area. As metro areas and populations expand the density of governments goes down 
but then grows over time. These measures give a general picture of how densely 
fragmented a metropolitan area is, but no indication in terms of the variation in the levels 
of fragmentation. Looking at measures of horizontal, vertical and internal fragmentation 
will help explain some of the variation in fragmentation and why some urban areas had 
continued growth in government while others did not.    
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Figure 4.5: Average Political Fragmentation (number of governments per 10,000) 
and Spatial Fragmentation (number of governments per square mile) in 
Metropolitan Areas by Region, 1950-2000. Regional averages of political and spatial 
fragmentation reflect a similar pattern, sharp declines in the 1950s and then, with the 
exception of Western metros, an increase. Western metros continued to experience 
declining political fragmentation whereas Midwest and Southern cities saw notable 
increases in average levels. Source: US Census of Government 
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Horizontal Fragmentation. After measures of spatial and general political 
fragmentation, horizontal fragmentation measures are fairly common in the literature. 
The bulk of the fragmentation measures used in this analysis represent aspects of 
horizontal fragmentation. Horizontal fragmentation is non-overlapping, coterminous  
governments of the same type, across the metropolitan area. The most common indicator 
of horizontal fragmentation is municipal governments which do not overlap and 
geographically cover the entire metro area.  For this study I included the proportion of 
municipalities of all governments in the metro area as an indication of general purpose 
government fragmentation. Also included is the proportion of school districts of total 
governments in a metropolitan area. The percentage of the metropolitan area population 
that resides in the principal city is another variable included in order to account for 
whether or not the population is concentrated outside of the central city. The last measure 
of horizontal fragmentation used is the number of municipalities per capita (10,000), 
however, this measure is highly correlated (0.68) with political fragmentation (total 
governments per capita) and so the two variables are indexed to create a measure of 
governing density.  
Higher index values of density of governments indicate greater amounts of 
government. The data is skewed right with a mean of -0.001 and a median value of -0.2 
with a standard deviation of 0.91. This is not altogether surprising as the amount of 
governments varies widely by metropolitan area and region. This is seen in Figure 4.6 
where the average density of government ranges over time from -1.2 to a high of 6.5. 
Overall the average dropped until 1970 and then has grown steadily and this same pattern 
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can be seen regionally with the exception of Western metro areas, which saw growth in 
government density between 1960 and 1980 and experienced a decline through 2000. 
Figure 4.6: Average Density of Governments and Average by Region. Density of 
Government indexes the number of governments per capita (10,000) and the number of 
municipalities per capita (10,000). The average over time is -0.001 and ranges from -1.23 
to 6.48. Regionally the average for the Midwest is 0.6, the Northeast is -0.1, the South 
and the West are both -0.3. Overall the average has dropped until 1970 and then grown 
steadily and this same pattern can be seen regionally with the exception of Western metro 
areas who after seeing a growth in government density between 1960 and 1980 
experienced a decline through 2000. 
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Overall the average percent of the metropolitan area’s population contained in the 
central city is 36% with a standard deviation of 24% and ranges from low of 0.4% to a 
high of 90%. Over time the average has been declining from a high just over 50% to 
close to 25% in 2000. The rate of decline appears to be slowing after 1980. Regionally, 
the South still contains the highest percentage of metro area population in its principal 
cities with an average of 49%, followed by the Midwest (39%), the West (30%) and then 
the Northeast (22%). The amount of a metropolitan area residing in the central city gives 
an indication of how competitive the core city is as a residential choice and so higher 
percentages of the population residing in the central city is to the benefit of the city. For 
the metropolitan areas included in this study, Southern cities have been more likely to 
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Figure 4.7: Average Percent of a Metropolitan Area’s Population in the Central 
City by Region. Overall the average percent of the metropolitan area’s population 
contained in the central city is 36%. Over time the average has been declining from a 
high just over 50% to close to 25% in 2000. The rate of decline appears to be slowing 
after 1980. Regionally, the South still contains the highest percentage of metro area 
population in its principle cities with an average of 49%, followed by the Midwest (39%), 
the West (30%) and then the Northeast (22%). 
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Considering the proportion of municipal governments to the total number of 
governments in a metropolitan is another measure of horizontal fragmentation. Greater 
municipal choice may support higher levels of sorting along racial and economic lines as 
higher degrees of municipal fragmentation could create more competition for residents 
and economic investment. The ratio of municipal governments to total governments in a 
metro area has a mean of 0.2 with a standard deviation of 0.13 and a range of 0.01 to a 
high of 0.79. Over time the proportion of municipal governments has held steady with a 
sharp increase between 1970 and 1980. This is mirrored regionally with the jump being 
more pronounced in Southern (0.3 average) and Midwestern (0.2) metropolitan areas and 
more gradual in Northeastern (0.12) and Western (0.13) metros. Southern metropolitan 
areas represent an interesting case because in general they have higher levels of residents 
choosing to reside in the core city, but they also have a greater proportion of municipal 
governments relative to other types of governing units. Higher concentrations of 
municipal governments relative to other types is thought to be indicative of higher 
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Figure 4.8: The Average Proportion of Municipalities to Total Governments by 
Region. The ratio of municipal governments to total governments in a metro area has a 
mean of 0.2 with a standard deviation of 0.13 and a range of 0.01 to a high of 0.79. Over 
time the proportion of municipal governments has held steady with a sharp increase 
between 1970 and 1980. This is mirrored regionally with the jump being more 
pronounced in Southern (0.3 average) and Midwestern (0.2) metropolitan areas and more 
gradual in Northeastern (0.12) and Western (0.13) metros. 
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The proportion of school districts to total governments in a metropolitan area is 
similar to the proportion of municipalities. In this case a type of special district is singled 
out because school district has a powerful influence on resident choice. There is also 
some evidence that metropolitan areas with more school districts have greater racial 
sorting. The average proportion of school districts to total governments is 0.19 with a 
standard deviation of 0.1 and a minimum of 0.02 and a maximum of 0.64. Between 1970 
and 1980 the average has dropped and then risen near its 1950 high of just over 0.2. Since 
1980 the average proportion of school districts seems to be declining slightly through 
2000. This pattern is echoed regionally with the Northeast (0.24) maintaining a higher 
proportion of school districts, followed by the West (0.2), Midwest (0.2) and the South 
(0.16). 
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Figure 4.9: Average Proportion of School Districts to Total Governments by Region. 
The average proportion of school districts to total governments is 0.19 with a standard 
deviation of 0.1, a minimum of 0.02 and a maximum of 0.64. Between 1970 and 1980 the 
average has dropped and then risen near its 1950 high of just over 0.2. Since 1980 the 
average proportion of school districts seems to be declining slightly through 2000. This 
pattern is echoed regionally with the Northeast (0.24) maintaining a higher proportion of 
school districts, followed by the West (0.2), Midwest (0.2) and the South (0.16). 
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These measures of horizontal fragmentation are selected to distinguish not only 
the differences in the number of governments across metropolitan areas regionally but 
also that certain areas of the country have more choice in terms of residential government 
or school districts. Schools and municipal government represent salient distinctions to 
individuals when deciding where to live within a metropolitan area. Greater choice in 
terms of the number of schools and municipalities relative to other governments will also 
have an impact on the proportion of metropolitan population in the core city. There is a 
similar pattern regionally between metropolitan areas with higher densities of 
government and share of metropolitan population. Cities that have lost population share 
over the time period are also located in regions that have higher levels of horizontal 
fragmentation.    
Summary. Historical trends of horizontal fragmentation are similar across the 
regions and follow a pattern of decline between 1950 and 1960 and then gradually 
increase through 2000. The Midwest and Northeast tend to have higher density of 
governments compared to other regions and this corresponds to their share of 
metropolitan area population. While the city's share of the metro area population has been 
decreasing over time, this has been most dramatic in the Northeast. In terms of the 
proportion of governments that are municipalities, the typical metropolitan area saw a 
steady uptick between 1970 and 1980 with the South having the highest proportion of 
governments that are municipal and the Northeast the lowest over time. The proportion of 
governments that are school districts round out the horizontal fragmentation measures 
and show a general trend of decline through 1970 but do increase in 1980. The Northeast 
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has the highest proportion of school districts and the South has the fewest during the time 
period of the study. 
Vertical Fragmentation. Unlike horizontal fragmentation where governing 
boundaries do not intersect, vertical fragmentation considers the impact of governments 
that do overlap each other. Berry (2009) argues that where there is more vertical 
fragmentation, defined here as overlapping boundaries, governments will have higher 
taxes. Greater levels of taxation are driven by special districts that seek to provide 
benefits to special-interest constituencies and which are paid for from the common tax 
base (89). Ideally, to quantify this effect I would use geographic boundaries and 
jurisdiction specific tax rates and compute the total tax rate wherever governing 
boundaries overlap. In this study using 100 cities and the governing bodies included in 
their region represents over 2,000 jurisdictions. Accumulating both the mapping data and 
taxing information for each government through time is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. I follow Berry's prescription and use his measure of overlapping 
jurisdictions per municipality. This is defined as the number of special districts, 
territorially overlapping townships and counties over the number of municipalities, which 
are cities and territorially exclusive towns.
4
 This measure uses horizontal fragmentation 
as the denominator and the numerator reflects the amount of vertical layering in a 
metropolitan area.  
The ratio of overlapping to non-overlapping territories is skewed right with a 
mean of 4 and a median value of 2, and a standard deviation of 6. Jurisdictional overlap 
ranges from a low of 0.19 to a high of 94. Figure 4.10 show that the average amount of 
jurisdictional overlap has been decreasing over time though there was a period of growth 
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between 1960 and 1970 and again between 1980 and 1990. Across regions the average 
amount of overlap has been steady with the West (6.3) at much higher averages than the 
Midwest (3.3) and South (2). The pattern in the Northeast (4.5) reflects that of the overall 
average with two jumps in growth followed by decline. 
Figure 4.10: Average Jurisdictional Overlap (Vertical Fragmentation) Across Metro 
Areas and by Region, 1950-2000. The average amount of jurisdictional overlap is 3.7. 
The average has been decreasing over time though there was a period of growth between 
1960 and 1970 and again between 1980 and 1990. Across regions the average amount of 
overlap has been steady with the West (6.3) at much higher averages than the Midwest 
(3.3) and South (2). The pattern in the Northeast (4.5) reflects that of the overall average 
with two jumps in growth followed by decline. Source: US Census of Government.
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The measure of vertical fragmentation is designed to capture the degree of 
overlapping jurisdictions in a metropolitan area in relation to the number of municipal 
governments. For example, in 2000 Sacramento's metropolitan area was home to 317 
special district governments and only 21 municipal governments, putting it in the 98th 
percentile for vertical fragmentation. For the same census year, in the metropolitan area 
of Baton Rouge there are 36 municipal governments and only 6 special districts putting it 
in the 5th percentile for vertical fragmentation. This variation in the amount of 
jurisdictional overlap could have a direct relationship with the tax burden born by the 
individual resident who ultimately supports special district governments through their 
taxes. 
Summary. Over time vertical fragmentation has been decreasing although there is 
a noticeable spike in the overlap in the 1970s. Regionally the trend in overlap varies with 
the South maintaining almost the same amounts across the time period and the West and 
Midwest maintaining much higher levels. Most of the movement occurs in the Northeast, 
which has steadily decreased its levels of jurisdictional overlap with the exception of a 
large jump in 1970.  
Internal Fragmentation. Political fragmentation is commonly thought of as just the 
number of political entities in a geographic area (general purpose governments, school 
districts, special districts) and to this list I also add the number of elected officials in a 
central city. A metropolitan area with a multiplicity of governments is generally thought 
to be inefficient on the one hand but responsive to the populace they serve. In the same 
way, having a large number of elected officials can be a frustration to the policy process 
and central planning but citizens may have the benefit of having a public servant 
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responsive to local issues. At the city level having a small number of elected officials is 
generally considered a sign of a progressive, streamlined ("reformed") government 
whereas a city with a large number of elected officials is arguably more cumbersome, 
because officials will resist any changes or policies that they perceive to threaten their 
political turf.
5
 The number of elected officials in each city represents another layer of 
political fragmentation and is a proxy for the potential vitality and efficiency of the 
central city.  
 Within a metropolitan area there is great variety in the number and types of 
elected officials that serve residents. Beginning with the executive level, the typical city 
has a mayor and a legislative body, usually a council that ranges in size, where members 
are elected at-large or by district and is headed by a president of the chamber. Other 
common elected offices are those that conduct day to day functions such as a city clerk, 
treasurer, auditor, or comptroller. The judicial branch of a city usually has several elected 
offices as well and these range from municipal judges to sheriff. School districts are 
generally governed by an elected body, for example a Board of Education, and these 
offices can be elected by district or at-large, range in size, and in some cases the mayor is 
a member. There can also be special district offices that are filled by popular election 
such as water/sewerage districts. From city to city the offices that are elected by popular 
vote or appointed by the mayor with the approval of the legislative body vary. Within the 
sample of central cities included in this study, cities such as Birmingham, Alabama elect 
a mayor, a handful of council members and a school board, an average of eight elected 
officials over the time period. Compare this to Chicago where citizens elect not only a 
mayor and council, school board, but a city clerk, treasurer, and judges, on average over 
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fifty-three elected officials. The variation in elected officials begs the question does it 
make it harder for a city to compete for residents and economic development when there 
are eight officials or fifty-three? 
When measuring elected officials it would be ideal to have the total number of all 
elected offices (municipal government, city/county officials, special district elected 
officials, and school boards). This level of historic detail is difficult and cumbersome to 
gather with accuracy, particularly for those cities in the lower half of the top 100 list that 
spent the last fifty years in continual decline. The Municipal Year Book published lists of 
municipal level elected offices for cities with populations 25,000 and greater with 
consistency between 1950 and 1970. The number of municipal elected officials in 2000 
was compiled by searching each city’s official website. For many cities the number of 
municipal elected officials could then be backfilled by comparing the number in 2000 
with the number in 1970. For those cities that had a different number of officials in 2000 
than in 1970 the average number of elected officials was used for the missing years. 
The typical city had an average of 0.6 elected officials for every 10,000 and this 
remains somewhat unchanged over the time period, with a slight decrease leading to 1970 
and then gradually growing through 2000. Figure 4.11 shows the average elected officials 
per capita as well as a break out by region. Average regional levels of elected officials 
per capita are highest in the Northeast with an average of 0.81 and the Midwest with an 
average of 0.54. This is followed by the South which averages 0.43 officials per capita 
but between 1990 and 2000 the rate of elected officials appears to be growing. The 
average level in Western cities is 0.4 and this appears to be declining into 2000.  
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Figure 4.11: Average Ratio of Internal Fragmentation, Elected Officials per Capita 
(10,000) in Central Cities by Region, 1950-2000. The average (0.56) number of elected 
officials per capita is somewhat unchanged over time with a slight decrease leading to 
1970 and then gradually growing through 2000. Regionally average levels are highest in 
the Northeast (0.81) and Midwest (0.54) followed by the South (0.43) which between 
1990 and 2000 is growing however average levels in the West (0.36) appear to be 
declining. Source: US Census and Municipal Year Book. 
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Summary. Internal fragmentation measured as the number of elected officials per 
capita in central cities represents a potentially understudied component of fragmentation. 
While the number of elected officials in central cities has not changed dramatically over 
time, it has been gradually increasing. Regionally, the number of elected officials per 
capita varies widely with the Northeast having the highest and Western cities the fewest. 
This pattern of fragmentation is not unexpected given scholarly work that tends to 
characterize Western cities as more progressive and reformed whereas Northeastern cities 
may still have carry over from when government was run by political machines. The 
amount of internal fragmentation also seems to be growing over the time period but part 
of this growth could be driven by the decline of population in central cities, which may 
artificially inflate the number of elected officials per capita. 
Central City Outcomes 
  There are three aspects of city well-being against which the measures of 
fragmentation will be modeled. While there are many ways to measure how well or 
poorly a city is faring, for the purposes of this study three basic indicators of central city 
health will serve as dependent variables: the ratio of population change between census 
years, racial dissimilarity and isolation at the metropolitan level, and fiscal health. Factors 
of population, racial segregation and fiscal health represent very general but key 
indicators of urban decline and growth. Cities not well off are often hallmarked by near 
constant population loss, declining revenues and racial segregation, while cities that are 
considered more successful have growing population densities, revenues, and declining 
segregation over time. Each of these outcome measures are discussed and their expected 
relationship to the cadre of fragmentation measures.    
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Population Change. Population is one of the most basic indicators of a city's well-
being. Population drives national and state standing and ranking among metropolitan 
areas and for individual cities is a key determinant in funding decisions by the state and 
federal government. It is also a fundamental component in redistricting of voting districts. 
Shifts in population can effect a city’s political representation in state government 
dramatically. Every municipality is concerned about its numbers and while coping with 
population loss is a common concern for many central cities, not all of the principal cities 
have declining populations. Cities in the South, after having experienced some population 
loss around 1970, have seen their average levels of population grow since then. Western 
cities have had periods of slow growth but overall these cities have experienced growing 
population.  
Population change is measured by taking the total population of the current year 
and dividing by the previous census year population central city. This gives a ratio of 
population change where values less than one indicate population loss and values greater 
than one indicate population growth from the previous census year. Figure 4.12 shows 
the distribution of population change by time period in a series of box plots. The 
dispersion of this ratio is shown by drawing a box around the first through third quartile 
with a bold horizontal line at the median value. The whiskers extending from the boxes 
denote relative extreme values and the individual cities listed are outliers. The general 
picture is that over time, median population change values hover around one with half of 
the cities losing population and half gaining population between census years. What 
emerges in this plot is a pattern of cities with extreme values over one, indicating leaps in 
population growth from the previous census year, which is somewhat unexpected given 
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the focus of the literature on cities that have suffered dramatic population decline. This 
growth is regionally concentrated in the South and West. The plot is useful in that it gives 
a visual representation of population shifts that focus on growth rather than decline. 
 
Figure 4.12: Box plot of Central City Ratio of Population Change (log) 1950 - 2000. 
The distribution of population change is shown by drawing a box around the first through 
third quartile with a bold horizontal line at the median value. The whiskers extending 
from the boxes denote relative extreme values and the individual cities listed are outliers. 
The general picture over the time period is that the average population change has 
remained relatively stable over time. Most cities in 1950 had ratios of population change 
greater than 1 meaning they had gained population since 1940, but population ratios shift 
down in later decades. While cities in the first quartile tend to fall below one, indicating 
population loss, many cities in the South and West had dramatic gains in population. 
Source: U.S. Census. 
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Racial Dissimilarity. A common charge leveled against the growth of political 
fragmentation is the role it has played in separating urban populations by race within a 
metropolitan area. In order to test for segregation and racial separation across the 
metropolitan area, I used the black-white dissimilarity and isolation indexes from the 
American Communities Project located at Brown University. The index is based on 
census tract level information and ranges from 0 to 1, where one is perfect integration and 
zero is perfect segregation. 
 The Index of Dissimilarity conveys an idea of how integrated a metropolitan area 
is by measuring what percent of African-Americans would need to move in order to 
achieve complete racial integration. As shown in Figure 4.13, the average dissimilarity 
score over the time period is 0.71 indicating that nearly three-fourths of the African-
American population would need to change areas in order to be evenly distributed across 
a typical metropolitan region. The dissimilarity index rose to its peak in 1970 and has 
tapered to a low of 0.62 in 2000. By Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor's (1999) standard, any 
score over 0.6 is considered high. For the cities and metro areas included in this study, 
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Figure 4.13: Racial Dissimilarity and Isolation for Metropolitan Areas, 1950-2000. 
The average dissimilarity score over the time period is 0.71 indicating that nearly three-
fourths of the African-American population would need to change areas in order to be 
evenly distributed across the metropolitan region. The dissimilarity index rose to its peak 
in 1970 and has tapered to a low of 0.62 in 2000. The average isolation index score is 
0.45 and indicates that 45% of blacks in the metro area are not exposed to whites. The 
isolation index follows a similar pattern to dissimilarity, rising in 1970 to a high of 0.52 
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Figure 4.14 also shows the average levels of racial isolation which is a measure 
that indicates the likelihood of seeing or interacting with someone of another race. The 
black-white isolation index values reflect exposure of African-American to white 
individuals across the metro area. The index also ranges from 0 to 1 and the average 
isolation index score is 0.45 and indicates that 45% of blacks in the metro area are not 
exposed to whites. The isolation index follows a similar pattern to dissimilarity, rising in 
1970 to a high of 0.52 and then declining to a low of 0.35 in 2000. Cutler, Glaeser and 
Vigdor characterize a city as having a ghetto if dissimilarity scores are over 0.6 and 
isolation greater than 0.3 (1999, 459). This study utilizes these indexes to approximate 
segregation levels at the metropolitan level and while unable to identify at this level if 
individual cities meet this criteria, it is reasonable to use the 0.6 dissimilarity score and 
0.3 isolation score as a threshold of evidence for geographic segregation.  
The index scores for isolation and dissimilarity also vary by region. Average 
dissimilarity index scores for the Midwest are 0.78, in the Northeast 0.71, in the South 
0.69 and 0.67 in the West. Average isolation scores in Midwestern metros are 0.53, in the 
Northeast 0.38, in the South 0.51 and 0.28 in the West. In general the regional pattern 
matches the overall picture of segregation, as levels increase though 1970 and then begin 
declining. Looking at geographic regions, evidence of segregation is evident here too. 
Western metropolitan areas have higher levels of exposure of black to whites, but 
dissimiliarty and isolation scores indicate the existence of systematic spatial segregation.    
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Figure 4.14: Racial Dissimilarity and Isolation in Metropolitan Areas by Region, 
1950-2000. Average dissimilarity index scores for the Midwest are 0.78, in the Northeast 
0.71, in the South 0.69 and 0.67 in the West. Average isolation scores in Midwestern 
metros are 0.53, in the Northeast 0.38, in the South 0.51 and 0.28 in the West. In general 
the regional pattern matches the overall picture of segregation, levels increase though 
1970 and then begin declining. Source: American Communities Project.  
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Fiscal Health. The financial health of a city is an important benchmark of overall 
well-being. The quality and diversity of services offered by city governments ranges from 
maintaining streets and parks, trash pickup, police and fire protection, public schools, and 
even some health services. The ability of city officials to hire adequate staff, offer 
pensions and other benefits as well as contract out services depends on its financial 
standing. Cities do not share the ability of the federal government to take on debt and so 
economic downturns can have a direct impact on a city’s financial stability. The most 
recent economic recession has left cities such as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Chicago, 
Illinois, Washington D.C. and New York City facing large budget deficits that must be 
reconciled. This can ultimately mean cuts in government services, employee layoffs and 
pension negotiations. Detroit, Michigan filed for bankruptcy in 2013 and this represents 
an extreme case both in terms of the contributing factors to its financial descent. It is the 
largest city to date to file for bankruptcy.
6
 Suburban growth may also be a contributing 
factor as outlying municipalities offer more choices of exit to households and firms. Over 
the last century, the tax bases of many cities, particularly within the Rustbelt, have eroded 
while the demands for services have increased. Sunbelt cities have remained attractive to 
households and businesses and typically have experienced revenue growth over the last 
sixty years.  
City governments take in revenue through taxes, fee for service, 
intergovernmental transfers and state and federal aid. For the purposes of this study, each 
city’s own-source revenue is measured because it represents what capital a city is able to 
bring in through taxes on residents and firms. Own-source revenue can also be a rough 
representation of the tax burden in the city. Following Berry (2009)’s investigation of 
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fragmentation on own-source revenue, I operationalize this measure by taking the sum of 
all revenues raised by each city, excluding intergovernmental transfers, as well as state 
and federal aid, and divide by the city population. Figure 4.15 shows the average own-
source revenue from 1950 through 2000. The average amount of own-source revenue 
collected by central cities is $1,220 per capita and has been increasing over the time 
period from a low of $438 in 1950 to a high just over $1,800 in 1990. Regionally the 
Northeast has had higher averages ($1,598) that have risen steadily but appear to be 
leveling off between 1990 and 2000. The South ($1,167) and West ($1,150) have almost 
identical trajectories of consistent growth and then leveling off between 1990 and 2000. 
The Midwest has also seen increases in average own-source revenue ($932) but the 
growth rate is slower and plateaus around 1980.     
  
Measuring Fragmentation and City Outcomes 
 Wiedlocher  133 
Figure 4.15: Average Own-Source Revenue per Capita (10,000) and by Region. The 
average amount of own-source revenue per capita collected by central cities is $1,220 and 
has been increasing over the time period from a low of $438 in 1950 to a high just over 
$1,800 in 1990. Regionally the Northeast has had higher averages ($1,598) that have 
risen steadily but appear to be leveling off between 1990 and 2000. The South ($1,167) 
and West ($1,150) have almost identical trajectories. The Midwest has also seen 
increases in average own-source revenue ($932) but the growth rate is slower and 
plateaus around 1980. All dollar values are CPI-adjusted to year 2000 dollars. Source: US 
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Additional Factors  
 In addition to the measures of fragmentation, several control variables are 
included in the models in order to reflect key variables that urban scholars have identified 
as critical to city growth or decline. There are many explanations for why cities have 
differing outcomes and while Chapter 2 covered in detail some of the common threads in 
this literature, the quantitative analysis must also include measurements that take into 
account the impact of factors like poverty, manufacturing, and household income. 
 Race. The first factor is the percent African-American of central city population. 
This measure attempts to capture the argument that central cities historically are home to 
minority populations that were typically kept out of higher-wage jobs due to 
discrimination. African-Americans also experienced discrimination in the housing market 
and were effectively barred from suburban home ownership until federal fair housing 
laws were passed in 1968. Figure 4.16 is a box plot of the percent African-American in 
central cities and shows how the median percentage has risen steadily during the six 
decades considered in this study. The box is drawn around the first and third quartile with 
a horizontal line showing the median value for that year. The typical percent of African-
American population in central cities rose from a low of 13% in 1950 to 30% in 2000. 
The vertical lines give a sense of the dispersion and outlying values where it is evident 
that some cities have a much higher portion of their population that is African-American 
than the typical. In 1950 outliers were clustered in the South but Washington, D.C. and 
Gary, Indiana are notable outliers in later years. 
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Figure 4.16: Box plot of Percent African-American in Central Cities, 1950 - 2000. 
The average percent of African-American population in central cities rose from a low of 
13% in 1950 to 30% in 2000. The vertical lines give a sense of the dispersion and 
outlying values where it is evident that some cities have a much higher portion of their 
population that is African-American than the typical. In 1950 outliers were clustered in 
the South but Washington, D.C. and Gary, Indiana are notable outliers in later years. 
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Manufacturing. Manufacturing jobs were an attraction that drew many new households to 
cities well into the 1950s until industries began moving facilities and processes to other 
areas of the country and overseas. Cities located in the Rustbelt felt these changes keenly, 
particularly those in which the auto and steel plants that had been the cornerstone of the 
local economy. Figure 4.17 shows a box plot of the percent employed in manufacturing 
industries in central cities. The average percent employed in manufacturing has fallen 
from a high of 28% in 1950 to a low of 15% in 2000. The inter-quartile range between 
the first and third quartile has been steadily shrinking as well indicating that as a whole, 
fewer cities have less of their workforce employed by manufacturers. The vertical 
whiskers, however, indicate that there are still some cities with over 30% of the 
workforce in manufacturing. Rustbelt cities of Fall River, Massachusetts, Rochester, New 
York, and Reading, Pennsylvania are notable outliers and demonstrate that even while the 
sector as a whole has pulled back from central cities, there are still some that rely on 
manufacturing jobs.  
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Figure 4.17: Box plot of the Percent Employed in Manufacturing Industries in 
Central Cities, 1950 - 2000. The average percent employed in manufacturing has fallen 
from a high of 28% in 1950 to a low of 15% in 2000. The inter-quartile range between 
the first and third quartile has been steadily shrinking as well indicating that as a whole, 
fewer cities have less of their workforce employed by manufacturers. The vertical 
whiskers however indicate that there are still some cities with over 30% of the workforce 
in manufacturing. Rustbelt cities of Fall River, Massachusetts, Rochester, New York, and 
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Income. In a similar vein as declining employment, the variability of household income 
of city residents can also play a role in overall city health. When households are faced 
with job loss or other income reduction, some will choose to move out of the city to find 
other work. At the aggregate level, when whole sectors of the economy suffer and are 
located in central cities, this can have a disproportionate effect on residents and 
ultimately city budgets as tax revenues fall. Figure 4.18 shows a box plot of median 
family income in core cities between 1950 and 2000. The income values have been 
adjusted to 2000 dollars and the average ranges from a low of $23,981 in 1950 to $40,687 
in 2000. Income reached a high of $41,055 in 1970 but declined quickly between 1970 
and 1980. The vertical lines show the dispersion of the measure beyond the first and third 
quartile and indicate that in later years some cities remain stubbornly at the bottom for 
average family income while cities like Seattle, Washington and Berkeley, California are 
wealthy outliers. This reflects the regional component of economic success and family 
wealth in cities. Cities home to industries that grew during the time period, such as 
defense, aeronautics and technology, have see median family incomes grow and reaped 
the benefits of being home to these industries. 
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Figure 4.18: Median Family Income in Central Cities 1950 - 2000. Income is adjusted 
to 2000 dollars and the average ranges from a low of $23,981 in 1950 to $40,687 in 2000. 
Income reached a high of $41,055 in 1970 but declined quickly between 1970 and 1980. 
The vertical lines show the dispersion of the measure beyond the first and third quartile 
and indicate that in later years some cities remain stubbornly at the bottom for average 
family income while cities like Seattle, Washington and Berkeley, California are wealthy 
outliers. Source: U.S. Census.  
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Poverty. Another common thread running through the urban politics literature is that 
cities historically have a concentration of poor households which cost more to provide 
services for and contribute less to overall revenues. Cities which experienced white flight 
and the decline of manufacturing industries were also home to residents unable to move 
to suburbia and disproportionately impacted by economic disinvestment. Figure 4.19 
shows the percent of families in poverty in central cities between 1950 and 2000. The 
median percent of families considered in poverty by the U.S. Census declines from a high 
of 20% to a low of 11% in 1970 and then rises again to a high of 19% in 2000. The 
dispersion of the measure gradually tapers off indicating fewer extreme values. Outliers 
switch in 1980 from concentrating in Southern cities to Rustbelt cities, notably Camden, 
New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan which were hard hit by manufacturing decline and 
white flight. 
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Figure 4.19: Percent of Families in Poverty in Central Cities, 1950 - 2000. The 
median percent of families considered in poverty by the U.S. Census declines from a high 
of 20% to a low of  11% in 1970 and then rises again to a high of 19% in 2000. The 
dispersion of the measure gradually tapers off indicating fewer extreme values. Outliers 
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Unemployment. During the time period of this study, cities changed dramatically and 
while some did decline in the face of economic disinvestment, white flight and increased 
poverty, other cities grew and were prosperous while having success in technology and 
service industries and a growing population. Including the percent of the labor force that 
is unemployed for each city will help show where cities have done well and that others 
have struggled with persistent unemployment. Figure 4.20 shows the percent of civilian 
labor force unemployed in central cities. The box plot shows that the typical city has 
relatively low unemployment percentages until the 1980 and 1990s. Unemployment in 
central cities declines from 1950 through 1970 to a low of 4.5% but rises significantly to 
a high of 8.3% in 1990, and then declines again in 2000. There are many outliers 
however where cities such as Detroit, Michigan and Camden, New Jersey who have felt 
job losses over time acutely, and then unemployment remains persistently higher than 
median levels of unemployment. 
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Figure 4.20: Percent of Civilian Labor Force Unemployed in Central Cities, 1950 - 
2000. The box plot shows the dispersion of unemployment but drawing a box around the 
first and third quartile, the horizontal lines shows the median value, and the extending 
vertical lines indicate extreme values. Unemployment in central cities declines from 1950 
through 1970 to a low of 4.5% but rises significantly to a high of 8.3% in 1990, and then 
declines again in 2000. There are many outliers denoting cities such as Detroit, Michigan 
and Camden, New Jersey who have felt job losses over time acutely. Source: U.S. 
Census. 
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Region. The last control variable included in the models takes into account the impact 
that geography plays on city outcomes. As mentioned already, there are key features of 
cities in the Northeast and Midwest, such as decline of the manufacturing industry, that 
make these cities different than cities in other regions. In that same vein, cities in the 
South and Southwest have seen industries relocate to their region and in some cases have 
also experienced rapid population growth. While the Census breaks the continent into 
four regions (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) for the purposes of this study I have 
chosen to control for cities located in the Sunbelt or Rustbelt.
1
 Figure 4.21 is a U.S. map 
with Rustbelt states shaded light blue and Sunbelt states shaded light yellow. Rustbelt 
cities are located in the Northeast and upper Midwest where manufacturing, iron and steel 
works, and other heavy industries were concentrated. Of the 100 cities analyzed in this 
study 52% of the cities are located in the Rustbelt. Sunbelt cities are located in the South 
and West and are characterized by mild weather and rarely have had hard freezes. These 
cities rose in prominence between 1950 and 2000 and represent 27% of the cities. 
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Figure 4.21: Regional Map of Rustbelt and Sunbelt Cities 1950 - 2000.  Rustbelt cities 
are located in the Northeast and upper Midwest where manufacturing, iron and steel 
works, and other heavy industries were concentrated. Of the 100 cities analyzed in this 
study 52% of the cities are located in the Rustbelt. Sunbelt cities are located in the South 
and West and are characterized by mild weather and rarely have a hard freeze. These 
cities rose in prominence between 1950 and 2000 and represent 27% of the cities.  
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Summary 
Chapter 4 has identified eight measures of political fragmentation to test its 
impact on cities’ population change, own-source revenue and metropolitan wide racial 
segregation. Political fragmentation is classified into three types, horizontal, vertical and 
internal fragmentation. Measures of horizontal fragmentation include an indexed variable 
for the number of governments per capita (10,000) and the number of governments per 
square mile which declined through 1960 before increasing steadily to levels similar to 
1950. Measures looking at the proportion of municipal governments as well as the 
proportion of school districts to other governments have also increased, particularly 
between the decades of 1970 and 1980. Vertical fragmentation has been decreasing over 
time. However, there are stark regional differences notably in the West where 
jurisdictional overlap has been historically much higher. Internal fragmentation has 
remained steady over the time period but regionally the Northeast and Midwest have 
higher levels and this appears to be increasing. In general the levels of city population 
have been steady, while the tax burden and segregation levels have been increasing. 
Whether this is related to the amount and types of political fragmentation is the question 
at the heart of this study. Chapter 5 formally models these expected relationships with 
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Notes: Chapter 4 
                                                          
1
 The US Census of Government is not entirely accurate in its counts of governments. 
2
 Definitions for metropolitan areas, principle cities, combined metropolitan statistical 
areas as well as micro and macro statistical areas are taken from the United States 
General Accounting Office "Report to the Subcommittee on Technology, Information 
Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, Committee on Government Reform, 
House of Representatives," Metropolitan Statistical Areas: New Standards and Their 
Impact on Selected Federal Programs, 2004: GAO.  
URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04758.pdf 
3
 Regional definitions follow the state designations of the US Census which is broken 
into four divisions (Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania; Midwest: Indiana, 
Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota and South Dakota; South: Delaware, DC, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas; West: Arizona, 
Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, California, Oregon 
and Washington). 
URL: http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf 
4 Only 20 states have a government classification of towns or townships and in some 
states they act much like a municipality and do not overlap (Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota and 
Wisconsin). But in the other states, towns act more like a special district and may overlap 
municipalities (Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New York, Ohio and Vermont). I include the 11 states with overlapping towns 
as part of the numerator for jurisdictional overlap and the remaining 9 states with 
territorially exclusive townships as part of the denominator. 
5
 For example the City of St Louis has had the same number of aldermen/alderwomen for 
decades, despite continual losses in population. During the 2012 election, Proposition R 
passed by 61.5% to decrease the number of aldermen from 28 to 14 in 2020 to fit the 
current dynamics. There is a racial component to this proposition, in the northern 
predominately African-American areas of the city a majority of residents voted against 
Proposition R. Aldermen in this area were unconvinced that reducing elected officials 




 Information about cities on the brink of financial collapse and Detroit’s filing for 
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Chapter 5 
The Effects of Political Fragmentation 
The relationship between political fragmentation and central city outcome 
measures is expected to be complex and vary by type of fragmentation - horizontal, 
vertical and internal - as well as by outcome, population density, racial dissimilarity and 
isolation and own-source revenue. Before presenting the models and analysis of the 
results, the reasoning for certain expected relationships between fragmentation and city 
outcome are stated.   
Horizontal fragmentation is expected to have a negative impact on central city 
population density. As the number of residential choices increases across an urban area, 
households are more likely to choose to exit the core city by selecting a suburban 
residence over a city neighborhood. Central city population is predicted to be negatively 
associated with vertical fragmentation. Jurisdictional overlap is an indication of 
overspending by special districts as they seek to provide increased service and protect 
special interests. Theoretically, increases in services would only serve to further attract 
residents reducing the population pool for the core city. Internal fragmentation is 
expected to have a negative impact on city population. The assumption here is that more 
elected officials represent cities that have less reformed governance, more bureaucracy 
and internal politicking and will be disadvantaged in comparison to streamlined suburban 
governments. 
Higher levels of horizontal and vertical fragmentation are also expected to 
increase the amount of racial separation and isolation between the city and the metro 
area. Historically racial sorting has been facilitated through restrictive covenants and 
racially biased financial incentives. Though many minority households have left racially 
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homogenous city neighborhoods for suburban ones, metropolitan areas are hardly a 
picture of integration and diversity. It is expected that higher levels of political 
fragmentation in terms of the multiplicity and stratification of governments have 
effectively allowed for increased segregation and isolation between white and African-
American households. Cities surrounded by higher levels of horizontal and vertical 
fragmentation will likely have more households that would need to move in order to have 
racially integrated communities and travel farther to be exposed to individuals of a 
different race.     
The fiscal stability of central cities is predicted to be adversely affected by 
horizontal fragmentation. A city’s ability to increase its own-source revenue stream is 
tied to residents and property values. The tax base of cities shrinks as residents opt for 
suburban communities and this process is more pronounced as the numbers of municipal 
and special district governments increase. Cities are also more likely to produce services 
in house or to spend more on redistributive policies and other services, putting them at a 
further financial disadvantage.  The amount of jurisdictional overlap in a metro area is 
expected to have a positive impact on central cities’ fiscal health. The city represents one 
more potential participant dipping into in the common fiscal pool and increases in 
jurisdictional overlap could increase the tax burden of city residents.  
 In order to determine the impact of political fragmentation on central city 
outcomes I utilize panel regression models fitted to four aspects of outcome: population 
change, racial dissimilarity, racial isolation and own-source revenue. Using data on the 
100 largest cities in 1950 and following their progress over five decades the influence of 
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fragmentation is presented and described at the horizontal, vertical and internal level. 
This chapter discusses the hypotheses, methodology, and the results of the four models.  
Quantitative Analysis 
 One of the central motivations for conducting an analysis with a historical lens is 
the argument that political fragmentation is not well illustrated in cross-sectional data. 
Utilizing a pooled time series regression analysis allows the combination of multiple 
cross-sections to capture variation between different cities as well as differences over 
time (Sayrs 1989). In order to achieve coefficient estimates that are efficient and unbiased 
specific consideration is given to the behavior of error in the model. In a cross-section 
time series regression error variance occurs within observations for each year and also 
between years. For instance, changes in the city outcome variable in 1960 may influence 
the estimates for that variable in 1970. There are three major concerns about the behavior 
of the error term in cross-sectional time series: to determine whether differences in the 
error term is across entities (i's) given the vector of betas matter (selecting either fixed 
effects or random effects), to determine whether the error variance within each group is 
constant (assumed to be homoskedastic), and to check that errors across time are not 
correlated (assumed to have no serial correlation) (Wooldridge 2002). The Hausman test 
is commonly used to decide between random and fixed effects, and methods exist to 
calculate errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation if either 
assumption is violated.  
 A key difference between using a random versus fixed effect regression to 
estimate the parameters is that random effects are assumed to come from one normal 
distribution whereas fixed effects assumes there are time invariant qualities (Wooldridge 
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2002). The advantage of the random effects model is that it is efficient, only one degree 
of freedom is used up when estimating the constant, which is the mean random effect. 
This means that differences between entities do not matter because if it is a normal 
distribution and 95% of the observations fall within two standard deviations of the mean, 
the vector of explanatory variables added to this random draw for any i will yield very 
similar predictions (Wooldridge 2002). On the other hand, for fixed effects each i's 
constant is drawn from its very own distribution, which adds (i-1) parameters, eating up 
degrees of freedom and giving each i its own constant. Fixed effect panel OLS is equal to 
OLS with a dummy for each i. While this allows the unique attributes of each city, at 
each point in time, to be in a sense accounted for, its primary disadvantage is the 
additional parameters eat up degrees of freedom and the standard errors of the parameters 
are subject to bias (Wooldridge 2002). The loss in efficiency is traded for less omitted 
variable bias in parameter standard errors. Fixed effects would theoretically account for 
unobserved, unobservable and even unmeasurable city idiosyncrasies. In other words, 
there may be unique attributes to a city such as Detroit that make it different from the 
other cities included in the sample. If fixed effects estimates are statistically significant 
different from the random, these time invariant characteristics must be controlled for, 
according to convention and the Hausman test.     
Population Change and Political Fragmentation 
 The first model examines at the impact of political fragmentation on the ratio of 
population change in the central city. The distribution of population change is skewed 
right and so the natural log was taken so the functional form would approximate a normal 
distribution. Political fragmentation measures attempt to model the three aspects of 
fragmentation (horizontal, vertical and internal) previously discussed. Horizontal 
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fragmentation was measured using the percent of the metropolitan area's population 
residing in the central city, the proportion of school districts to total governments in the 
metro area, and an indexed variable of the ratio of total governments per capita (10,000) 
and the number of municipalities per capita (10,000). The index, referred to as density of 
governments, is also skewed right and so the natural log was used in the model. Vertical 
fragmentation is measured using Berry's (2009) measure of jurisdictional overlap and 
internal fragmentation is measured as the number of elected officials within the central 
city per capita (10,000). A measure for spatial fragmentation is also included as a general 
measure of fragmentation and as it was also skewed right, the natural log was used in the 
model. Measures in the central city for the percent African-American, percent employed 
in manufacturing, the percent unemployed, the percent of families in poverty and location 
in the Sunbelt and Rustbelt are included as controls.  
 Table 5.1 shows the model diagnostics that informed my selection of the best 
fitting model. The Hausman, which checks for the presence of statistically significant, 
city-specific time-invariant fixed effects not captured in the model (Wooldrige 2002) is 
the first diagnostic test. The null hypothesis of no city-specific effects is not rejected 
which means that the more efficient random effects model performs better than fixed 
effects. The second and third tests are designed to test assumptions about the behavior of 
residuals in longitudinal models. The Breusch-Pagan null hypothesis tests for constant 
error variance or homoskedasticity in the residuals. In this model the assumption of 
homoskedasticity was violated indicating that there is group-wise heteroskedasticity, 
meaning that the non-constant error variance is within cities which can cause the standard 
errors for the coefficients to be biased downwards, and ascribing statistical significance 
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to variables that are not significant (Wooldridge 2002). In the third test, the Breusch-
Godfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation, the null hypothesis was also rejected 
meaning that the residuals are correlated across time within cities. For any given city in 
the sample, the best predictor for the value of its residual at time t is the value of its 
residual in the previous time period (time = t-1). The result of the violation is that the 
estimates for the coefficients are inefficient. To correct for violations of serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity a variance covariance matrix with robust standard errors was used 
to estimate the model in order to make the estimates more efficient and unbiased. 
Table 5.1: Central City Population Change Model Diagnostics 
Test Ho Statistics Result: Ho 
Hausman 
Random over Fixed 
Effects 
Χ2(15) = 18.35 
p = 0.24 
Not Rejected 
Breusch-Pagan Homoskedasticity 
Χ2(17) = 37.22 




No Serial Correlation 
Χ2(1) = 4.3 





F(5, 474) = 6.69 





Z = 3.44 
p = 0.001 
Rejected 
    
 
 The fourth and fifth diagnostic tests look for significant time-fixed effects and 
cross-sectional dependence. The Lagrange Multiplier tests the statistical significance of 
time, essentially looking to see if there are fixed effects in population change between 
1950 and 1960 that are different than between 1970 and 1980. The null hypothesis that 
there are no time-fixed effects was not rejected and so time-fixed effects are included in 
the model. Population change may trend upwards or downwards simply with the passage 
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of time and including the time-fixed effects wards off the impact of omitted variable bias 
and gives a degree of confidence that the explanatory power of variables in the model are 
wrongly assigned. The final diagnostic test, the Pesaran test for cross-sectional 
dependence looks to see if residuals are correlated within time periods across cities. For 
example there may have been significant events such as highway construction or riots in 
cities between 1960 and 1970 that cause residuals to be significantly lower or higher than 
in other time periods. The inclusion of time-fixed effects helps to avoid cross-sectional 
dependence and the null hypothesis was not rejected so it is not necessary to address. 
 The results of the population change model reveal an interesting though modest 
relationship with political fragmentation which can be seen in Figure 5.1 and Table A5.1 
in the appendix. Figure 5.1 plots the estimated coefficients with 95% confidence intervals 
extending in horizontal lines through each point. The lines that do not cross the vertical 
zero line indicate the variable is statistically significant in the estimated model. The 
percent of the metropolitan area living in the central city and the proportion of school 
districts to total governments in the metro area were statistically significant fragmentation 
measures. Percent African-American in central cities and location within the Sunbelt 
were the significant control variables. 
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Figure 5.1: Central Cities Ratio of Population Change Random Effects Model 




  To further explore the size and meaning of the significant variables, their 
predicted effect on population change is graphed. Figure 5.2 is a layered plot that shows 
the distribution of the percent of a metro area living in the central city in the shaded 
histogram with the first and third quartiles noted with vertical white lines. Plotted over 
the histogram is the predicted change in cities population ratio across the range of the 
cities’ share of the metro population. The actual values of the ratio of population change 
variable are shown and indicate that while holding all other variables at their median and 
year to 1970, as the percentage of a metropolitan area’s population living in the central 
city increases the model predicts the population change ratio would be greater than one, 
indicating a city’s population is increasing from the previous census year. The model 
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predicts that all else equal, cities in the first quartile which are cities that hold 16% of 
metro area population or less, would lose population from the previous census year. As 
cities remain population centers in their regions, their population tends to keep growing. 
Figure 5.2: Predicted Change in Population across the Range of the Percent 
Metropolitan Area Population Located in the Central City. The distribution of the 
percent of a metro area living in the central city is shown in the shaded histogram with 
the first and third quartiles noted with vertical white lines. Plotted over the histogram is 
the predicted change in cities population ratio across the range of the cities’ share of the 
metro population. The actual values of the ratio of population change variable are shown 
and indicate that while holding all other variables at their median and year to 1970, as the 
percentage of a metropolitan area’s population living in the central city increases the 
model predicts the population change ratio would be greater than one, indicating a city’s 
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 The second significant fragmentation measure on population change is the 
proportion of governments that are school districts. The predicted effect on population 
across the range of school district proportion is shown in Figure 5.3. This plot shows the 
distribution of proportion of total governments that are school districts in a metropolitan 
area in gray with the first and third quartiles marked with vertical white lines. The 
predicted population change ratio is superimposed with the 95% confidence interval 
across the range of the proportion school districts values. While the logged population 
change ratio is modeled, the actual values are shown in the plot to make interpretation 
more straightforward. With all other variables held at their median and the year set to 
1970, increasing the proportion of governments that are school districts is predicted to 
decrease central city population from the previous census year. While the slope of the 
line is positive, it does not cross the 1.0 threshold which would indicate population 
growth from the previous decade. Having a greater number of public school choices 
seems to be something that encourages families to leave central cities.  
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Figure 5.3: Predicted Population Change Ratio across the Range of Proportion 
School Districts of Total Governments in Metropolitan Areas. The distribution of the 
proportion of total governments that are school districts in a metropolitan area is shown 
in gray with the first and third quartiles marked with vertical white lines. The predicted 
population change ratio is superimposed with the 95% confidence interval across the 
range of the proportion school districts values. While the logged population change ratio 
is modeled, the actual values are shown in the plot to make interpretation more 
straightforward. With all other variables held at their median and the year set to 1970, 
increasing the proportion of governments that are school districts is predicted to decrease 
central city population from the previous census year. While the slope of the line is 
positive, it does not cross the 1.0 threshold which would indicate population growth from 
the previous decade.  
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 While fragmentation has a moderate impact on population change, it is significant 
and meaningful. A population change ratio presents a general picture of population, 
indicating only whether there is growth or decline and little information beyond that. For 
measures of horizontal fragmentation to be significant demonstrates that there is a 
relationship between the governing arrangements in a metropolitan area and city 
outcomes. The population change model also hints at the complexity of the relationship 
since not all measures of fragmentation reveal harmful effects on cities. This model finds 
that cities with greater shares of metropolitan area population are predicted to keep 
gaining population over time. However school districts have a harmful effect on central 
cities and as they represent a greater proportion of the governing mix, population is likely 
to decline. 
Dissimilarity and Political Fragmentation 
 The second model utilizes the Index of Dissimilarity between African-Americans 
and whites in the metropolitan area as the dependent variable. The index ranges from 0 to 
1 and values indicate the proportion of the population which would need to move in order 
for the metro area to achieve integration. The model is built on the same fragmentation 
and control variables as the population change model. Horizontal fragmentation was 
measured using the natural log of the percent of the metropolitan area's population 
residing in the central city, the proportion of school districts to total governments in the 
metro area, and the log of an indexed variable, the density of governments. Vertical 
fragmentation is measured using Berry's (2009) measure of jurisdictional overlap and 
internal fragmentation is measured as the number of elected officials within the central 
city per capita (10,000). The natural log of spatial fragmentation is also included as a 
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general measure of fragmentation. Measures in the central city for the percent African-
American, percent employed in manufacturing, the percent unemployed, and the percent 
of families in poverty are included as controls. 
 Table 5.2 shows the model diagnostics that informed my selection of the best 
fitting model for racial dissimilarity. The results of the Hausman test, which checks for 
the presence of statistically significant, city-specific time-invariant fixed effects not 
captured in the model (Wooldrige 2002) tests a null hypothesis of no city-specific effects. 
The null hypothesis was not rejected which means that a fixed-effects model is 
recommended. Using the fixed-effect model means that an estimated effect is figured for 
each city and included as a control in the model. The downside of including each city as 
control is the loss of degrees of freedom due to estimating an additional 100 coefficients. 
The upside is that this controls for statistically significant time-invariant differences 
between cities, i.e., institutionalized racism and segregation, history that matter more for 
the Index of Dissimilarity than for population density.   
Table 5.2: Black-White Dissimilarity Index Model Diagnostics 
Test Ho Statistics Result: Ho 
Hausman 
Random over Fixed 
Effects 
Χ2(15) = 2,422.59 
p = 0.000 
Rejected 
Breusch-Pagan Homoskedasticity 
Χ2(17) = 57.63 




No Serial Correlation 
Χ2(1) = 9.5 





F(5,440) = 55.75 
p = 0.00 
Rejected 
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 In this model the assumption of homoskedasticity was violated indicating that 
there was heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis of constant error variance was not 
rejected. The test for serial correlation was also violated and the null hypothesis was not 
rejected, meaning that the residuals are correlated across time within cities. For any given 
city in the sample, the best predictor for the value of its residual at time t is the value of 
its residual in the previous time period (time = t-1). The result of the violation is that the 
estimates for the coefficients are inefficient. To correct for violations of serial correlation 
and group-wise heteroskedasticity, a variance covariance matrix with robust standard 
errors was used to estimate the model in order to make the estimates more efficient. The 
Lagrange Multiplier tests a null hypothesis that there are no time-fixed effects was not 
accepted and so time-fixed effects are included in the model.  
 The results of the dissimilarity model are displayed in Figure 5.4 and are also 
shown in Table A5.2 in the appendix. The figure shows a plot of the coefficients with 
their confidence intervals as well as a vertical line at zero. Any variable whose 
confidence interval crosses through zero is not statistically significant. The percent of the 
metropolitan population in the central city, density of governments, proportion of school 
districts and percent African-American in the central city all have a positive and 
significant predicted effect on dissimilarity and percent employed in manufacturing in 
central cities has a significant negative effect on dissimilarity. 
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 To further explore the effect size and substantive interpretation of the significant 
fragmentation measures have on dissimilarity, a series of plots are used to examine the 
predicted effects. The impact of density of governments, which is an index of the number 
of governments per capita and the number of municipalities per capita, is the first 
significant variable to be examined. Figure 5.5 shows a plot of the distribution of the 
density of governments in metropolitan areas and the first and third quartiles of 
government density are shown with vertical white lines. Plotted over the histogram is the 
predicted dissimilarity score across the range of government density while holding all 
other variables at their median and the year set to 1970. All else equal, increasing the 
governments around a central city is predicted to increase the dissimilarity score for the 
entire metropolitan area. As density of governments increases from the 25th to 75th 
percentile, racial dissimilarity increases from 0.80 to 0.82. While the size of the effect 
may seem small, what is implied is that according to this model, the typical metropolitan 
area would need for 80% of its residents to move in order to achieve racial integration. 
Having a greater number of governments, particularly municipal governments seems to 
increase segregation in metropolitan areas.  
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Figure 5.5: Predicted Metropolitan Area Dissimilarity Index Score Across the 
Range of Government Density. Plotted is the distribution of the density of governments 
in metropolitan areas which is an indexed variable comprised of the number of 
governments per capita (10,000) and the number of municipalities per capita (10,000). 
The natural log of government density is modeled but the actual values are shown along 
with the first and third quartiles which are indicated by the vertical white lines. Plotted 
over the histogram is the predicted dissimilarity score across the range of government 
density while holding all other variables at their median and the year set to 1970. All else 
equal, increasing the governments around a central city is predicted to increase the 
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 The second significant fragmentation measure, the percent of a metropolitan area 
living in the central city, is also an indication of horizontal fragmentation and was 
significant in the population change model. Figure 5.6 shows a histogram of the percent 
metro area population living in the central city in gray with the first and third quartiles 
marked by vertical white lines. Plotted over the histogram is the predicted dissimilarity 
score across the range of the percent of metropolitan population living in the central city. 
All things equal, as a city’s share of the metropolitan area population increases, the 
predicted dissimilarity index score also increases. As the city's share of metropolitan area 
population increases from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, 16% to 54% of metro 
area population, dissimilarity increases from 0.80 to 0.82. As with governing density, this 
implies that the typical metropolitan area would need 80% of its population to move in 
order to achieve racial integration between African-American and white residents. Also 
noteworthy is that while holding all things constant, the model predicts metropolitan 
areas to be highly segregated as indicated by the range of dissimilarity in Figure 5.6 
(0.79 - 0.85) and this is consistent with the effect of governing density on dissimilarity. 
Since the data is aggregated at the metropolitan level it is not possible to say where 
within the region minorities are residing but studies such as those done by Orfield (2002) 
suggest that in a typical metro area minorities reside primarily in the central city and 
inner-ring suburbs. Cities which have a greater share of metropolitan population seem to 
have more regional segregation . 
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Figure 5.6: Predicted Metropolitan Area Dissimilarity Score Across the Range of 
the Percent of a Metropolitan Area in Central City. A histogram of the percent metro 
area population living in the central city is shown in gray with the first and third quartiles 
marked by vertical white lines. Plotted over the histogram is the predicted dissimilarity 
score across the range of the percent of metropolitan population living in the central city. 
All things equal, as a city’s share of the metropolitan area population increases, the 
predicted dissimilarity index score also increases. 
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 The third and final significant fragmentation measure on dissimilarity is the 
proportion of school districts of total governments in a metropolitan area. Figure 5.7 
shows a histogram of proportion of school districts of total governments in metropolitan 
areas with the first and third quartiles denoted with vertical white lines. Overlaid the 
histogram is the predicted dissimilarity score across the range of proportion school 
districts holding all other variables at their medians and year set to 1970. The 95% 
confidence interval is shown by the dashed lines. All things equal, increasing the 
proportion of school districts in a metropolitan area is predicted to increase the 
dissimilarity index score for the metro area. As the proportion of governments in a metro 
area that are school districts increases from the 25th (0.12) to the 75th percentile (0.28), 
dissimilarity increases from 0.80 to 0.82 across the metro. The impact of school districts 
on racial segregation suggests that it is not just the number of governments in a 
metropolitan area that matters, but also the types of government. In this case of this 
model, having more school districts in relation to other governments, increases 
segregation which is troubling given evidence that school segregation drives disparate 
outcomes in student achievement (Condron, Tope, Steidl, Freeman 2013). Having more 
school districts in a metropolitan area increases the amount of segregation in that region.  
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Figure 5.7: Predicted Metropolitan Area Dissimilarity Index Score Across the 
Range of the Proportion of School Districts to Total Governments. Plotted is a 
histogram of proportion of school districts of total governments in metropolitan areas 
with the first and third quartiles denoted with vertical white lines. Overlaid the histogram 
is the predicted dissimilarity score across the range of proportion school districts holding 
all other variables at their medians and year set to 1970. The 95% confidence interval is 
shown by the dashed lines. All things equal, increasing the proportion of school districts 
in a metropolitan area is predicted to increase the dissimilarity index score for the metro 
area.  
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Own-Source Revenue and Political Fragmentation 
 The third model considered the impact of political fragmentation on own-source 
revenue in central cities. Own-source revenue is an indication of the revenue generating 
power of cities from their own tax and fee collection and reflects the general tax burden 
born by residents. The values are per capita and CPI adjusted to year 2000 dollars, the 
median value is $984 but the standard deviation is $1,006. The data is skewed right 
which is common for income measures. The natural log of own-source revenue was used 
as the dependent variable in this model and the transformation created a normalized 
distribution with a mean value of 6.85 and a standard deviation of 0.7. Determining the 
best model fit was the same for the previous models and the results of the tests are shown 
in Table 5.3. The first diagnostic test was the Hausman and the results supported using 
the fixed-effects model over the random effects. The Breusch-Pagan test looks for 
homoskedasticity and in this model the null hypothesis was not rejected, meaning that 
this model did not violate the assumption of constant variance in the standard errors. 
Table 5.3: Own-Source Revenue Model Diagnostics 
Test Ho Statistics Result: Ho 
Hausman 
Random over Fixed 
Effects 
Χ2(17) = 107.37 
p = 0.000 
Rejected 
Breusch-Pagan Homoskedasticity 
Χ2(19) = 29.03 




No Serial Correlation 
Χ2(1) = 0.17.86 





F(5,469) = 45.81 





Z = -0.9 
p = 0.37 
Not Rejected 
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 The third diagnostic test, the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test looks for serial 
correlation in the residuals and for this model the null hypothesis was not accepted 
meaning that for any given city, the best predictor for its residual at time t is the residual 
in the previous time period (time = t-1). To improve the statistical efficiency of the 
estimated coefficients a variance covariance matrix was estimated to make the estimates 
more efficient. The last two diagnostic tests consider the effects of time and in the case of 
the Lagrange Multiplier test the effect is significant. This indicates there are significant 
differences across the time periods and so time-fixed effects are included in the own-
source revenue model. The final diagnostic, the Pesaran test, looks for cross-sectional 
dependence which if present would mean that the residuals are correlated within time 
periods across the cities. The null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence was not 
rejected so within time correlations are not a problem at this time. 
 The results of political fragmentation and own-source revenue are presented in 
Figure 5.8 and also shown in Table A5.3. Figure 5.14 plots the coefficients as points with 
their 95 percent confidence intervals as horizontal lines extending through them. In this 
model the statistically significant variables are ones that do not cross the vertical line at 
zero. The percent of the metropolitan area residing in the city limits has a negative effect 
on own-source revenue whereas jurisdictional overlap, the proportion of the metropolitan 
area that is municipalities, the elected official per capita in central cities, the percent 
African-American, the percent employed in manufacturing, and median family income in 
central cities are all positive.   
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Figure 5.8: Own-Source Revenue Fixed-Effects Model Results 
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 To further explore the effect size and substantive interpretation of the significant 
fragmentation measures on own-source revenue, a series of plots are used to examine the 
predicted effects. Figure 5.9 is the first of the four significant fragmentation measures and 
shows the distribution of the percent of metropolitan areas living in central city with the 
first and third quartiles noted with white vertical lines. Plotted over the histogram is the 
predicted own-source revenue score for the metropolitan area across the range of percent 
metropolitan area in the central city. The 95% confidence interval is shown by the dashed 
lines. All things equal, increasing the city's share of the metropolitan area population 
decreases the own-source revenue for the central city. As the city's share of population 
moves from the 25th to the 75th percentile, 16% to 54% of metro area population own-
source revenue is predicted to decrease from $846 dollars per capita to $799. Essentially 
the more individuals who live in the central city, the model predicts would experience 
less of a tax burden than cities with a smaller share of the population. Cities that have a 
greater share of the metropolitan population have a smaller own-source revenue per 
capita, meaning that city residents pay less in taxes. 
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Figure 5.9: Predicted Own-Source Revenue Across the Range of Percent of 
Metropolitan Area in Central City. The graph shows the distribution of the percent of 
metropolitan areas living in central city with the first and third quartiles noted with white 
vertical lines. Plotted over the histogram is the predicted own-source revenue score for 
the metropolitan area across the range of percent metropolitan area in the central city. 
The 95% confidence interval is shown by the dashed lines. The log of own-source 
revenue is used in the model but actual dollar values are shown. All things equal, 
increasing the city's share of the metropolitan area population decreases the own-source 




Cities Awash in a Sea of Governments   
174  Chapter 5  
  The next significant fragmentation measure considered is the proportion of total 
governments in a metro area which are municipalities. Figure 5.10 shows in gray a 
histogram of the proportion of municipal governments of total governments in the metro 
area with the first and third quartiles marked with vertical white lines. Drawn over this is 
the predicted own-source revenue across the range of the municipality's proportion of 
total governments while holding all other variables at their medians and year set to 1970. 
In the model both own-source revenue and municipalities are logged but what is shown is 
actual values. All things equal increasing the proportion of municipal governments to all 
other governments in a metropolitan area increases the central city's own-source revenue. 
As the proportion of municipalities increases from the 25th percentile (0.11) to the 75th 
percentile (0.27) revenues are predicted to increase from $784 to $855 per capita. This is 
evidence that the governing arrangements around a central city, particularly at the 
municipal level, have a direct impact on the city. What is suggested by the relationship 
here, is that it costs more for city residents - they bear a higher tax burden - when the 
surrounding metropolitan area has a higher proportion of municipalities to total 
governments. Cities surrounded by more municipal governments may need to levy higher 
taxes to increase their own-source revenues.    
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Figure 5.10: Predicted Central City Own-Source Revenue Across the Range of the 
Proportion Municipal Governments of Total Governments in Metropolitan Areas. 
The plot shows in gray a histogram of the proportion of municipal governments of total 
governments in the metro area with the first and third quartiles marked with vertical 
white lines. Drawn over this is the predicted own-source revenue across the range of the 
municipality's proportion of total governments while holding all other variables at their 
medians and year set to 1970. In the model both own-source revenue and municipalities 
are logged but what is shown is the actual values. shown are actual values. All things 
equal increasing the proportion of municipal governments to all other governments in a 
metropolitan area increases the central city's own-source revenue.
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 The next fragmentation measure to have a significant relationship with own-
source revenue is the number of elected officials per capita in the central city. This is the 
first and only model where this variable was significant. Figure 5.11 shows a histogram 
of the distribution of the number of elected officials per capita in gray with the first and 
third quartiles noted by the vertical white lines. Overlaid is the predicted own-source 
revenue across the range of elected officials per capita with the 95% confidence interval. 
The log of city own-source revenue is modeled but the actual dollar values are shown. 
Holding all other variables at their medians and year set to 1970, increasing the number 
of elected officials per capita in the central city is predicted to increase its own-source 
revenue. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the number of elected officials 
per 10,000 residents is predicted to increase own-source revenue from $792 to $883 per 
capita. Implied here is that cities with fewer elected officials will have a lower tax 
burden. The impact of elected officials on city outcomes is a relatively understudied 
measure of fragmentation and this model suggests that it is an area worth further 
investigation. Cities with more elected officials seem to have a higher tax burden per 
capita. 
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Figure 5.11: Predicted Own-Source Revenue Across the Range of Elected Officials 
per Capita (10,000) in Central Cities. A histogram showing the distribution of the 
number of elected officials per capita is shown in gray with the first and third quartiles 
noted by the vertical white lines. Overlaid is the predicted own-source revenue across the 
range of elected officials per capita with the 95% confidence interval. The log of city 
own-source revenue is modeled but the actual dollar values are shown. Holding all other 
variables at their medians and year set to 1970, increasing the number of elected officials 
per capita in the central city is predicted to increase its own-source revenue.
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 The final significant fragmentation measure is jurisdictional overlap which is the 
variable based off of the work of Berry (2009) and aims to isolate the impact of vertical 
fragmentation on own-source revenue. The plot in Figure 5.12 shows a histogram of the 
distribution of jurisdictional overlap in metro areas with its first and third quartiles noted 
by white vertical lines. Superimposed is the predicted own-source revenue across the 
range of jurisdictional overlap with the 95% confidence interval. Own-source revenue 
and jurisdictional overlap are both modeled using their natural log but actual values for 
these variables are shown in the graph. Holding all other variables to their medians and 
year set to 1970 increasing the amount of jurisdictional overlap in a metropolitan area 
increases the own-source revenue for the central city. As jurisdictional overlap increases 
from the 25th (1.6) to the 75th (4.2) percentile, own-source revenue is predicted to 
increase from $802 to $850 per capita. This finding is in-line with Berry's, though his 
work was at the county level, and this further suggests that the governing arrangements 
and the levels and types of fragmentation that exist in a metropolitan area matter and 
have a direct impact on the central city. In this case, the model suggests that all else 
equal, city residents have a higher tax burden in regions where there is greater levels of 
vertical fragmentation. Residents appear to have to pay more in taxes for living in the 
central city when there is greater amounts of vertical fragmentation in the region. 
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Figure 5.12: Predicted Own-Source Revenue in Central Cities Across the Range of 
Jurisdictional Overlap in Metropolitan Areas. The plot shows a histogram of the 
distribution of jurisdictional overlap in metro areas with its first and third quartiles noted 
by white vertical lines. Superimposed is the predicted own-source revenue across the 
range of jurisdictional overlap with the 95% confidence interval. Own-source revenue 
and jurisdictional overlap are both modeled using their natural log but actual values for 
these variables are shown in the graph. Holding all other variables to their medians and 
year set to 1970 increasing the amount of jurisdictional overlap in a metropolitan area 
increases the own-source revenue for the central city. 
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Summary 
 Overall the model results are in line with many of the hypotheses proposed at the 
start of the chapter, but there were also some unexpected results. Three models were 
estimated to investigate the impact of political fragmentation (horizontal, vertical and 
internal) on central city population change, black-white dissimilarity across the 
metropolitan area and own-source revenue for the central city. A fourth model was also 
estimated for black-white isolation across the metro area but the results were minimal and 
are presented in the following appendix.  
 The first hypothesis considered the impact of horizontal fragmentation on 
population change in central cities over time. Though most of the fragmentation 
indicators were not significant, the proportion of school districts of total governments in a 
metropolitan area and the percent of the metro population in the central city did impact 
whether city populations change. Cities that had a larger share of the region's population 
were predicted to grow in population from the previous census year. The proportion of 
school districts to other governments has a negative effect on population change. The 
model predicts that cities would lose population between census years as the proportion 
of school districts increases. This supports the hypothesis and is evidence that horizontal 
fragmentation in the metropolitan area does impact the central city.    
 The second hypothesis considered the impact of segregation and political 
fragmentation. Horizontal fragmentation was expected to increase segregation between 
African-Americans and whites within metropolitan areas and the model estimated 
confirmed this. The government density index and the proportion school districts are two 
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measures of horizontal fragmentation that had a significant and positive impact on 
segregation. Metropolitan areas where there were more governments and where school 
districts made up a higher proportion of total governments also had higher levels of 
segregation. These results are troubling because, while minorities are no longer only 
concentrated in a region's core city, the results indicate that at least for the metropolitan 
areas in this sample, governments, particularly school districts are racial dividing lines.   
 The third hypothesis considered the impact of vertical fragmentation, measured as 
jurisdictional overlap, on central city own-source revenue. The results of the own-source 
revenue model are in line with work by Berry (2009) and reveal that the governing 
arrangements surrounding a central city do have an impact on the tax burden borne by 
city residents. Jurisdictional overlap was a positive and significant factor in own-source 
revenue, which is the income brought in to city coffers through  taxes and fees. An 
unexpected finding was the relationship between the proportion of municipal 
governments in the metropolitan area and central city own-source revenues. Cities which 
have higher numbers of municipalities relative to other governments were shown to have 
higher own-source revenue. In other words, city residents are predicted to have a higher 
tax burden as the proportion of municipal governments increases. This shows that not 
only does horizontal fragmentation impact the central city, but vertical fragmentation in 
metropolitan areas does as well. 
 The last hypothesis looked at the role of internal fragmentation on city outcomes. 
In the population change and segregation models internal fragmentation was not 
significant. However, the own-source revenue model did show a significant relationship. 
As the number of elected officials increases in the central city, so too does the tax burden 
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for city residents. The role of elected officials on city revenues has not been widely 
examined but fits within a broader narrative that better, more efficient governments have 
fewer elected officials per capita and that older, less progressive city governments would 
have more elected officials. The findings in this model suggest that there is a direct and 
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Appendix: Chapter 5 
Racial Isolation and Political Fragmentation 
 A fourth model examining the relationship between political fragmentation and 
racial isolation was also estimated but the results did not yield much and so are presented 
here within the Appendix. The Isolation Index between African-Americans and whites at 
the metropolitan level (and unlike the dissimilarity index which considers the degree to 
separation between the races), the Isolation Index measures the amount of exposure one 
group has to only members of the same group (Massey and Denton 1988, 288). The index 
ranges from 0 - 1 where 0 is no exposure to others outside of your racial group and 1 is 
perfect exposure to others of another race. The exposure of African-Americans to white 
residents considers the degree of possible contact or interaction between the racial groups 
and the same group of political fragmentation variables are modeled to estimate their 
ability to predict levels of isolation. In addition variables controlling for the percent 
African-American, percent employed in manufacturing, percent unemployed, percent of 
families in poverty, median family income in central cities and the proportion of 
municipalities to other governments are included.
16
 
 The same cadre of diagnostic tests are used to evaluate model fit for racial 
isolation. Table A5.1 shows the model diagnostics that informed my selection of the best 
fitting model for racial isolation. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test was not 
accepted which means that a fixed-effects model is recommended. Using the fixed-effect 
model means that an estimated effect for each city is included as a control in the model. 
The second and third tests are designed to test assumptions about the behavior of 
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residuals in longitudinal models. The Breusch-Pagan null hypothesis tests for constant 
error variance or homoskedasticity in the residuals. In this model the assumption of 
homoskedasticity was violated indicating that there was heteroskedasticity which means 
the standard errors for the coefficients are biased downwards, leading to ascribing 
statistical significance to variables that are not significant (Wooldridge 2002). In the third 
test, the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation, the null hypothesis was 
not rejected meaning that the residuals are not correlated across time within cities. To 
correct for violations of heteroskedasticity a variance covariance matrix with robust 
standard errors was used to estimate the model in order to make the estimates more 
efficient. 
Table A5.1: Isolation Index Model Diagnostics 
Test Ho Statistics Result: Ho 
Hausman 
Random over Fixed 
Effects 
Χ2(16) = 85.75 
p = 0.000 
Rejected 
Breusch-Pagan Homoskedasticity 
Χ2(18) = 51.37 




No Serial Correlation 
Χ2(1) = 1.31 





F(-) = -- 





Z = -- 
p = -- 
-- 
    
 
 The fourth diagnostic tests look for significant time-fixed effects. The Lagrange 
Multiplier's null hypothesis is that there are no time-fixed effects and this was not 
rejected. To account for time-fixed effects dummy a factor variable for time is included 
in the model. The final diagnostic test, the Pesaran test of cross-sectional dependence 
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looks to see if residuals are correlated within time periods across cities. The inclusion of 
time-fixed effects helps to avoid cross-sectional dependence and the null hypothesis for 
the Pesaran test was not rejected.  
 Figure A5.1 plots the estimated coefficients with their confidence intervals and 
Table A5.2 shows the coefficient values with their standard error and model fit statistics. 
Lagging the independent variables on racial isolation was found to produce the more 
efficient estimates and model fit. Using the lag of a variable allows us to see the predicted 
effect of racial isolation based off of the previous census decade's data. The downside to 
lagging variables is the loss of observations, in this case 100 observations are dropped 
and prediction for isolation begin with 1960 and go through 2000. Like dissimilarity, the 
isolation index is a residential measure and population shifts, such as racial sorting along 
residential boundaries, may take additional time before their effect is significant. For the 
coefficients plotted on Figure A5.1, any variable whose confidence interval crosses 
through zero is not statistically significant. In this model the lagged log of the density of 
governments and the lag for percent unemployed in the central city have a positive and 
significant impact on racial isolation. The lag for percent employed in manufacturing in 
central cities has a significant negative effect on isolation. 
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Figure A5.1: Fixed-Effects Model Results for Black-White Isolation Index with 
Lagged Independent Variables  
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Table A5.2: Black-White Isolation Index with Lagged Independent Variables Fixed-
Effects Model Results 
(Dependent Variable = Black-White Isolation Index) 
Model  
Lagged % Metro Pop in City (log) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Lagged Density of Governments (log) 
0.44*** 
(0.008) 
Lagged School Districts 
0.11 
(0.4) 
Lagged Jurisdictional Overlap (log) 
0.152 
(0.116) 
Lagged Elected Officials per Capita 
0.098 
(0.091) 
Lagged Spatial Fragmentation (log) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
Lagged % African-American 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
Lagged % Manufacturing 
-.012* 
(0.006) 
Lagged % Unemployed 
0.045** 
(0.014) 
Lagged % Families in Poverty 
-0.001 
(0.001) 










F(15, 382) 39.01 
p < F 0.000 
N 497 (i = 100, t = 4-5) 
          Time-fixed effects significant and negative (not shown). 
           *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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 Density of governments is measured by indexing the total number of governments 
per capita and the number of municipalities per capita for each metropolitan area. The 
coefficient value of 0.44 shows that increasing government density in year one is 
predicted to increase isolation between African-Americans and white residents in the 
following census year. This supports the hypothesis that racial isolation is residentially 
driven and that horizontal political fragmentation that increases residential choice 
decreases the exposure of African-Americans to whites. Increases in the number of 
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Table A5.3: Central City Population Change Model Results for Random Effects 
with Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Robust Standard Errors 
(Dependent Variable = Percent Population Change in Central Cities, 
natural log) 
Model  
Density of Governments (log) 
0.02 
(0.02) 






Jurisdictional Overlap (log) 
0.004 
(0.01)  
Elected Officials per Capita 
-0.012 
(0.012) 

























F(17, 571) 24.83 
p < F 0.00 
N 589 (i = 100, t = 4-6) 
      Time-fixed effects significant and negative (not shown). 
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Table A5.4: Black-White Dissimilarity Index Fixed-Effects Model Results  
(Dependent Variable = Black-White Dissimilarity Index) 
Model  
% Metro Pop in City (log) 
0.001* 
(0.0003) 






Jurisdictional Overlap (log) 
-0.011 
(0.01) 
Elected Officials per Capita 
0.028 
(0.018) 



















F(15, 442) 64.81 
p < F 0.000 
N 557 (i = 100, t = 2-6) 
          Time-fixed effects significant 1960 and 1970 are positive; 1980-2000 are negative     
          (not shown). 
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Table A5.5: Own-Source Revenue Fixed-Effects Model Results 
(Dependent Variable = Own-Source Revenue, natural log) 
Model  
% Metro Pop in City (log) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 












Elected Officials per Capita 
0.214*** 
(0.051) 












% Families in Poverty 
-0.0008 
(0.001) 







F(19, 566) 200.52 
p < F 0.000 
N 586 (i = 100, t = 5-6) 
          Time-fixed effects significant and positive (not shown). 
          *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure A5.2: Variance Inflation Factor for Population Density, Dissimilarity Index, 
Racial Isolation Index and Own-Source Revenue Models. The dotted line represents a 





                                                          
16
 The measurements of median family income and proportion of municipalities of total 
government were not included in the population density and racial dissimilarity models 
due to high variance inflation factor scores. Figure 5.5 shows the spread of VIF scores 
across all four models. 
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Notes for Chapter 5 
1
 Rustbelt cities and states: Bridgeport, Connecticut; Hartford, CT; New Haven, CT; 
Chicago, Illinois; Peoria, IL; Evansville, Indiana; Fort Wayne, IN; Gary, IN; 
Indianapolis, IN; South Bend, IN; Des Moines, Iowa; Boston, Massachusetts; Cambridge, 
MA; Fall River, MA; New Bedford, MA; Springfield, MA; Worcester, MA; Detroit, 
Michigan; Flint, MI; Grand Rapids, MI; Minneapolis, Minnesota; St. Paul, MN; St. 
Louis, Missouri; Omaha, Nebraska; Camden, New Jersey; Elizabeth, NJ; Newark, NJ; 
Paterson, NJ; Trenton, NJ; Albany, New York; Buffalo, NY; New York, NY; Rochester, 
NY; Syracuse, NY; Yonkers, NY; Akron, Ohio; Canton, OH; Cincinnati, OH; Cleveland, 
OH; Columbus, OH; Dayton, OH; Toledo, OH; Youngstown, OH; Allentown, 
Pennsylvania; Erie, PA; Philadelphia, PA; Pittsburgh, PA; Reading, PA; Scranton, PA; 
Providence, Rhode Island; Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Sunbelt cities and states: Birmingham, 
Alabama; Mobile, AL; Montgomery, AL; Phoenix, Arizona; Berkeley, California; Long 
Beach, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Oakland, CA; Sacramento, CA; San Diego, CA; San 
Francisco, CA; Jacksonville, Florida; Miami, FL; Tampa, FL; Atlanta, Georgia; 
Savannah, GA; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; New Orleans, LA; Shreveport, LA; Charlotte, 
North Carolina; Austin, Texas; Corpus Christi, TX; Dallas, TX; El Paso, TX; Fort Worth, 
TX; Houston, TX; San Antonio, TX.
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Chapter 6 
Metropolitan Areas as Communities 
Metropolitan growth in America means that cities have developed multiple 
identities over the last century. For example Houston is a municipality that covers 
roughly 580 square miles and has a population of 1.9 million as of the 2000 U.S. Census, 
but it is also a metropolitan area spanning 7,700 square miles and is home to over 4.7 
million people residing in 130 municipalities. Sixty years ago if a resident of Houston 
told someone he was from Houston, Texas that person would probably assume he meant 
the city of Houston, a place with a specific municipal boundary.  Today it is common to 
state the city as the place one is from, while not actually living within the city boundaries. 
For instance, a person may say he is from Houston but live in the community of Katy, 
Texas, a municipality with over 13,000 residents, its own fire and police departments, 
grocery stores, public schools, a mall, animal control, a publically elected mayor, and city 
government; a complete city in its own right. While Katy, Texas is legally its own city 
because of its proximity to the City of Houston, both in terms of distance and economic 
activity, it belongs to the metropolitan area of Houston and its fortunes are tied to the 
successes and failures of both the city of Houston as well as the greater region.  
 Suburban communities like Katy represent what is deplorable in the eyes of critics 
like Lowi (1979), who argue that they approach cities as a good to be consumed.  
However Katy, Texas lauds itself as the best of both worlds, offering small town charm 
with big city convenience. This represents something that is highly desirable to 
residential consumers, a chance to escape some of the perceived worst aspects of city 
living, like poverty, congested streets, dirt, noise, pollution, crime and live in a single-
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family detached home, in a safe, clean neighborhood in a good school district. In order to 
create idyllic suburban communities the geographic space is divided into distinct political 
entities which manage and oversee service delivery. In other words, across metropolitan 
areas, political fragmentation is the modus operandi to create governments and areas like 
Katy, Texas.   
 Scholars of urban America are divided over whether the governing arrangements 
in metropolitan areas represent a success story of democratic choice of where to live and 
conduct business, or if they represent a type of exploitation of city resources that fosters 
myopic vision among elected leaders who may resist collaboration or regional problem 
solving. Among the multitude of reasons public officials, journalists and scholars point to 
for why cities or regions struggle, political fragmentation makes a regular appearance. 
There are sharp divisions over whether the numbers of governments in a region represent 
a potential threat to progress, or if municipal boundaries should be dissolved and as 
proponents of reform call for, a unified, metropolitan-wide regional government be 
established. Creating a regional government or even getting local actors to agree to a 
regional policy plan has been historically and currently difficult (Nelles 2013). 
Recap of the Study  
 Whether or not political fragmentation is harmful to cities is an empirical question 
and the heart of this study. In order to answer this question political fragmentation was 
carefully defined and measured in 100 cities and their metropolitan areas from 1950 
through 2000. Fragmentation is categorized in this study into three components: 
horizontal, vertical and internal fragmentation. Horizontal fragmentation is the 
proliferation of coterminous governments of the same type across the metropolitan area. 
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Municipal governments are a common manifestation of this as they do not overlap 
geographically. Vertical fragmentation occurs when governing units do intersect with 
other governments. This is common among special districts which may only cover certain 
portions of a metropolitan area and not align neatly with municipal borders. Internal 
fragmentation is the division of political power among elected officials within a unit of 
government and for the purposes of this study was limited to the central cities. These 
components of political fragmentation were modeled against three outcome measures, 
metropolitan-wide segregation, population change and own-source revenue. These 
outcomes were chosen based off scholarly evidence as critical factors for a city and its 
region's growth or decline.  
 The results of the analyses reveal that political fragmentation is a complex but 
influential component to city health and how cities and their regions relate to each other.  
Analysis of own-source revenue, which represents the tax burden of city residents, 
reveals that they pay more in taxes for living in the central city when there are greater 
amounts of vertical fragmentation in the region. Cities with more elected officials seem to 
have a higher tax burden per capita as well. It was also found that cities surrounded by 
more municipal governments may need to levy higher taxes to increase their own-source 
revenues. However, cities that have a greater share of the metropolitan population have 
smaller own-source revenue per capita, meaning that city residents pay less in taxes.  
The analysis of racial segregation across the metropolitan area shows that having 
more school districts increases segregation in that region. Having a greater number of 
governments, particularly municipal governments, seems to increase segregation in 
metropolitan areas. Cities which have a greater share of metropolitan population seem to 
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have more regional segregation. The impact of political fragmentation on segregation is 
currently a somewhat understudied area of research and this project serves to continue the 
dialogue. The population change model reveals that having a greater number of public 
school choices seems to be something that encourages families to leave central cities. 
However, as cities remain population centers of their regions, their population tend to 
keep growing. 
Future Research and Parting Thoughts 
 Over the course of this research, one of the striking aspects of metropolitan 
governance which came to light is the role political fragmentation plays in creating 
regions where local governments and local officials take on an individualistic point of 
view. I argue that this perspective is fostered by those who argue for government 
consolidation to be replaced with regional government and those who see the 
proliferation of government as a public good, offering greater variation in choice to 
residents. Both viewpoints cast issues of government and governance in an “us” versus 
“them” mindset where one side essentially calls for reform because of problems caused 
by what others have done, while the opposing side resists because cooperation or 
consolidation would risk loss of political identity and control of assets. These lines of 
argument create a seemingly large cavern between the sides. A possible bridge could be 
built by shifting the conversation away from “us” and “them” to nurturing a collective 
metropolitan consciousness.    
 The work of Elinor Ostrom demonstrates that communities with a common 
interest or use of a common resource can work together to solve scarcity issues even in 
the absence of formal, centralized governments. The collaboration can not only be 
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achieved across disparate actors but be maintained and nurtured over time (Ostrom 
1990). Theoretically, collective action has potential to guide future research and policy 
for metropolitan areas. The population and economic activity of metropolitan areas can 
represent a collective good. The strains of this are already present in the approach of 
special district creation to capture potential tax revenue in order to provide services and 
in metropolitan planning organizations to craft policy solutions for transportation and 
environmental monitoring. What is lacking or underdeveloped, is the residential and 
business collective conscience, the idea that people belong to not just a local government 
but also to a region and their individual actions taken together have impacts that are felt 
far beyond their local border. Practically speaking raising the collective awareness of a 
region may improve chances for government consolidation, or it may provide political 
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